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Reflections on the Quarter

The Removal of Chairman Khrushchev

A PRECISE assessment of the causes of Nikita S. Khrushchev's ouster on October 15 as Premier and First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union eludes even the most astute Western observer. Several differences, however, clearly distinguished the rule of Khrushchev from that of his predecessor Stalin.

Chairman Khrushchev's power was never so absolute as Stalin's had been: his mandate appeared to derive from the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Party. Even though he had packed both chambers with his own supporters, Khrushchev, unlike his predecessor, had apparently to defend his policies in the Presidium against opposing views. The failure of Soviet agriculture, the inability of Moscow to maintain unity within the international communist movement, and the loss of prestige suffered by the Soviet Communist Party in its relations with other communist parties must have made Khrushchev increasingly vulnerable to criticism within the Presidium.

To many of the economic problems facing the Soviet Union Khrushchev sought pragmatic, "revisionist" and often contradictory solutions. Over the years he placed increasing emphasis on consumer goods production, while still trying to retain as a priority the expansion of heavy industry. He embarked upon a program designed to increase housing in the Soviet Union. In agriculture, Khrushchev introduced a series of changes, including the abandonment of the Virgin Lands program, begun under his own auspices, in favor of the intensive application of chemical fertilizers.

Khrushchev's campaign to effect changes in the Soviet economy culminated in debate about the so-called Liberman proposals. With their emphasis upon the profit motive and the introduction of supply and demand factors, the ideas of Professor Yevsey G. Liberman (Kharkov University), if adopted, might have produced important changes in the hitherto centralized Soviet economy controlled by the Party and the governmental bureaucracy. The experiment in "Libermanism" had already begun in two plants manufacturing garments. Earlier this year Liberman had indicated that his system was soon to be adopted generally in Soviet light industry.

Perhaps some of his colleagues saw in Khrushchev's economic innovations a potential challenge to their influence. After almost half a century in power, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has developed vested interests which can probably only be safeguarded so

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long as the Party remains in absolute control of Soviet economic, as well as political, affairs.

Khrushchev's "pragmatism" in the management of relations among the world's communist parties may have provided a source of discomfort to high ranking Party members in the Soviet Union. He appeared unable or unwilling to heal the rift between Moscow and Peking, or even between Moscow and Bucharest. The meeting of twenty-six communist parties, scheduled by Khrushchev for December 15 in order to prepare for an All-Party Congress sometime in 1965, was regarded by most of the world's communist parties (especially those in Western Europe) as singularly inopportune. In fact, only eleven parties had agreed to attend this meeting before Khrushchev's dismissal.

Reacting to Peking's recent success in winning some of the formerly pro-Soviet parties over to its side and creating factionalism in several others, and to Peking's efforts—abetted by the communists of New Zealand—to create a Fifth International, Khrushchev may have envisaged the proposed December meeting as an opportunity to bolster Soviet influence in the world communist movement. He may have reasoned that the only way to reduce Chinese influence in the world communist movement was to expel Peking. Khrushchev appears to have contemplated the creation of another "Communist International" in which the Soviets could reassert their control of the movement.

This latter plan the parties of Western Europe rejected. Even for those parties most solidly in the Soviet camp the thought of another Communist International must have been repugnant. Indeed, to many communist parties within and outside the bloc, the quarrel between Moscow and Peking could not have been altogether unwelcome. Khrushchev had granted to the leaders of the East European communist states a degree of freedom unknown in Stalin's day. In return he received their voluntary, if not unqualified, support for his major foreign policies, particularly in his quarrel with the Chinese and his (related) emphasis on peaceful coexistence.

To the communist parties outside the communist world, he appeared capable neither of bestowing or denying the right to choose between Moscow and Peking. The status of the Soviet Communist Party had declined apparently from that of unquestioned leader of international communism to that of *primus inter pares* as Khrushchev progressively yielded to the demands of other communist parties in order to gain their support in his quarrel with Peking. His handling of this dispute appears to have been a source of embarrassment and concern to his colleagues. *Pravda's* criticism of Khrushchev after his removal no doubt reflected dissatisfaction within the Soviet Communist Party with his policies toward other communist parties.

In the light of these events, it is not surprising, in retrospect, that the enthusiasm of Khrush-

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chev's erstwhile supporters gradually changed to opposition during the months preceding his ouster. It is unlikely that Brezhnev's sudden ascent in the Soviet hierarchy as Khrushchev's first assistant in the Secretariat was the First Secretary's own doing. Reportedly, Khrushchev had attempted, without success, to promote his son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, then editor of *Izvestia,* to membership in the Secretariat.

Khrushchev's removal appears to have been engineered by those of his colleagues who feared that his continuation in power was detrimental to the Party at home as well as injurious to the Soviet Union in its dealings with other communist parties and Moscow's principal adversaries in the West. The coup was timely, for Khrushchev had planned to introduce new proposals in November, curtailing the authority of central planners. Consequently members of key bureaucracies appear to have united temporarily in opposition to what Soviet sources termed Khrushchev's "harebrained scheming."

The military, seemingly, gave tacit approval to the removal of Khrushchev. However, the subsequent rise of two KGB stalwarts, Shelepin and Semichastny, respectively past and present chiefs of the secret police, suggests that this Soviet security organization may have played a part in effecting the governmental changes of October. Shelepin was promoted to full membership in the Presidium and Semichastny has become a member of the Central Committee. In the months before Khrushchev's dismissal, the KGB may have acted contrary to the ex-Premier's wishes in the mustard gas attack against a West German expert on monitoring devices who was working in the Federal Republic's Moscow embassy. Such action was ill-timed in the light of preparations for Khrushchev's visit to Bonn, which the KGB may have opposed. Furthermore, the security organization had violated diplomatic courtesy in the drugging and detention of four U.S. military attachés.

The memory of the reign of terror organized by former KGB chief Beria still lingers in the Soviet Union. Hence the elevation of persons associated with the secret police, whether or not as a reward for the deposing of Khrushchev, gives rise undoubtedly to apprehension among the Soviet people. Moreover, there appears to have been a strengthening of Party control over the army. General Yepishev, chief of the Politprau, an organizational device for assuring communist control over the armed forces, has risen in the CPSU. Although only a general, Yepishev now ranks fourth in the Soviet military hierarchy, ahead of the marshals who head the major Soviet commands. Conceivably, Yepishev, like Shelepin and Semichastny, has been compensated in this manner for his role in smoothing the way for Khrushchev's ouster.

Whatever his shortcomings, under Khrushchev's leadership the Soviet Union had taken great strides in science and technology. The Soviets, moreover, had under-

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taken new programs in Asia, Africa and Latin American regions in which the Soviet Union, during Stalin's time, had relatively little interest. Khrushchev had raised and lowered tensions in Berlin, Cuba, the Congo and the Middle East.

It is likely that the Soviet Union will mark time in foreign policy in the period immediately ahead until the contest for power in the Kremlin is resolved. Efforts will continue, however, to outpace the West in science and technology and perhaps to improve relations with Peking. For a time, power may remain divided between Party First Secretary Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin, as was the case following the death of Stalin. Like Stalin's successors, those who follow Khrushchev have given no intimation that they are prepared to abandon the revolutionary goals of communism.

The Expansion of East-West Trade

In recent months East-West trade has shown a marked increase. There can be little doubt that the U.S. decision of 1963 to sell wheat to the Soviet Union paved the way for this development. The Kennedy Administration, by that decision, seemed to abandon heretofore strongly held policy positions which sought to hinder communist economic growth by denying the Soviets easy access to imports from the West. Instead, many U.S. government officials have suggested that it is in the interest of the United States and its Western allies to increase economic contacts with East European communist states in order to loosen Soviet control over them. President Johnson, in an address on May 23, declared that "The U.S. no longer considers the East European nations to be helpless tools of the Soviet Union that would either have to be liberated . . . or considered as enemies." By promoting nationalist tendencies in East European countries and increasing their reliance upon Western goods and markets, it is suggested, the prospects for a relaxation of tensions between the communists and the West, as well as the eventual evolution of the communist economic system toward a freer economy, may be enhanced.

Soviet economic planners, in recent writings, have occupied themselves with the problems of agricultural production and the role which profit incentive might perform as a means of increasing industrial production in the Soviet Union. The continuing failure of the world's most highly planned socialist system to provide for the dietary needs of the population, despite Soviet achievements in science and technology, together with its wealth of arable land, has apparently led the Soviet leadership to consider changes in the economic structure of the Soviet Union. Thus the leading advocate of reform in the Soviet economy, Professor Yevsey G. Liberman of Kharkov University, proposed in September the establishment of a permanent high level agency to work out governmental measures to put into effect his profit-incentive proposals.

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Large-scale Western trade on generous terms of credit could enable the communists to make up for failures in planning and management and to continue to direct capital investment into space spectaculars and nuclear weapons. The Soviets confront still other economic difficulties. They realize that the expansion of their chemical industry makes necessary the acquisition of plants and equipment in the West. Moreover, Cuba appears to have become an economic burden, as Havana's 1963 trade deficit with the USSR increased by more than 80 per cent above the 1962 level, largely the result of a sharp reduction in Cuban sugar exports which fell from 2,233,000 metric tons in 1962 to 996,000 metric tons in 1963.

Because they face formidable economic problems themselves, the Soviets are willing to permit, and perhaps to encourage, East European communist countries to increase trade with Western Europe. Moscow was probably unwillling, if not unable, to supply the growing and more varied needs of her COMECON partners. Thus it has become increasingly imperative for these states, if they are to achieve economic goals, to trade with the West. Previously, Khrushchev, in an address to the Central Committee of the Communist Party on February 14, 1964, had declared that "The cause of communist construction will gain if more extensive use is made of the scientific achievements of the capitalist countries in the interest of developing the Soviet economy."

One of the objectives of communist states in trading with the West is to obtain access to the latest in science and technology. Rumania presents an instructive illustration of a communist country which has tried to utilize Western scientific advances to strengthen its economy. Shortly after the signing of the U.S.-Rumanian trade accord in June, Rumania dispatched delegations to Italy, West Germany, Austria and Greece. In each country, the Rumanians emphasized their desire to pursue policies independent of the Soviet Union. One official even went so far as to attribute Rumania's allegedly high rate of economic growth to his government's policy of independence from Soviet control. Moreover, they boasted that Rumanian chemical combines, utilizing West German technical equipment, have increased their production ninefold in the last four years. Similar advances might be anticipated from other trade pacts with the West.

During a recent visit to Austria, Rumanian First Deputy Premier Gheorghe Apostol voiced disagreement with East German efforts to promote a more closely integrated COMECON and reiterated a previous Rumanian proposal to permit the association of noncommunist states with COMECON. Despite—or perhaps because of—the fact that Austrian sales to Rumania fell from $16.6 million in 1962 to $15 million in 1963, while Rumanian exports to Austria have risen from $4.9 million in 1959 to $21.6 million in 1963, Austria agreed in July to assist in the construction of

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five new power plants, and to sell railway equipment and possibly a cellulose plant and a varnish factory to Rumania. Rumanian officials also held discussions with German industrialists to consider the possibility of receiving German assistance.

Heretofore, debate about East-West trade has been centered upon the issue of strategic items, i.e., goods of potential military value which, it was generally agreed, were not to be sold to communist states. The discussion has now shifted largely to the question of whether to provide long-term credits to finance Soviet purchases. Early in September, Britain, in contravention of the 1934 Berne Agreement of North Atlantic nations—which limits to a maximum of five years the length of credits to communist countries—and in the face of U.S. objections, agreed to extend a fifteen-year credit to the Soviet Union for the purchase of an $84 million synthetic fiber plant. It was argued that Britain's exclusion from the Common Market, as well as balance of payments difficulties, makes it imperative that she trade with the East. Moreover, Japan agreed to the sale to the Soviets of a $10 million fertilizer plant for which payment will be deferred for a period of eight years. These two sales by private firms, underwritten by their respective governments, will assist the Soviets to overcome their economic difficulties and may contribute to Moscow's military potential. They could give impetus to increased competition among West European nations and Japan to win Soviet orders with especially generous financial terms. Long-term credits enable communist countries to overcome some of the difficulties posed by the lack of sufficient convertible exchange. It can be argued that credits extended beyond the five-year period amount to a form of economic aid to the Soviet Union, assistance which might otherwise have been extended to countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Trade between Eastern and Western Europe is rising. Between 1958 and 1963 the Common Market increased its imports from Eastern Europe (including the Soviet Union) by 96 per cent and its exports by 73 per cent. This compares favorably with Common Market trade with the rest of the world, which rose by only 50 per cent for imports and 36 per cent for exports during this same period. Even the trade of the Common Market with the other OECD countries of Europe has not grown as rapidly as EEC trade across the Iron Curtain (the increase in trade between EEC and OECD Europe between 1958 and 1963 was 68 per cent for imports and 64 per cent for exports). To be sure, Common Market trade with Eastern Europe may be regarded as infinitesimal, since it amounts to only 3-4 per cent of its total world trade. (In terms of U.S. dollars, this amounted to $1,364.76 million for imports and $1,081.32 million for exports in 1963.) Nevertheless, its growth has kept pace with, or exceeded, the expansion of world trade. Con-

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sidering the major East-West trade agreements concluded in 1964, one may predict that this trend may be even further accentuated in the near future.

West Germany alone accounts for between 40 and 50 per cent of all Common Market exports to the communist world. Bonn has opened its markets to about 30 per cent of all Common Market imports from Eastern Europe, despite the Hallstein Doctrine, according to which West Germany withholds diplomatic recognition from countries having diplomatic relations with East Germany.

Chancellor Erhard has loosened restrictions upon trade with Eastern Europe. State (Länder) governments have been authorized to extend credits to communist countries for periods up to five years. Previously, credits were limited to six months. The fact that Bonn still refuses to provide governmental guarantees for credits to communist states may lessen the prospects for a rapid increase in trade. Although the Bonn government has begun to consider the possibility of an exchange of trade missions with Czechoslovakia and the renewal of the currently expired trade agreement with the Soviet Union, the Germans remain wary of the political implications of such moves. Prague has sought, for example, to obtain from the Federal Republic a public renunciation of the 1938 Munich Agreement. Bonn is unlikely to go beyond its unpublished note of December 1963 to Prague which describes the Pact as void with respect to territorial questions.

The French government has abandoned the five-year limit for credits to communist states. In an accord with the Soviet Union, signed on October 30, France agreed to extend credits in the amount of $356 million to the Soviets for a seven-year term. The agreement calls for a 60 per cent increase in trade between the two countries over the next five years.

In September a group of French experts, representing the National Association for Technical Research, a private scientific organization, signed a protocol in Warsaw expressing readiness to increase cooperation for joint research and for the construction of electrical engineering, chemical and other industries. Premier Maurer of Rumania, during his visit to France in August, also explored the possibility of obtaining long-term credits for the purchase of French industrial equipment. Thus it becomes increasingly difficult for other EEC governments, as well as the United States, to deny their businessmen equal opportunity to reap the benefits they believe to exist in trade with Eastern Europe.

It is probable that U.S. businessmen will press for an easing of restrictions against trade with communist countries. They are likely to become as anxious as their European counterparts to benefit from East-West trade. In April, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce announced its support for steps to liberalize American trade with the Soviet Union at least equal to regulations prevailing in other countries.

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Competition for a greater share of the communist market could produce serious discord among NATO members as well as the EEC partners. In order to forestall the possibility of ruinous competition for East European markets, it might be in the interest of the Common Market countries to agree upon another new limit for credits to replace the five-year limit on credits contained in the Berne Convention. The EEC has already found it necessary to alter certain tariff policies because of problems posed by trade with COMECON members. During July, China offered shipments of dehydrated eggs to EEC members at prices far below the level in the Common Market. Thus the Market's automatic protective machinery imposed a supplementary levy on imports based upon the lowest offering price. As a result, July's very high levy has reduced powdered egg imports from other European countries. To remedy this situation, which has strained severely West Germany's trade relations with one of her traditional agricultural suppliers, Denmark, the Executive Commission has recommended the creation of two tariff bases—one for states with free economies and a second for states with managed economies. No doubt, should intra-bloc trade increase markedly within the coming months, the EEC Commission will face other problems requiring structural or procedural changes in the Common Market's tariff and economic policies. Apprehensive of the effects which Common Market agricultural policy may have upon Eastern Europe, the Soviets undoubtedly look with favor upon the prospect that increased East-West trade might lead to dissension within the EEC and economic dislocation within the Free World.

The diversion of credit to communist bloc countries could serve to decrease the amount of private capital Western businessmen will have to invest in noncommunist countries. Japan, in particular, might concentrate upon assisting less developed states in Southeast Asia rather than helping to alleviate Soviet shortages of foreign exchange. Finally, increased Western trade with communist states may, one day, enable the latter to invest more heavily in development projects in Africa and Asia and thus to reap political benefits from such action. With this Western assistance, the communists might reverse setbacks such as those experienced in 1963 when their exports to countries in Africa and Asia declined by 10 per cent from their 1962 level.

For the West there are few political advantages to be gained by increased trade with communist states. Experience does not provide conclusive evidence that trade serves as an instrument for the promotion of understanding or the achievement of a political *rapprochement,* especially in states in which power remains concentrated in the hands of a few. Not a few Britons, in the thirties, saw in trade with Hitler's Germany a means of averting war. Yet Britain and Germany found themselves at war,

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even though trade between the two countries exceeded by far the commerce which passes between Western nations and the communist world. Expanded East-West trade may serve only to increase the capabilities of communist states for pursuing more aggressive anti-Western policies, while strengthening their grip upon subject populations and enabling the Soviet Union to concentrate upon its own formidable economic problems.

New Proposals for European Political Unification

The Government of the German Federal Republic and M. Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister, have offered new proposals designed to provide momentum to the movement toward political union in Europe. Since the failure of the Brussels talks in January 1963, the Six have had little success in breaking the deadlock among themselves on the question of the appropriate political structure for a united Europe. The EEC countries have yet to reach agreement as to whether Europe should be organized as a confederation or as a federal union.

In September, however, the Bonn government submitted an "informal working paper" to its five partners in the European Community. The German draft was designed to stimulate new discussion about possible steps toward political unity by presenting a minimum program for political cooperation among the Six. The Germans did not attempt to advance a comprehensive plan for political union. The German initiative was in keeping with the gradualist philosophy of the European Community. Thus Bonn's aim was to create institutions from which political unity might eventually develop.

Chancellor Erhard's government made several specific proposals. In the first phase, the establishment of a permanent "secretariat" is recommended. The Germans, in an apparent effort to win French support, proposed regular meetings of the heads of government of the Six and their ministers of defense, foreign affairs and culture. The Six would take new steps toward political unity after a transitional period of three years. Finally, the Bonn government recommended that the powers of the European Parliament be increased to include budgetary control over the European Communities. The Germans anticipated that their proposal would take account of the differing conceptions of political union prevalent among the Six. Its main objective was to reconcile the attitudes of France and the Netherlands, the foremost proponents, respectively, of the confederal and federal approaches to political union.

On September 9, Foreign Minister Spaak offered his own proposal for a new *relance*. Speaking before the Assembly of the Western European Union meeting in Paris, the Belgian Foreign Minister proposed the creation of a "Commission" composed of three "wise men," European statesmen, who would serve for a period of three to five years. This Commission would

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constitute the embryo of a political institution and be empowered to study foreign policy and defense questions from a "European" point of view and make proposals to a Council of Ministers. The Commission would have as its task, moreover, the drafting of a plan for a European federation. On this occasion Spaak conceded that he had "watered his wine" to take account of President de Gaulle's views on political union. He suggested that his proposal was designed to end the present deadlock in the movement toward European integration without, however, abandoning his long-term goal of a European federation.

In his proposal, Spaak no longer insisted that Britain must participate in discussions on European political unification: he explained that the Six could not wait indefinitely until the British qualified for membership in the European Community. This concession went far toward removing one of the obstacles which has hindered progress toward European political unification, namely, the insistence of certain EEC countries upon British membership in the Common Market as a prerequisite to their own participation in European political institutions. The British, nevertheless, may still participate in the founding of a political union in Europe. Britain's new Labour Government, it was reported, has not rejected the idea of taking part in the talks on European political institutions, although there is little likelihood that the British will seek membership in the Common Market. Thus the prospects for new steps toward political union among the Six may have brightened.

The question of the fusion of the existing institutions of the European Community has yet to be resolved. In July the Six agreed "in principle" to merge the Executives of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and EURATOM by January 1, 1965. This was to be followed on January 1, 1967 by a merger of the Treaties of Paris (establishing ECSC in 1951) and Rome (creating EEC and EURATOM in 1957). The Six have yet to reach agreement upon the powers to be accorded a merged Commission for the three Communities. The ECSC High Authority, the counterpart of the EEC Commission, possesses supranational powers not granted to the Common Market. Proponents of a "federal" Europe favor a strengthening of supranationality in a single Commission for the three Communities, while supporters of a "confederal" Europe wish to limit the ability of the Communities to act apart from the dictates of member governments.

The choice of the future capital of a united Europe presents the Six with another political problem of considerable importance. Friction arose among them when Luxembourg requested compensation for losses resulting from the removal of the High Authority of ECSC to Brussels, should the new Community institutions be located in that city. The Grand Duchy demands, as a *quid pro quo,* that the European

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Parliament, now meeting in Strasbourg, move to Luxembourg. France, in turn, opposes this proposal, pointing out that Luxembourg is already the headquarters of the European Court of Justice. Many members of the European Parliament have expressed their desire to move from Strasbourg to Brussels in order to ensure a more efficient liaison with other institutions of the European Community.

Thus the seemingly technical matter of the reorganization of the institutional structures of the European Community becomes a political issue of importance to each of the Six. The selection of a permanent seat for the institutions of the European Community probably constitutes, in effect, the selection of the future capital of a united Europe. The Europeans confront a problem not unlike that facing the founding fathers of the United States when they had to select a site for their own capital.

The initiatives of European leaders represent efforts to reconcile diverse viewpoints with the need for new forms of political organization. The success of a second *relance* in Europe toward integration depends upon the ability of European leaders to overcome the inertia of parochial interests and to take the "wider view."

India Since Nehru

Since the death of Jawaharlal Nehru on May 27, 1964, India has experienced troubles both natural and man-made. These include the worst floods in forty years, especially in the Punjab and the Delhi-New Delhi area, a result of one of the wettest monsoons on record; an agricultural crisis which the new Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, has called India's "most formidable problem," with severe food shortages and a drastic rise in prices of basic foodstuffs; renewed communal rivalry; failures in the Third Five-Year Plan; and mounting evidence of corruption and black market operations. At the center the collective leadership which has succeeded the charismatic Nehru is still relatively untried, and in some of the states the political situation is even more confused than usual. This is notably true of the Punjab, where the strong man, Pratap Singh Kairon, Chief Minister for more than eight years, was forced to resign shortly after Nehru's death; and of Kerala, where presidential rule has again been imposed, after the fall in early September 1964 of the Congress government headed by R. Sankar, due largely to the defection of several Congress members of the Legislative Assembly.

India is still under emergency rule, imposed in late October 1962 following the Chinese attack, even though many Indians feel that its continuation is unnecessary and in fact endangers the constitutional liberties of the people. The national budget has been raised to well over $4 billion annually, and over one-third of this total is allocated to defense. The official position of the Government of India is that the emergency cannot be permitted to slow down the pace of national development, but since late 1962 it

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has undoubtedly placed new burdens on limited resources.

India has never really recovered its equilibrium since the Chinese attack, and the loss of its great leader and the accumulation of troubles in recent months have been further blows to national confidence and morale. One should not, however, overlook the many elements of basic strength in India, and the great survival capacity of a people long accustomed to enduring unusual privations and disappointments. The transition from Nehru to a collective leadership, with Lal Bahadur Shastri as the choice of the dominant wing of the Congress Party led by Kamaraj Nadar, and supported by party bosses Atulya Ghosh and S. K. Patil, was unexpectedly smooth and was, in fact, an impressive demonstration of the strength of the Indian political system.

In foreign affairs the most notable recent trend has been toward a much less active world role and a greater concentration on relations with immediate neighbors. This trend has been manifest since the Chinese attack, which was a great humiliation for India and which adversely affected India's prestige and influence abroad, especially in Southeast Asia and among nonaligned nations generally. In the aftermath of this national humiliation India was forced to concentrate on improving its defensive capabilities and on relations with its neighbors. It has made some progress in its military efforts, thanks to more realistic policies, larger appropriations and substantial assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR; but its relations with neighbors, with the exception of Nepal, have tended to deteriorate rather than improve. Pakistan is alarmed over the military build-up in India, which it insists adds to its own security problems, and India is alarmed over Pakistan's "chumming up" with China, to use Nehru's words, and over the generally unsympathetic attitude which Pakistan has shown toward the new dilemmas created for India by the Chinese pressures.

India's concentration on internal problems and on relations with immediate neighbors has been even more marked since Nehru's passing and the recent spate of domestic troubles. Nehru was a great world figure, with a wide range of international contacts and experience. Shastri had never traveled outside the subcontinent before he became Prime Minister, and his Foreign Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh, is relatively inexperienced in foreign affairs, aside from Indo-Pakistani relations. When Shastri was unable for reasons of health to attend the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London in July 1964, India's chief representatives were T. T. Krishnamachari, the Finance Minister, and Indira Gandhi (Nehru's daughter), Minister of Information and Broadcasting—not Swaran Singh. Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister attended the second conference of nonaligned countries in Cairo in mid-October 1964, but neither played a conspicuous role. This was

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Shastri's first venture in international diplomacy, and it was a sobering as well as educational experience. It must have been hard for India's representatives to play "second fiddle" to such flamboyant spokesmen as Sukarno and Nkrumah.

Historically and culturally, Southeast Asia has long been an area of special interest and concern to India; but in recent years India has not been popular in most of the countries of the region, and its prestige has declined notably since the demonstration of Chinese power and Indian weakness in the Himalayas. The increase in Chinese pressure and influence in Southeast Asia should be a matter of even greater concern to India than to the United States, but thus far India has shown little evidence of a determination to give greater attention to this vital area. Swaran Singh, however, has privately indicated an awareness of the importance of Southeast Asia to India, and his first tour abroad after becoming Foreign Minister in June 1964 was to several countries of this region.

In Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, India's split personality regarding alignment vs. nonalignment and regarding its relations with the United States and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, is an obstacle to a consistent or positive policy. The new leaders of India have pledged themselves to continue to follow the course of foreign policy charted by Nehru. Like Nehru they have insisted that India is still a nonaligned country, even though they realize that they can hardly be nonaligned vis-à-vis China and that they are following certain lines of policy which prior to October 1962 would have been regarded as inconsistent with nonalignment.

They are relying heavily on the United States and Britain for continued military as well as economic assistance. They are also relying more heavily than many Indian and Western critics would like on the Soviet Union for the same kinds of assistance. Obviously they also hope that the USSR will serve as a brake on Communist China, will help to strengthen India vis-à-vis China, and will come to India's aid if a major Chinese attack on India is launched. The arms deal with the Soviet Union, whereby the latter will provide India with more MIG-21's and other sophisticated military equipment and will accelerate its assistance in building plants in India for the manufacture of MIG's and spare parts, has been interpreted as an indication of an end to what some Indian commentators have called "a drift to the West." This interpretation was reinforced by the warmth of President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan's remarks during his official visit to the Soviet Union in September 1964, and by the reactions in the Indian Parliament, Indian newspapers, and other channels of Indian public opinion to the President's visit.

Western commentators have been less charitable and more apprehensive in describing and ap-

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praising India's efforts to establish closer relations with the Soviet Union, while at the same time it looks to the West for substantial economic and military aid. India may offer an opportunity for U.S.-Soviet cooperation and "commingling," as Nehru often urged, possibly with good effects on the whole range of Soviet-American relations, but many Americans are understandably suspicious of Soviet intentions in India as elsewhere, and are inclined to take a dim view of India's efforts to maintain close relations with the USSR.

The abrupt and unexpected deposition of Nikita Khrushchev on October 15 raised fresh doubts and apprehensions in India regarding the nature and intentions of the leaders of the Soviet Union, whoever they may be, and the prospects for the continuance of a policy of "peaceful coexistence"; and the explosion of China's first atomic bomb the following day did nothing for the self-confidence of the new set of Indian leaders who must now concern themselves with the psychological, and eventually the military, impact of China's entry into the ranks of the nuclear powers.

India's adherence to a rather rigid kind of nonalignment left it mentally as well as militarily unprepared for the lesson in *realpolitik* and in communist behavior which the Chinese taught it. It is to be hoped that its more flexible interpretation of nonalignment since October 1962 will enable it to pursue more adequate and more realistic foreign and defense policies.

The Cairo Conference

From October 5-10, the heads of state or government of fifty-seven countries gathered in Cairo for the second conference of "nonaligned" states. While Cuba participated as a fully accredited member, ten other Latin American countries sent observers to the conference.* Although they probably attended for different reasons, many of the Latin American countries are no doubt genuinely receptive to some of the views expressed at the conference. Nonalignment, to them, means a loosening of ties with the United States, although not withdrawal from the Western world. The reception accorded to President de Gaulle in Latin America illustrates the sympathy which not a few Latin Americans feel toward his conception of a "third force."

Convened to develop a program of action to forward the principles enunciated at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, the Cairo Conference found itself divided in purpose. It is ironic that while the neutrals drew comfort from their perception of centrifugal tendencies in both the communist world and the West, they are experiencing similar tendencies within their own group. In Cairo divisions between moderates and militants appeared. The split among the nonaligned leaders is likely to continue to hamper their diplomatic and economic efforts to become an active "third force" in international affairs.

*These states were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad, Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Finland was the sole European state represented.

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The participants must view with disappointment the final communiqué entitled the "Program for Peace and International Cooperation." A reading of this document and the delegates' speeches reveals that the nonaligned states today are divided upon basic issues. There are several possible explanations for this situation.

It will be recalled that the Belgrade Conference of 1961 took place just after the Soviet Union had broken the nuclear test moratorium. That conference sent a mission to the Soviet Union and the United States urging the cessation of nuclear testing. Reportedly, the nonaligned states at Cairo recognized that the Chinese nuclear explosion was imminent. Yet the communiqué issued at the close of the Cairo Conference did not even mention Communist China specifically in calling upon all states to accede to the Test Ban Treaty. Indeed, the admission of Communist China to the United Nations remains a prime objective of the nonaligned states. The Cairo Conference lends increasing credence to the view that more African and Asian states will support the admission of Peking to the UN during the 1964 session of the General Assembly.

Undoubtedly the leaders assembled in Cairo felt keenly the absence of the late Prime Minister Nehru, who had played a leading role at the Bandung and Belgrade Conferences. The new Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was unable to succeed to Nehru's mantle as the dominant figure among the nonaligned representatives. Some have criticized Shastri's failure to take a strong stand against the treatment accorded Premier Moise Tshombe of the Congo. Moreover, India was unsuccessful in gaining approval of its plan for establishing machinery for retaining contacts among the nonaligned nations.

Initially, Yugoslavia and India sought at Cairo to focus attention upon dangers posed by Peking's growing influence in Africa and Asia, to formulate a set of principles for peaceful coexistence and to produce an acceptable definition of nonalignment. These countries attempted to use the issue of economic development to create stronger bonds among the nonaligned. Indonesia, supported by Ghana, Guinea, Burundi and the Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, disagreed with "moderate" delegations regarding the relative importance of peaceful coexistence and thwarted the latter's efforts to de-emphasize the disagreements between the neutrals and the West.

In his speech of October 6 to the conference, Indonesian President Sukarno challenged those delegates who had hailed with optimism the underdeveloped world's progress toward independence and freedom. He argued that there exists on many levels a continuing confrontation between "imperialism" and the new emerging forces. In an obvious reference to Malaysia, he alleged that former colonial powers still attempt to create strife among local populations and to provoke the secession of one part

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of a former colonial territory from the rest under the pretext of self-determination. Only through solidarity, Sukarno contended, will the nonaligned be able to meet such challenges. In short, the Indonesian President apparently believes that "peaceful coexistence" is possible between the Soviet Union and the United States, but not between the new states and the West until they become equal in strength with the West. Attacking "peaceful coexistence" in much the same way as the Chinese communists have done, the Indonesian President may have as an objective to exploit the Moscow-Peking schism to his own advantage. President Sukarno uses the threat of closer relations with Communist China as a lever in his dealings with the United States and the Soviet Union.

In contrast to Sukarno, Presidents Tito and Nasser each stressed the more positive results to be gained by economic cooperation. Efforts to insert into the final communiqué a declaration of confrontation between the emerging nations and the "old forces of imperialism" were blocked by the "moderates," including India, Yugoslavia, the UAR, Ceylon, Tunisia and Ethiopia. Although the final resolutions gave peaceful coexistence priority over the confrontation thesis, the general tone of the conference and the "Program for Peace and International Cooperation" remained, on balance, anti-Western. There were attacks upon U.S. policy in South Vietnam and Cuba, an appeal for self-determination for all nations and peoples, a call for a boycott of South Africa, and an expresssion of the desire for peaceful settlement of disputes and condemnation of the use of force, especially by the West.

The communiqué contains not a few inconsistencies and contradictions which belie its classification as an objective appraisal of how to promote international cooperation. For example, while the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay and British military installations in Aden and Cyprus are condemned, no mention is made of Chinese repression in Tibet, the Soviet military presence in Cuba, or the communist offensive in Laos. There was, of course, no censure of Indonesia's aggression against Malaysia or Egypt's open intervention in the Yemen. Rather, the conference recommended that the United States lift what was termed erroneously its "commercial and economic blockade applied against Cuba." The nonaligned states, in their communiqué, condemned the use of "foreign pressure and intervention to impose changes in the political, economic and social system chosen by a country." Yet this same document contains an appeal to the nonaligned world to impose economic sanctions against South Africa.

The unprecedented action of Egypt in "restricting" the movement of Premier Tshombe, the leader of a foreign state with which Cairo ostensibly maintains good relations, shocked many delegates and may produce results which run counter to African interests. In-

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deed, the hostility of nonaligned states may force the Congo into some form of cooperation with countries such as South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal. Moreover, the Egyptian action rallied many Congolese newspapers and groups to the support of their ruler. Deep resentment manifested itself in the Congo at this breach in normal diplomatic courtesy in what was deemed an attempt to influence Congolese internal affairs. If Egypt hoped to turn the Congolese against their Premier it has probably achieved the opposite. Premier Tshombe expressed the belief that the purpose of his arrest may have been to goad him into breaking diplomatic relations with Egypt, thus clearing the way for the latter to recognize the rebel Stanleyville regime and, perhaps, to extend assistance to groups opposing the Leopoldville regime.

Although Egypt's hostility toward Tshombe may have failed to produce the desired results, Nasser succeeded in enlisting African support for the condemnation of Israel as a "lackey" of the West. The conference gave its collective support "to the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle for liberation from colonialism and racism," and endorsed a recommendation for "the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland and their inalienable right to self-determination." Delegate after delegate denounced the rulers of Israel and called for the support of the Palestine Liberation Organization, a group of Arab refugees who hope to recapture Palestine, "to restore justice" in the Middle East.

The delegates to the Cairo Conference met with little success in deciding upon specific measures to give substance to their principles, yet the anti-Western sentiments expressed in Cairo are likely to be given open expression wherever and whenever an opportunity is present. The United Nations in particular may assume greater importance as the arena in which the nonaligned states can press their struggle to achieve economic and political equality. Yet the likelihood that the nonaligned states will develop common policies in the United Nations remains remote. Moreover, the pronouncements of the nonaligned states on colonialism may be tempered by realization of their continued dependence upon Western economic assistance. Hence most of the nations represented at the Cairo Conference are unlikely to heed the advice and example of President Sukarno to struggle with all means at their disposal against the "old forces of imperialism."

Communist Setback in Chile

The Chilean presidential election of September 9 ended in victory for Senator Eduardo Frei, leader of the Christian Democratic Party. The result has been widely interpreted as a triumph for democracy over communism.

The presidential campaign had begun as a three-way contest last spring. The incumbent, President Allesandri, was unable constitutionally to run for re-election. There-

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fore Allesandri had accepted as his successor Senator Julio Durán to lead the so-called Democratic Front which included the Liberals and Conservatives as well as his own party, the Radicals. Six years ago this coalition, which has ruled Chile since the late 1940's, had won a narrow victory over Senator Salvador Allende, leader of the leftist FRAP (Frente de Acción Popular). But an upsurge of inflation and unemployment in Chile during the second half of 1963 convinced many observers that Allende might be able to defeat the ruling coalition this time. At the beginning of 1964 few believed that Frei could defeat either Durán or Allende.

In March, a by-election in the province of Curico, south of Santiago, produced a change in the political outlook. The local candidate of the Democratic Front had argued during the campaign that the by-election constituted a plebiscite on the policies of the ruling coalition. The results were a severe setback for the government party: the candidate of Allende's FRAP won and the Christian Democratic candidate ran a strong third. Actually, candidates representing the Democratic Front and the Christian Democrats had received half again as many votes as the leftist coalition, but because they were split FRAP won an easy victory. Although, as in most by-elections, local factors influenced the outcome, the presidential election in September might have had a similar ending had the voting patterns of the by-election been maintained. Allende's communist supporters, the most active group in his coalition, were elated by the FRAP victory in the by-election and termed it Chile's "parliamentary Sierra Maestre." Had the FRAP won in September, Chileans would have elected as president an avowedly pro-communist candidate. Both the Alliance for Progress and the cause of representative government in the Americas would have suffered a setback.

Senator Durán apparently interpreted the results of the by-election as a trend toward the left and quickly announced his withdrawal from the race. His Conservative and Liberal supporters turned to Senator Frei, the Christian Democrat. Durán, however, remained a force of some importance when his own party, the Radicals (a conservative group founded upon anticlericalism), refused to support the candidate of a Catholic party. Durán reluctantly agreed to go through the motions of campaigning for the presidency as the candidate of the Radicals.

The Allende vs. Frei contest pitted an aging left-wing professional against the founder of the Christian Democratic movement in Chile. Frei, who once served on the law faculty of Catholic University in Santiago, had been identified with conservative political groups earlier in his career. Allende tried to make an issue of the fact that Frei had been a member of the Chilean Falange in the early 1940's, but this attempt to pin a label of fascism upon his opponent made little impression upon the electorate in the face of Frei's support of

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democratic solutions to Chile's problems.

During the campaign Frei called for an acceleration of programs in the *Alianza,* as well as economic reforms in Chile, particularly in agriculture. The Encyclical "Mater et Magistra" served, in effect, as his campaign platform. Frei called for commercial ties with all nations of the world, including communist countries, and the imposition of restrictions upon foreign-based copper companies, compelling them, among other things, to process in Chile ore mined in that country. He proposed increases in taxes as well as new government programs in housing, education and employment. In his foreign policy statements he dodged the specific question of reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba, although he called for a "revitalization" of the Organization of American States with possibly the return of Cuba to the hemispheric family of nations. Finally, Frei offered, during the campaign, to continue Chile's traditional freedom for the Communist Party. However, he did not seek communist votes; he condemned the communists for having "failed in all aspects of governing."

In an election unmarred by violence, Frei gained 56 per cent, Allende 38 per cent and Durán 5 per cent of the popular vote. While Allende received more votes than in his last presidential effort, his percentage of the total vote was sharply reduced. In 1957 he had lost by only 35,000 votes, while in 1964 the difference was nearly a half million. It was generally concluded that the Alliance for Progress, the United States and the forces of democracy had won a great victory, and that communism had suffered a severe defeat in the Chilean election.

To be sure, an Allende victory would have been a grievous blow to the United States and hemispheric solidarity. Allende, if given an opportunity, would probably have made a radical break in Chilean domestic and foreign policy. President-elect Frei, however, must confront such endemic problems as inflation and inefficient use of natural resources, which continue to hinder Chilean development. Living costs have risen more than 30 per cent during the first eight months of 1964. Frei has not indicated precisely what measures he proposes to adopt to combat Chile's chronic inflationary spiral. Chilean taxes on certain business profits already exceed 82 per cent, leaving little room for additional revenues from this source. Nevertheless, Frei implied that additional taxes might be raised from large corporations, thus making it less likely that Chile will obtain the foreign investment necessary for development. In a nation desperately in need of new employment opportunities, economic stagnation could prove disastrous. Frei's call for agrarian reform to increase the productivity of large estates is commendable, yet the resources necessary for the purchase and redistribution of land are not available in Chile. U.S. aid is not sufficient for this purpose. Expropriation of the holdings of large landowners could merely

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serve to accelerate capital flight and slow the pace of economic development. During the presidential campaign, Frei called for a "true proletarian solution" in Chile but did not explain precisely what he means by this phrase.

Immediately following Frei's election victory, Premier Castro publicly challenged him to match alleged social progress under the communist regime in Cuba. Frei accepted the challenge on the condition that Castro would first hold free elections. While Chilean foreign policy under the Frei Administration will doubtless not be pro-Castro, Chile's traditionally pro-U.S. policy may be modified. Frei made clear his fascination with a "third force" in world affairs during President de Gaulle's visit to Chile. De Gaulle's call for a Latin bloc was received with marked coolness in countries like Venezuela and Colombia; in Brazil, President de Gaulle encountered opposition because of Common Market policies which favor African products over those from Latin America; and in Venezuela President Leone criticized France's trade with Cuba. However, De Gaulle received a warm welcome in Chile. There is a marked similarity in the outlook of President de Gaulle and President-elect Frei, both "Latin" leaders, with regard to the idea of a "third force."

Although France's ability to assist Latin America is minimal, De Gaulle may have struck a responsive chord in some countries of Latin America by offering an alternative to close ties with the United States. Latin American dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the Alliance may have led some leaders to court the French President in hope of eventually obtaining increased aid from the United States. Frei has made clear his belief that the democratic forces in Latin America have long lacked an ideology to match the attractions of communism. In Gaullism and Christian Democracy, Frei may have found an ideology suitable to his conception of Chile's needs.

Nevertheless, Chile remains a divided country. While the leftist coalition (FRAP) has shown strains since the election which could lead to its dissolution, the by-election returns of last March clearly indicate that, given a split in democratic ranks, a government of the far left could come to power in Chile. Congressional elections are scheduled for March of 1965. Should the new administration fail to make a good beginning before then, FRAP might make a comeback. In this event, Frei would be faced with a hostile Congress and Chilean policy could be expected to veer toward anti-Americanism. Chile and the Alliance for Progress may prosper under the administration of President Frei. But optimism concerning "democracy's great electoral victory" in Chile must be tempered by the knowledge that Chile, like other Latin American nations, faces formidable political and economic problems.

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CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN VENEZUELA: A TEST OF THE OAS

by Arthur P. Whitaker

ON November 29, 1963, Venezuela's representative to the Organization of American States addressed a note to the chairman of the OAS Council charging the government of Cuba with "intervention and aggression" against his country. The note also requested that "an immediate and urgent meeting of the Organ of Consultation" be held to take appropriate action under Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947, often referred to as the Rio Treaty. In plain English, Venezuela was asking for a meeting of American foreign ministers to impose sanctions on Cuba for inciting rebellion in Venezuela and shipping arms to the rebels.

At first the OAS Council acted with a despatch and decisiveness that left nothing to be desired. It held a meeting on December 3, 1963, at which the Venezuelan member supported his charge by describing how, on November 2, 1963, the authorities of his country had discovered a secret cache of "abundant war equipment" at a place[1] on its Caribbean coast and possessed "ample proof" of the "Cuban origin and provenance" of this war material. Immediately, the Council voted to convoke the Organ of Consultation (i.e., a meeting of American foreign ministers, as prescribed by the OAS Charter), the date and place to be fixed in due time, and meanwhile to constitute itself provisionally the Organ of Consultation (as permitted by the Charter, and as had been done previously in similar cases) and to appoint a committee to investigate and report on Venezuela's charges. The committee was appointed the same day, visited Venezuela from December 8 to 15, completed its investigation by January 24, 1964, gave the Cuban government an opportunity to reply to a detailed statement of the charges and supporting evidence, and then submitted its report on February 18, 1964.[2] The report fully substantiated Venezuela's charges.

[1]Punta Macama or Macamba, on the Paraguaná peninsula, which lies between Caracas and the Maracaibo oil fields.

[2]*Report of the Investigating Committee appointed by the Council of the Organization of American States Acting Provisionally as Organ of Consultation (In accordance with the resolution of December 3, 1963)* (Washington, D. C.: Pan American Union, 1964; Council Series, OEA/Ser. G/IV.c-i-658).

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Obviously, the next step was to convoke at once the "urgent" meeting of foreign ministers which had already been agreed to in principle. But at this point the procedure bogged down. As week after week passed without further action, it began to look as if no further action on this flagrant case would ever be taken and the already shaky prestige of the OAS plumbed new depths. Not until after a revolt in April had ousted the pro-Castro regime from office in Brazil—the largest of the Latin American countries—did things get moving again. Even then the call for the foreign ministers' meeting was not issued until June, and the meeting did not begin until July 21. Moreover, although the meeting finally imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions on the Castro regime, the vote was divided, 15 for and 4 against, and the minority included the second largest Latin American country (Mexico), two of the most democratic (Chile and Uruguay), and one of those that depended most heavily on U.S. aid (Bolivia).

Previously, where Castro was concerned, the OAS had almost always shown itself weak in performing its ostensible function as a regional security organization. The single exception occurred during the missile crisis of October 1962, when the OAS Council voted unanimously in favor of the shipping quarantine or blockade of Cuba announced by President Kennedy;[3] but even then Brazil, Mexico and Bolivia abstained on the resolution authorizing the use of force against Cuba in case the quarantine should not bring about the removal of Soviet missiles from the island.

Although the removal of the missiles greatly reduced the threat from Cuba as a Soviet military base, there was no diminution in the other major threat posed by the Castro regime, which arose from its announced determination to export, through subversion and otherwise, its form of revolution to the rest of Latin America. Conclusive proof that it had tried to do so in the case of Venezuela had now been offered by the government of that country and confirmed by the OAS Council's Investigating Committee. This case therefore provided a clear-cut test of the viability of the OAS as a regional security organization and of its value to its members, including the United States. Consequently, it will be worth while to inquire more closely into the nature of the

[3]This was one of the previous cases, referred to on p. 511, in which the Council had acted provisionally as Organ of Consultation. It first called a meeting (the ninth) of the Organ, i.e., the foreign ministers; then, acting "provisionally," voted for the blockade; and thereupon canceled the call.

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test, the reasons why the OAS was so slow in meeting it, and the significance of the sanctions finally imposed on Cuba. As will appear below, the upshot was a potentially far-reaching change in OAS security arrangements. The inquiry gains added interest from the bearing of this case on the relationship of the OAS to the United Nations, and from the light it throws on the strength of Latin American attachment to the rule of nonintervention and the concept of national sovereignty, and on the weakness of the Pan-Latin American movement so long advocated by leaders in that area.

II

The Investigating Committee appointed by the OAS Council in accordance with its resolution of December 3, 1963, was made up of five members, one from the United States and four from Latin American countries. The latter included Uruguay, which had hitherto opposed strong action against Cuba; Colombia and Costa Rica, which had advocated it; and Argentina, whose record was mixed, and whose representative, Ambassador Rodolfo A. Weidmann, was chairman of the committee. Consequently, no one could claim that the committee was packed against Cuba. In addition, three members (those from Argentina, Colombia and Costa Rica) each had as his adviser a military officer, which was highly appropriate since the *corpus delicti* was war equipment and it would require military expertise to determine whether this equipment was in fact "of Cuban origin and provenance" as charged by Venezuela.

These three officers formed a "group of military advisers," or sub-committee, which, after conducting a technical examination of the arms cache and the locale in which it had been discovered, submitted on February 18 a detailed report[4] of its findings to the Investigating Committee. This report showed that the arms in question (weighing three tons, according to other sources) included such items as 81 automatic rifles, 31 machine guns, 5 mortars, 20 rocket launchers or bazookas, ammunition for these weapons, and numerous demolition blocks and charges and a 40 horsepower outboard motor. Proof had been obtained from Belgium that the automatic rifles were made by a Belgian firm for the Castro government of Cuba in 1959 and that no other country possessed rifles of this type. In this and other cases, said the report, unsuccessful efforts had been made to obliterate the dis-

[4]See *Report of the Investigating Committee, op. cit.*, Appendix 5, pp. 49-60.

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tinctive markings on the weapons, such as those identifying them as property of the Cuban army. Another damning piece of evidence was the outboard motor, for it was established that this had been sent from Canada to Havana by air on October 1, 1963, consigned to the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, an agency of the Cuban government. Ironically, the cache also included bazookas and rockets of a type sent by the United States to Cuba in 1956-1957 under its program of military aid to the Batista government. On these and other grounds the group of military advisers concluded that the war equipment in question came from Cuba, was prepared by a well organized group of persons familiar with its use, was intended for subversion, formed part of a plan for more extensive shipments of arms, and was probably transported by sea and unloaded surreptitiously.

In addition to incorporating the military advisers' report in its own, the Investigating Committee reported the Venezuelan government's discovery on November 4, 1963, of a plan for the capture of the capital city, Caracas, by the "Armed Forces of National Liberation" (FALN), a notorious Venezuelan communist organization devoted to terrorism and subversion. The committee pointed out that this so-called Caracas Plan contemplated the use of arms like those in the recently discovered cache. Not surprisingly, the committee held that this plan was aimed not only at capturing Caracas but also at blocking the national election scheduled to be held in Venezuela on December 1, 1963, and at seizing control of the country.

After reviewing all the evidence in the light of Castro's hostile course toward Venezuela since 1959, the Investigating Committee concluded unanimously that "the acts of intervention that have been outlined, and, in particular, the shipment of arms, constitute a policy of aggression on the part of the present government of Cuba against the territorial integrity, the political sovereignty, and the stability of the democratic institutions of Venezuela."[5]

When the Council received this forthright report on February 18, two main courses of action were open to it: (1) proceed through OAS channels by calling a meeting of the Organ of Consultation to take appropriate action under the terms of the Rio Treaty, as contemplated by the resolution of December 3, 1963, or (2) refer the case to the United Nations. Legally, the latter

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

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alternative was sounder, since Article 53 of the UN Charter prohibits regional organizations from undertaking enforcement action without authorization by the UN Security Council. Collective as well as unilateral self-defense is permitted by Article 51 of that charter, but only in case of direct armed attack; no such attack was involved here, whereas enforcement action was. To be sure, a precedent for enforcement action by the OAS in the present case was provided by its authorization of the quarantine of Cuba in the 1962 missile crisis, and Venezuela now invoked that precedent by reference, declaring that the OAS, after having taken enforcement action at the request of the United States on the basis of aerial photographs, surely could not now refuse a similar request from a Latin American country based on the even clearer evidence of the Cuban arms cache on Venezuelan soil. However, the validity of the precedent had been seriously questioned by competent jurists in various countries, including the United States.

Yet reference of the case to the United Nations was open to an even stronger practical objection. This was that no United Nations body could be expected to take enforcement action against Cuba, no matter how conclusive the evidence, since it was sure to be vetoed in the Security Council by the Soviet Union and voted down in the General Assembly by the communist and African-Asian blocs. In this situation, advocates of enforcement action against Cuba held that the OAS would only stultify itself by tying its own hands through a tender consideration for legal niceties when the case would be settled in the United Nations on political grounds, without regard for the law and the evidence. Accordingly they continued to press for OAS action. To this end, even before the OAS Investigating Committee completed its task, Venezuela sent a military mission to several South American countries to present directly to their governments full proof of its charges against the Castro regime. Headed by Vice Admiral Luis Croce Orozco, the mission started from Caracas on January 22, and by the time it returned there on February 16 (two days before the Investigating Committee's report was submitted), it had visited Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, Peru and Brazil.

Whether or not Venezuela's military mission convinced any doubting Thomases, it clearly changed no positions. The most important position, that of Brazil, remained firm as publicly announced by the foreign minister on January 3, after conferring

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with President João Goulart. Brazil, he declared, would continue to defend the principles of self-determination and nonintervention, would not break relations with Cuba, and would not approve sanctions against Fidel Castro's government. The other four Latin American governments which still maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba—Mexico, Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile—showed no inclination to break them, much less to join in multilateral action by the OAS against Castro's government.

On the contrary, on February 22 Mexico raised a new roadblock to such action and did so in a spectacular way. President Adolfo López Mateos, accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Manuel Tello, had just completed a conference with President Lyndon Johnson in Palm Springs, California, and a communiqué had been issued indicating that the meeting had been completely harmonious, without a disagreement of any kind. Then, in a press conference, the Mexican President dropped a bombshell by declaring without qualification that Venezuela's charges against Cuba ought to be handled not by the OAS but by the United Nations, on the ground that Cuba was no longer a member of the OAS. To make matters still worse, Foreign Minister Tello went on to tell the press that if the OAS insisted upon handling the case, Mexico would not necessarily feel bound to support any sanction it might impose on Castro's government.[6]

Although Mexico had always resisted the imposition of sanctions on Cuba, its Palm Springs pronouncement was startling both for its timing and for the intransigence displayed by Foreign Minister Tello. It was made not only immediately after the seemingly harmonious parley between Presidents López Mateos and Johnson, but also at a time when it was known that the OAS Investigating Committee's report on Venezuela's charges against Cuba was about to be published and that the report would confirm the charges. Since the Mexican President and his foreign minister were no tyros in diplomacy, the timing could hardly have been accidental. On the contrary, it seemed clearly designed to neutralize in advance the stimulus the report would give to enforcement action against Cuba. The harsh terms of Tello's warning against such sanctions left no room for doubt on this point. If his warning was not a threat to secede from the OAS, it was at least a threat to nullify, in flagrant violation of the Rio Treaty, for that treaty makes all sanctions except armed force binding on all

[6] *Christian Science Monitor,* February 23, 1964.

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members when adopted by a two-thirds majority. Yet Tello was now asserting that his government would not be so bound, despite the fact that no one was proposing the use of armed force. Even Venezuela, which took the most extreme position, was only calling for the lesser sanctions, such as the severance of diplomatic and economic relations and communications with Cuba.

According to newspaper accounts from Palm Springs, this Mexican *démarche* caught the U.S. government completely by surprise, for there had been no suggestion of it in the just completed conference between the two presidents, during which little had been said about Cuba and neither party had tried to influence the other's attitude toward the Castro regime. U.S. officials, it was reported, tried to de-emphasize the incident but were obviously worried by it. They might well have been, for there can be no question that Mexico's strong pronouncement took the steam out of the Investigating Committee's report when that was published three days later. To make matters worse, it was just at this time that, over protests from the United States, trade with Cuba was being significantly expanded by England, France and Spain, to the obvious advantage of Castro's regime both materially and psychologically. This doubtless reinforced the dampening effect of the Mexican declaration.

III

Even so, the continued inaction of the OAS in the face of its own Investigating Committee's explosive report is so extraordinary that it requires further explanation. From the evidence now available, the main reasons appear to have been as follows:

1. There was a deep rift between the governments advocating effective sanctions (though not armed intervention) against Cuba, and those that favored only token measures or none at all. The first group, headed by Venezuela, included all other Caribbean countries, with the possible exception of Haiti;[7] their proximity to Cuba and, in most cases, their relative weakness and vulnerability, gave them a keen sense of the danger from Cuba. In the second group were Mexico and all the South American countries except the two bordering on the Caribbean (Colombia and Venezuela); because of their greater size, or their remoteness from

[7]Haiti was regarded as doubtful because it was ruled by a dictator who was said to fear that the imposition of sanctions on Cuba might be taken as a precedent for similar action against his own regime. Haiti finally voted for sanctions.

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Cuba, or both together, there was no such sense of danger to overcome their various inhibitions against enforcement action.

The hard core of this "soft-line" group was what remained of the six-power bloc that had toned down action against Castro Cuba at the Punta del Este foreign ministers' meeting in January 1962. By early 1964 two of these six had been detached from the bloc in the OAS Council: Argentina, by the overthrow of President Arturo Frondizi's government; and Bolivia, by its withdrawal from the Council in a huff over a dispute with Chile. Yet even the government now in control in Argentina, headed by President Arturo Illia, shared the widespread Latin American reluctance to take enforcement action, and Bolivia, which was still a member of the OAS and could be expected to take part in any foreign ministers' meeting on Cuba, was said to remain flatly opposed to such action. And that continued to be the position of the other four members of the bloc: Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. They could of course be outvoted, but the victory would at best be hollow, since two of these countries, Brazil and Mexico, were by far the most populous in Latin America and the four together contained more than half its total population. The victory might even be Pyrrhic, for feeling was running so high that the imposition of the majority's will might lead to the disruption of the OAS; that was the point of Mexico's Palm Springs pronunciamento on Washington's Birthday.

2. Even the advocates of sanctions disagreed as to the choice of sanctions among those authorized by the Rio Treaty, which ranged from the recall of chiefs of mission through the severance of diplomatic and other relations to the use of armed force. As already noted, the last-named alternative was ruled out from the start as too strong and the first was manifestly too weak. In between lay a variety of possible measures; all had their advocates, either singly or in one combination or another. Among the countries that had already broken diplomatic relations with Cuba were bargain-hunters who would have made such action the only OAS sanction; it would be a gesture of compliance with the organization's obligation to do something, yet the whole burden of doing it would fall on the four governments that still maintained such relations with Havana. (For the same reason, of course, these four opposed it.) Venezuela and several other governments repulsed this solution as totally inadequate, yet agreement on stronger measures was hard to achieve. With regard to economic

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sanctions, it was objected that these had already been tried by the United States without conspicuous success and were now being undercut not only by the Soviet bloc but also by the growing trade between Western Europe and Cuba. In this situation, said the objectors, economic sanctions would mean only cutting off Latin America's trade with Cuba; the volume of that was far too small to give the measure much effect on Cuba, whereas it was certain to injure the few countries that had any significant trade with Cuba; and since the most important of these, Mexico, was already opposed to sanctions on other grounds, the only result might be to harden its opposition and increase the danger of a permanent schism in the OAS. A similar objection was raised to banning air communications with Cuba; Mexico was the only American country that still maintained them. It was also argued by some (as had been done by the United States in its "Vichy gamble" of 1940-1942) that there were weighty reasons, humanitarian as well as selfish, for maintaining diplomatic offices, listening posts and lines of communication even in an unfriendly country.

3. There was likewise disagreement as to whether the sanctions should be made mandatory or should merely be recommended, leaving each government free to comply or not as it chose. The latter solution had been adopted on a notable occasion, and in somewhat similar circumstances, during World War II. Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Third Meeting of American Foreign Ministers was held at Rio de Janeiro; a resolution making the severance of all relations with the Axis powers compulsory was urged by the United States and other governments but strongly opposed by Argentina and Chile; and the latter obtained enough support in Brazil and elsewhere to force the watering-down of the measure to a mere recommendation, as the only means of averting a schism in the Inter-American System. The same solution was strongly urged in some quarters now, but as strongly opposed by Venezuela and others.

4. Similarly, there was disagreement as to whether priority should be given to imposing sanctions on Cuba or to maintaining the solidarity of the Inter-American System (minus Cuba). This bald statement of the alternatives could be misleading, for, at least in the minds of many, the sanctions themselves were intended to maintain that solidarity by making it more difficult for Castro to disrupt the OAS by means like those he had em-

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ployed in Venezuela; that is, the sanctions were not merely punitive. Yet there was an important difference, though it was one of degree and emphasis, for it was a real question how far the OAS majority could go in imposing sanctions without pushing the determined minority to the breaking point. As Argentine Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz said at a later stage, the problem had three different aspects, which must be clearly distinguished: first, Cuba's aggressive policy and intervention in Venezuela; second, Cuba and continental security; and third, continental unity. Since all three aspects were closely interrelated, none could be handled without considering its effect on the other two.

5. There was also disagreement on a fundamental juridical problem: whether a distinction can be made between a state and its government. In this case the United States was deeply involved. Some Latin Americans took the view that since Castro's government had been excluded from the Inter-American System by the Punta del Este meeting, it could not now be subjected to Inter-American sanctions as though it were still a member. As already noted, it was on this ground that Mexico in February 1964 advocated referring the case to the United Nations. On the other hand, the United States and other Latin American countries insisted that the exclusion of Castro's government did not exclude Cuba nor impair the right of the OAS to take appropriate measures with regard to it. According to this view, Cuba was still a member but its membership was latent, pending the re-establishment of a government which was not "incompatible" with the principles of the Inter-American System, as Castro's government had been adjudged by the Punta del Este meeting in a resolution adopted by a unanimous vote; even Mexico and the other members of the anti-sanctions bloc had voted for it.

6. The strongest bond of unity in this bloc was its devotion to nonintervention, self-determination and absolute national sovereignty. This bond owed its great strength to the fear that any relaxation of these related principles might furnish a precedent for future Inter-American "interventions" in a less worthy cause. In Mexico's case devotion to these principles was reinforced by attachment to that country's Estrada Doctrine of recognition.[8] Without this bond it would hardly have been possible to hold

[8]The Estrada Doctrine rejected nonrecognition and the severance of diplomatic relations as incompatible with national sovereignty.

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together such highly diversified countries as Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil and Mexico. Yet their devotion cannot be explained on purely rational grounds, for equally rational Latin Americans took an entirely different view of the problem. Thus, to the objection, strongly urged by the anti-sanctions group, that an OAS mandate to its members to sever diplomatic relations would be an intolerable infringement on their national sovereignty, President Betancourt replied: "We [Venezuelans] do not entertain a feudal concept of sovereignty. We admit that sovereignty is limited, a limitation that we accepted consciously and responsibly upon joining the Organization of American States and the United Nations. . . ."[9]

Similarly, to the objection that the imposition of sanctions on Cuba would violate the OAS rule of nonintervention, Betancourt and others retorted with perfect truth that the OAS Charter of Bogotá, which all the American states had ratified, categorically declared that the sanctions of the Rio Treaty did not constitute intervention. They also protested against the absurdity of using the nonintervention rule to prevent sanctions on Cuba for its intervention in Venezuela and warned that, if this folly prevailed, the hands of the OAS would be tied and, so far as it was concerned, Castro could go on repeating his interventions and aggressions elsewhere in Latin America with impunity. However one may explain such wide divergences of opinion, the fact remains that they were a major obstacle to general agreement on the position the OAS ought to take on Venezuela's charges against Cuba.

7. Another obstacle was the prevalence throughout Latin America of suspicions regarding the role of the United States, and particularly of the Central Intelligence Agency. Although the high tide of sympathy for Castro had ebbed greatly since the missile crisis of October 1962, Cuban propagandists were still able to capitalize on these suspicions. They lost no time in doing so. Thus, when the OAS Investigating Committee's report confirming the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela was published, Havana charged that the arms had been planted there by the C.I.A. Repeated time and again, this charge gained enough credence among the many who wanted to believe it, and sowed enough skepticism among the likewise numerous fence-sitters, to strengthen substantially the opposition to imposing effective sanc-

[9]See Betancourt's statement in the *Report of the Investigating Committee, op. cit.*, p. 40.

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tions on Cuba. Latin Americans had not forgotten that on previous occasions (Guatemala in 1954, Cuba and the Bay of Pigs in 1961) C.I.A. interventions in Latin America, initially denied in Washington, had later been confirmed.

8. Local situations added to the reluctance of certain countries to act against Cuba. For one thing, impending national elections, which in the case of the United States sharpened the desire for prompt action against Castro, had the opposite effect in Mexico and Chile. With elections coming up in Mexico in July 1964 and in Chile the following September, both governments hardened their stand against effective sanctions. Of the two, Chile's problem was the more serious, for all signs pointed to a close election in which both leading candidates openly opposed sanctions, and one, Salvador Allende, made no bones about his sympathy for Castro. In Mexico, the government party was virtually certain to win by a wide margin, as always, but within its own ranks there was a strong combination of pro-Castro feeling and neutralism. Moreover, circumstances had made Mexico the main channel for what remained of Western Hemisphere trade and communications with Cuba, and the vested interests thus built up in Mexico opposed any change in the status quo. In addition, Mexico's already booming tourist trade—a major source of foreign exchange—profited by the continuation of the Caribbean crisis, which diverted tourists from Cuba and Venezuela to Mexico. Similar brakes on action against Cuba were provided in other countries by pressure groups, such as Argentina's big, Peronist-controlled General Confederation of Labor (C. G. T.), which officially and publicly admonished the government of that country to oppose sanctions of any kind. Hence, although the majority of governments, with Venezuela in the vanguard, insisted that a mere token condemnation would not do, some were deterred from pressing too hard on democratic governments whose domestic political problems they understood only too well.

9. Finally, as if all this were not enough, the brakes on action were further tightened by an effort, made by zealous democrats as well as anti-democratic left-wingers, to couple the discussion of the Cuban question with two other issues, which, while related to it, were distinct. These were the questions of the attitude the OAS should take toward *de facto* governments set up by force and of the action the OAS could and should adopt to make good its commitment under the Bogotá Charter to promote effective

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democracy. Though ostensibly aimed against all kinds of coupists and enemies of true democracy, the main thrust of this effort at this particular time was against regimes stemming from recent right-wing military coups, such as those in Argentina and Peru in 1962. Those who had benefited from or merely sympathized with such coups naturally objected. Since they were among the leading anti-Castroites (Castro, they remembered, had begun by destroying the existing Cuban armed forces), the net effect of this effort to expand the agenda of the projected consultation on Cuba was to increase the difficulty of agreeing on any agenda at all.

IV

When there were so many reasons for delay and against effective action, the charges of Venezuela and the Investigating Committee against Cuba might have continued to gather dust indefinitely but for the revolt in Brazil early in April 1964 which ousted the pro-Cuban government headed by President João Goulart. Yet, though this upheaval removed the chief obstacle to a consultation on Cuba, it gave no assurance that the consultation would result in effective sanctions. All the objections noted above were still pressed by Mexico, Uruguay and Chile; and even the new military government of Brazil, while severing its own relations with Cuba on May 11, protested that this did not necessarily mean that it favored multilateral sanctions, on which it continued to reserve its position. Indeed, the first effect of the Brazilian overturn seemed to be to stimulate not the movement for sanctions but the one that concerned itself with *de facto* governments and effective democracy. This is understandable, for, although the revolt in Brazil had wide and enthusiastic popular backing, it was a clear-cut case of the overthrow of the constitutional government by military force, and the new government was not only headed by a military man, Marshal Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, but was in effect a military dictatorship that ruled by decree.

In these circumstances progress toward a consultative meeting was still understandably slow. In April Venezuela sent another special mission, this time headed by a civilian, former Foreign Minister Marcos Falcón Briceño, to whip up support in various South American countries. How successful he was can only be inferred, but, judging from the case of Argentina, he did not accomplish much. This was regrettable, for Argentina, always a

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leading Latin American country, now held a particularly important position because the rift between most of the others might enable it to tip the scales either way. Its government continued to plod along in the middle of the road; in fact, it now shifted its emphasis to a line that had somewhat the appearance of a delaying tactic. This was its contention, advanced by Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz in a statement to the press on May 9, that the OAS consultative meeting on Cuba should not be held until "continental coincidence" on the action to be taken there had already been reached by government-to-government discussion through ordinary diplomatic channels.[10] Moreover, continued the foreign minister, although Argentina had broken its own diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba, it was not disposed to try to force similar action on governments that were unwilling to take it. According to a news despatch of the same date, Argentina's preferred solution of the problem was to condemn Cuba's "infiltration" of Venezuela, warn Cuba to stop it, and establish a vigilance committee, but not to impose sanctions. Following Brazil's rupture of relations with Cuba, Zavala Ortiz stopped talking publicly against sanctions, but only to shift to greater emphasis on his thesis that the maintenance of Inter-American solidarity was inseparable from the other aspects of the problem.

For a brief moment early in July it appeared that Argentina might take a much stronger line against Cuba because of the discovery that guerrillas operating in its mountainous northern province of Salta were being directly supported and financed by Cuba.[11] Almost at once, however, it was reported that this circumstance was being used only to obtain more modern weapons for the Argentine armed forces, and on July 9 "a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry" was quoted as saying that Argentina would not lodge a protest on this account with the OAS but would merely incorporate the incident in the general context of its statement of the position it had already adopted. This position was described as in harmony with the contention of Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay that the problem of subversion should be handled by each country individually, without relying on collective sanctions.[12]

Brazil took another step away from this group when Foreign

[10] *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), May 11, 1964.
[11] *New York Times*, July 5, 1964.
[12] *Diario Las Américas* (Miami), July 7, 1964.

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Minister Vasco Leitão da Cunha announced on July 8 that his government would vote for sanctions, though he did not specify them and still preached unanimity.[13] The other members, however, held firm. On July 10 Foreign Minister Alejandro Zorrilla de San Martín of Uruguay declared just as clearly that his government would not vote for sanctions and would support the principles of nonintervention and self-determination, abstaining if the majority voted "radical" measures against Cuba.[14] Mexico continued to support the same principles even more strongly, and a long news despatch from its capital city on July 9 reported the "suggestion" that Mexico might withdraw from the OAS if sanctions were voted; though it also noted that, while government officials would not comment on the rumor, "diplomatic sources" doubted whether Mexico would go that far.[15]

In the meanwhile, on June 27, the OAS Council had finally decided to convoke a foreign ministers' meeting and had fixed the date for July 21. Just how the log-jam of the last six months had been broken is not entirely clear. Venezuela's persistence was undoubtedly a major factor, and perhaps it was aided at this juncture by the leaking of a nearly completed report on communist penetration and subversive activity in the Western Hemisphere which was being prepared by the Special Security Commission set up by the Punta del Este meeting in January 1962.[16] At any rate, the governments that had previously preferred to have the Cuban case handled by the OAS Council now gave in to Venezuela's demand for the greater resonance of a foreign ministers' meeting, and the call for it was all but unanimous. Only Mexico abstained, and there were no negative votes.

Another explanation offered by some commentators was that by dint of six months of diplomatic conversations, a basis for general agreement had at last been hammered out. There was in fact a working group of the OAS Council, composed of the United States, Peru, Costa Rica and Colombia, which drafted a compromise for that purpose. It declared that the Cuban type of action in Venezuela constituted aggression under the terms of the Rio Treaty and made the severance of commerce and shipping with

[13] *Ibid.*, July 8, 1964.
[14] *Ibid.*, July 11, 1964.
[15] *Ibid.*, July 10, 1964.
[16] This report, released on July 17, 1964, on the eve of the Meeting of American Foreign Ministers in Washington, covered the period from October 1963 to July 1964 and stressed that "Cuba continues to be the principal source of the spreading of Communist subversion in America." (*New York Times*, July 17, 1964.)

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Cuba mandatory, but only recommended the severance of diplomatic ties. Subsequently, the suspension of air communications was also recommended.

This was indeed a compromise, but its adoption was doubtful. *La Nación* of Buenos Aires did not exaggerate when it commented that there still remained pending "a quantity of juridical, political, and diplomatic controversies that do not augur well for the future."[17] On the one hand, on the eve of the meeting in Washington, Mexico's foreign minister, now José Gorostiza, told a press conference that his government would not agree to any sanctions whatever, and that as he was too busy to attend the meeting himself, Mexico would be represented by its ambassador to the OAS, Vicente Sánchez Gavito.[18] Chile and Uruguay too remained adamant against all sanctions, and Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina were expected to oppose any mandatory sanctions.

On the other hand, Venezuela, which could expect vigorous support from some of its Caribbean neighbors, still insisted that all the sanctions should be mandatory and objected to the compromise as disastrously weak-kneed. On July 19, as the meeting was about to begin, Betancourt's successor, President Paul Leoni, issued a blast against it from Caracas. "Recommendations," he said, "are not enough," and all the sanctions of the Rio Treaty, short of armed force, must be applied to Cuba, for otherwise the Inter-American System would "suffer as great damage as the individual members themselves"; its juridical basis would disappear, coups d'état throughout Latin America would be encouraged, and the repercussions would extend to the United States itself. But Venezuela, as a party to the dispute, would be unable to vote. Accordingly, on July 20 an experienced observer, Tad Szulc of the *New York Times,* estimated that of the 19 governments eligible to vote, only 13 would support "hard-line" sanctions and that even the compromise resolution might win only from 14 to 16 votes, depending on the attitudes of Argentina, Bolivia and Haiti.

As for the United States, its role was now described as that of a pacificator seeking to "obtain agreement on resolutions that, even if weaker in scope, can at least win a convincing majority at the 20-nation meeting," so that the hemispheric split might not be "overemphasized." Yet just at this time the domestic po-

[17]June 29, 1964.
[18]*New York Times,* July 14, 1964.

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litical risk of playing the role of pacificator was pointed up by the Republican Convention's nomination of Senator Barry Goldwater as its presidential candidate. Goldwater, always a hard-hitting critic of the Democratic Administration's failure to take vigorous action against Castro's regime, was sure to make effective use of any fresh ammunition provided by the Administration's course at a meeting in which the issue between hard and soft lines on Cuba was so clear-cut.

V

In this atmosphere the Ninth Meeting of American Foreign Ministers (the first since Punta del Este) began its sessions in Washington on July 21 as planned. All twenty governments were represented, eighteen by their foreign ministers and two, the Dominican Republic and Mexico, by their delegates to the OAS. The Dominican minister's absence was satisfactorily accounted for on the ground that his responsibilities as a member of his country's ruling junta forced him to stay at home. On the other hand, the obviously hollow explanation of the Mexican foreign minister's absence—that he was too busy preparing for the impending change of administration—served only to underline his government's opposition to the meeting and to any OAS action against the Castro regime.

As chairman of the meeting the delegates elected Foreign Minister Leitão da Cunha of Brazil, whose government had not yet committed itself to specific sanctions, and as chairman of the committee of the whole (*comisión general*) Foreign Minister Fernando Gómez Martínez of Colombia, which had already publicly espoused strong sanctions. As for the United States, it had hitherto worked mainly behind the scenes and had not made its position entirely clear, but on July 22, as soon as the discussion got under way, Secretary of State Rusk came out strongly in favor of sanctions. At the same time, he brushed aside Fidel Castro's recent offer to stop supporting subversion in Latin America in return for the cessation of Washington's support to anti-Castro Cuban exiles. Cuba's campaign of subversion, said Rusk, "is not a subject for bargaining." "Today," he concluded with unwonted emotion, "it is Venezuela which is under attack. Is there any one of us who can say with assurance, 'it cannot be my country tomorrow'? . . . Let us say to the Castro regime: 'Your interference

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in the affairs of other countries in this hemisphere must stop, and stop now."[19]

Expected to be completed in four days, the meeting dragged on for six, and the final act was not signed until noon on Sunday, July 26. Even that was made possible only by fourteen hours of negotiations on the fifth day, Saturday, which began in the morning and continued past midnight. The delay was due to a quest not for unanimity, which from the start proved to be unattainable, as foreseen, but for a formula that would do two things: first, win the support of what U.S. State Department spokesmen called a "meaningful" majority for sanctions against Cuba; and second, induce the minority opposed to sanctions to abstain instead of voting against them. Obviously the two objectives were closely interrelated, for feeling ran so high at the opposite extremes represented by Mexico and Venezuela that any concession to one side might alienate the other. The situation was made to order for honest brokers and secret conclaves, and the meeting abounded in both. One delegate, Chilean Foreign Minister Julio Philippi, was reported to have held seventeen conferences with one or more of his colleagues by the end of the first day.

Since unanimity was manifestly unattainable, three members of the "hard-line" group—Colombia, Panama and Costa Rica—lost no time in forcing the issue. Hardly had the ceremonial opening exercises been completed when they formally offered a resolution requiring the imposition of all possible sanctions, short of armed force, on Cuba.[20] The resolution was so strong that it satisfied even Venezuela, which abandoned its intention of offering a resolution of its own. This Colombian resolution, as it was commonly called, was finally adopted by the majority, though with some minor alterations and important additions, as will be noted below.

It was known from the start that such a resolution would probably pass by a bare two-thirds majority, 13 votes, but that it would certainly be fought to the finish by the "no sanctions" bloc formed by Mexico, Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay. The other two voting members were Argentina and Brazil (Venezuela, it will be recalled, as the complainant against Cuba could not vote), and since they were not committed to either group in the early stages,

[19]*New York Times*, July 23, 1964.
[20]The authority for sanctions was found in Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty.

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they held the balance of power in the conference. It was essential to win them over to the hard-line group if the goal of a "meaningful" majority were to be attained, for such a majority would have to be not only counted but weighed, and these two countries contained nearly half the total population of Latin America. Neither was likely to be an easy convert to hard-line sanctions. Both had come to Washington preaching the need for unanimity, which in this context could only mean concessions to the Mexican bloc, and indeed Argentina persevered in this line as late as Friday, July 24. On that day Argentina's Foreign Minister, Zavala Ortiz, offered a resolution which, while strongly condemning Cuba's "aggression and intervention" against Venezuela, merely warned Cuba of future sanctions if the offense should be repeated. Although the concluding paragraph included a specific reference to the sanction of armed force, which had hitherto been avoided or disavowed in this meeting, Argentina's resolution was much too weak for the majority who wanted sanctions now. Nor was it acceptable to the opposing bloc, who wanted no sanctions at all.

At this juncture the latter group made their strongest effort, employing the familiar hatchet-and-olive-branch tactic. Its hatchetman was Mexican Ambassador Sánchez Gavito, whose sister lives in Cuba and is said to be on friendly terms with the Castro regime. On July 25 Sánchez Gavito delivered what was described as the most vehement speech in the meeting up to this time, denouncing the proposed sanctions as not merely inappropriate under the terms of the Rio Treaty but as a "flagrant violation" of it. He supported this extraordinary judgment by the bizarre assertion that Cuba's actions had never disturbed the peace of Venezuela nor violated its territory, sovereignty or independence, and had at no time threatened the peace of "the continent." As if this were not enough, he also warned that the imposition of sanctions would put Inter-American solidarity itself to "the severest test in its long history."[21]

On the same day Mexico joined with Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay in extending a somewhat stunted olive branch. This took the form of an offer on their part to abstain, instead of voting no, provided the sanctions resolution were amended to permit the continuance of relations with Cuba by any state so desiring,

[21] *Diario Las Américas,* August 8, 1964, "Extractos del discurso del delegado especial de México, Vicente Sánchez Gavito, en la sesión de la comisión general."

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either for humanitarian reasons or for "reasons of interest." This left the majority cold. As one member said: "If they had offered to vote affirmatively, there might have been something to talk about. But it doesn't make sense to dicker over such a poor proposition merely in order to change four blackballs into four abstentions."[22]

VI

Nevertheless, in an effort to appease the no-sanctions bloc, two minor changes were made in the Colombian resolution. First, as a concession to all four members of the bloc, the word "rupture" in the clause on diplomatic and consular relations was softened to "not maintain"; but the clause was still mandatory. Second, the prohibition of air transport to and from Cuba was eliminated; this was a concession to Mexico, which, as noted above, was the only country that still maintained such a connection.

On the other hand, four additions were made to the Colombian resolution in order to strengthen it. First, to the requirement that the American states should "suspend all trade . . . with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment," was added the qualifying phrase "that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons." The qualification might be significant as regarded foodstuffs, for Uruguay had recently been negotiating a sale of its surplus beef to Cuba. The other three additions were entirely new paragraphs, which appeared as numbers 1, 5 and 6 in the resolution as finally adopted. Number 1, proposed jointly by the United States and Brazil, and number 5, which seems to have grown out of Argentina's otherwise unproductive proposed resolution, could prove highly important, whereas number 6, proposed by the United States alone, was generally regarded as at best futile.

The future importance of Paragraph 1 depends so greatly on Paragraph 5 that the two should be considered together. Both represent alternatives to earlier proposals for interpreting or amending the Rio Treaty so that, in the future, quicker and more effective action might be taken in dealing with Castro's efforts to export his revolution by subversion, as in the case of Venezuela. All such proposals had been sidetracked by doubts about the competence of a foreign ministers' meeting to perform that

[22] *Ibid.*, July 26, 1964.

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task, which, it was argued, lay exclusively in the province of the supreme organ, the Inter-American Conference. Instead, this meeting accomplished the same purpose without exceeding its powers: Confining itself to the case which was properly before it, it established precedents which would provide the basis for quick and effective action in any future case of this kind. After citing in the preamble the findings of the Investigating Committee appointed on December 3, 1963, it declared in Paragraph 1 that Cuba's acts as verified by that committee constituted "aggression" and "intervention" against Venezuela, "which affects all of the member states." This brought acts of the kind mentioned within the scope of the Rio Treaty. Then, in Paragraph 5, the resolution warned Cuba that "if it should persist in" actions of this kind against "one or more of the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential rights . . . of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed force, *until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere.*"[23]

The latter paragraph established a rule which was potentially of the highest importance. If the words mean what they seem to mean, any similar effort by Cuba to export its revolution could henceforth be met instantly with retaliatory measures up to and including the use of armed force by any governments so minded, without waiting for the Organ of Consultation (i.e., a meeting of foreign ministers or, provisionally, the OAS Council) to meet and make up its mind. Henceforth, the hard-line governments, no matter how few, need not be deterred by the no-sanctions governments, no matter how numerous. It remains to be seen whether, in any future case, the former will avail themselves of this opportunity in the face of obvious risks that it entails, which range from the disruption of the Inter-American System to the initiation of armed conflict that could escalate into a major war. At any rate, the door is now open to any American government that believes it has ground for action against Cuba and wants to take it, regardless of what the other governments and the Organ of Consultation might do or say. It is as interesting as it is idle to speculate on what might have happened had this new gloss on the Rio Treaty been in effect before the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, by which time Castro had already made

[23]Emphasis added.

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several efforts to export his revolution by force as well as by the somewhat less direct means employed against Venezuela in 1963.

The last of the new paragraphs, number 6, came as something of an anticlimax. Addressed to those states which were not members of the OAS but shared its "ideals," it urged them to "examine the possibility of effectively demonstrating their solidarity in achieving the purposes of this resolution." Except as a salutary reminder that the American states do not live in a closed regional system sealed off from the rest of the world, the injunction had so little to recommend it that one wonders why the United States insisted upon including it in the face of strong opposition from Latin American delegates. Some objected that it was improper to make any policy recommendation, even one in these vague terms, to nonmembers; others objected that the OAS would only make itself ridiculous by issuing an injunction that sounded like a cry for help and was virtually certain to be ignored by the addressees who counted most. The latter point was the more telling of the two, for the main thrust of the injunction was against the recent increase in exports from Great Britain, France and Spain to Cuba, and the United States had already protested with little effect in the case of Spain and with none at all in those of Britain and France. Since the protest responded in some measure to pressure from the U.S. Congress, it may be that the injunction to nonmembers of the OAS was incorporated in the resolution less for its effect on them than on the U.S. Congress.

Thus completed and signed on July 26, 1964, by the representatives of all twenty American states, and captioned "Application of Measures to the Present Government of Cuba," the resolution read as follows:

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,

HAVING SEEN the report of the Investigating Committee designated on December 3, 1963, by the Council of the Organization of American States, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, and

CONSIDERING:

That the said report establishes among its conclusions that "the Republic of Venezuela has been the target of a series of actions sponsored and directed by the Government of Cuba, openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the democratic Government of Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare," and

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That the aforementioned acts, like all acts of intervention and aggression, conflict with the principles and aims of the inter-American system,

RESOLVES:

1. To declare that the acts verified by the Investigating Committee constitute an aggression and an intervention on the part of the Government of Cuba in the internal affairs of Venezuela, which affects all of the member states.

2. To condemn emphatically the present Government of Cuba for its acts of aggression and of intervention against the territorial inviolability, the sovereignty, and the political independence of Venezuela.

3. To apply, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the following measures:

a. That the governments of the American states not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of Cuba;

b. That the governments of the American states suspend all their trade, whether direct or indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons; and

c. That the governments of the American states suspend all sea transportation between their countries and Cuba, except for such transportation as may be necessary for reasons of a humanitarian nature.

4. To authorize the Council of the Organization of American States, by an affirmative vote of two thirds of its members, to discontinue the measures adopted in the present resolution at such time as the Government of Cuba shall have ceased to constitute a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere.

5. To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in carrying out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or more of the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere.

6. To urge those states not members of the Organization of American States that are animated by the same ideals as the inter-American system to examine the possibility of effectively demonstrating their solidarity in achieving the purposes of this resolution.

7. To instruct the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to transmit to the United Nations Security Council the text of the present resolution, in accordance with the provisions of Article 54 of the United Nations Charter.[24]

VII

The resolution met with the expected variety of response from various countries. For once, Peking and Moscow found themselves

[24] *Department of State Bulletin,* August 10, 1964, pp. 181-182.

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in agreement: both pointed to it as fresh proof that the OAS was a branch of the U.S. State Department, and they praised the brave resistance of Mexico, Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay to the massive pressure of "aggressive Yankee imperialism." Secretary of State Rusk lauded the resolution for its "vigor and great clarity" and called this meeting "the most important ever held in this hemisphere," while Assistant Secretary Thomas C. Mann, the Administration's chief proponent of the hard line, called the meeting a "victory for the Inter-American System" and a "body blow to Castro." A few hours after the signing, Rusk told a television audience that "Castro has no future in Cuba or this hemisphere."[25] Similar jubilation was expressed by spokesmen for Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica and other hard-line governments.

Within six weeks three of the four no-sanctions countries had complied, after a fashion, with the resolution. Bolivia did so fully after President Paz Estenssoro had been safely inaugurated for another term. Just before going out of office President Jorge Alessandri of Chile bowed to the OAS majority to the extent of suspending diplomatic relations with Cuba. At the same time he pointed out that his action would not bind his successor, to be elected in September; but as it turned out, the victor in that election was the relatively moderate Eduardo Frei Montalva, who, though he had opposed sanctions on Cuba, was not expected to reverse Alessandri's action. Uruguay, the last of the three, complied on September 8. According to one report, its decision was influenced by the course of events in Chile but even so was taken by the narrowest of margins, only five of its nine-man Council of Government voting in favor of the break.[26]

Mexico remained adamant. Its refusal to comply with any part of the resolution was made official on August 3, 1964, by an announcement by Foreign Minister José Gorostiza that President López Mateos had decided to "maintain the contacts [of Mexico] with the Cuban government" without change. As before, the Mexican position was based mainly on the principles of nonintervention and self-determination, and on the arguments that the resolution on Cuba was not justified by the Rio Treaty and that the severance of relations with Cuba would do more harm than good. Gorostiza also objected to Paragraph 5 of the

[25] *New York Times,* July 27, 1964, report by Tad Szulc.
[26] *New York Times,* September 9, 1964.

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resolution as an improper extension of the right of self-defense. He did not repeat the proposal, made by his chief in February 1964, that the Cuban case be taken to the United Nations. Instead, he said that since disagreement about the case was apparently due to differing interpretations of the Rio Treaty, Mexico would support any move by OAS members to refer the question to the International Court of Justice and would be bound by its decision.[27] When on September 1 President López Mateos reiterated his decision in his final message on the state of the nation, he concentrated his fire on Paragraph 5, declaring that the extension it gave to the right of self-defense was incompatible with the Rio Treaty. Even if he was right, his government's nullification of the resolution on Cuba clearly violated its obligation under the Rio Treaty to be bound by a two-thirds majority vote, and so faced the OAS with a new test.

VIII

What would the imposition of OAS sanctions on Cuba accomplish? Probably no one really believed that it would cook Castro's goose. In informed quarters, the expectations were much more modest, at least according to Tad Szulc in a dispatch to the *New York Times* on the day the resolution was signed. As he put it, "The sanctions, of themselves, were expected to have little practical impact on Cuba. . . . The interest of the majority was to score a political point and to reinforce anti-subversion defenses."

Scoring a political point might not have been worth all this trouble, but reinforcing "antisubversion defenses" was, and Paragraph 5 of the resolution reinforced these defenses greatly. Whether it did so for better or worse remains to be seen,[28] but it has at any rate filled a prescription recommended on the eve of the foreign ministers' meeting by Senator Hubert H.

[27] *Diario Las Américas,* August 5, 1964. A briefer and somewhat misleading report of the announcement appeared in the *New York Times,* August 4, 1964. Gorostiza presumably had Article 96 of the UN Charter in mind in speaking of the International Court of Justice.

[28] The Dominican Republic's representative, Ambassador José Antonio Bonilla Atiles, saw nothing but good in it. Speaking at a meeting of Cuban exiles to endorse the resolution, he stressed the novelty and importance of Paragraph 5 and declared that, by assimilating Castro's measures against Venezuela to an armed attack, it had opened "new battlefields against the despot who drove you into exile." Castro, he said, surely realized this and was shaken by it; hence his violent harangue against the resolution on the day of its adoption (which coincided with the Castro regime's celebration of its July 26 movement). See *Diario Las Américas,* August 7, 1964, for the text of Ambassador Bonilla Atiles' address.

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Humphrey, whose subsequent election as Vice President of the United States gives added importance to his views. After endorsing a "national policy . . . of clear, unequivocal support for taking the necessary steps to cut off arms shipments from Cuba to Venezuela or any other Latin American nation," Humphrey continued: "Cuba must not be permitted to be an arsenal for terrorism, revolution and chaos. . . . The existing machinery of the O.A.S. should not be permitted to impede the successful handling of problems of this sort. . . . The machinery of the O.A.S. should be sufficiently flexible to permit bilateral action as well as multilateral action where it may be required."[29]

For the rest, this case was notable on two further counts. First, it raised again, though without clarifying it, the vexed question of the relations between the United Nations and regional organizations. Second, it brought out in high relief the difficulty of realizing the generations-old dream of Latin American solidarity. Any encouragement such dreams derived from the unity of Latin America's big three at the Punta del Este meeting in January 1962 vanished at the Washington meeting in July 1964, for the latter ended with Mexico on one side of a high fence and Argentina and Brazil on the other, and with the remaining Latin American countries similarly, though quite unequally, divided. The recent apparent trend in the OAS toward arraying the great bulk of Latin America against the United States had been sharply checked. Why this was so, whether the check would prove lasting, and how the diverse attitudes of the Latin American governments could be correlated with stages of economic, social and political development and the rising tides of nationalism and nonalignment or neutralism, are fascinating questions, but any effort to explore them here would take us far beyond the limits of the present article.

[29]Hubert H. Humphrey, "U.S. Policy in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1964, p. 595.

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THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON WAR AND THE CUBAN CRISIS*

by Robert D. Crane

BOTH Soviet and Chinese communist leaders have stated that the central issue in their dispute is how to achieve maximum speed in eliminating capitalism while simultaneously providing maximum security for communist gains. They disagree primarily on how to continue the conflict with the Free World at the maximum level consistent with the avoidance of escalation to strategic nuclear war.

Analysis of the Sino-Soviet dispute on war is useful to Western strategists because it can throw light on the Soviet strategic thinking which led to the Cuban missile crisis. It can also provide insights into subsequent Soviet strategic thinking which led to the present period of *détente*. This analysis, in turn, may prove useful in estimating the Soviet reaction to any crisis originating in Southeast Asia.

The Dispute Over Revolution as a Deterrent Force

The Soviet and Chinese communists are locked in a profound debate over the doctrinal foundations for an optimum deterrence strategy to promote the global victory of communism. The essential disagreement results largely from diverging Soviet and Chinese views on the precise locus of the revolutionary conflict in the modern age. In Marxist terms the question is: What and where are "the main contradictions of our time?"

The Soviets insist that the principal contradiction—and therefore the focus of world tension—is between socialism and imperialism, and, specifically, between the most advanced countries in each camp. The immediate military implication of this view is that, in evaluating the possible risks and gains of revolutionary war in the underdeveloped world, priority must be given to the consideration of the effect which any specific war may have on

*This article is condensed from a chapter in the author's study entitled "The Management and Resolution of Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Competing Strategies."

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the socialist-imperialist confrontation. In this way the communists may avoid, or at least maintain control of, any conflict which might result between the two most advanced industrial countries. The most important implication of the Soviet view on the "contradictions of our time" is that the rate of progress of world revolution must be determined primarily by the struggle for power between the Soviet Union and the United States. More specifically, an important and perhaps the determining factor in regulating the pace and direction of world revolution must be the technological and doctrinal requirements of nuclear deterrence. The Soviets believe that the successful and safe completion of world revolution requires the development of an optimum mix of doctrines and supporting force structure—within the constraints of credible logic and economic feasibility—to deter the West from any dangerous counterattacks during the prosecution of world revolution.

The Chinese place less stress on this problem of developing the necessary force structure and doctrines for nuclear deterrence. They do not yet have the capacity to develop an effective nuclear deterrent, even for regional use only. Most importantly, however, they believe that progress in world revolution will, in itself, be the best deterrent to Western counterattack. This belief results from what has become known as the Maoist view on the main contradictions of the present historical period. Mao Tse-tung believes that the political-military struggle during the third quarter of this century will not take the form of a war between the United States and the USSR but rather a struggle to control the intermediate zones.

The Chinese communists made the point specific during the course of their polemics with Chairman Khrushchev in 1963:

> The main contradiction of our time is . . . the contradiction not between socialism and imperialism, but between the national liberation movement and imperialism. The decisive force in the struggle against imperialism . . . is not the world system of socialism [led by the Soviet Union], not the struggle of the international working class, but again the national liberation movement.[1]

> The various types of contradictions in the contemporary world are concentrated in the vast areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; . . . the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the people of these areas, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's population.[2]

[1] *Peking Review*, October 25, 1963, p. 10.
[2] *Ibid.*, June 21, 1963, pp. 7, 9.

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Mao's current strategic thought is a direct projection of his strategy developed in the Chinese civil war—of surrounding the cities from the countryside. By 1937 Mao had developed this strategy for operations in China because the Kuomintang's hold on the cities was firm and incontestable while its control over the countryside was weak and vulnerable. Mao has now projected this strategy to the global arena.[3] Recent evidence that this concept of envelopment influences Chinese communist thinking is the fact that the *Peking Review* reprinted the following extract from the Resolution of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party adopted early in 1964:

> The plenum attaches great importance to the conclusion of the political report [of the Politbureau] that from a world-wide viewpoint, Asia, Africa, and Latin America represent the *countryside* of the world, while Europe and North America are its *cities;* that in order to win the victory of world revolution, the world proletariat must assign an important place to revolutions in Asia, Africa and Latin America, that is to say, to the revolution in the *countryside* of the world.[4]

The importance of the conflict between the Chinese communists and the Soviets on the "main contradictions of our time" is the effect it has on their respective policies of utilizing peaceful coexistence to further the ends of global revolution. Both the Chinese and the Soviets believe that peaceful coexistence—understood in its original defensive sense as the absence of general war—is essential. The fundamental difference between the Chinese and Soviet strategists concerns how the communists can best maintain peaceful coexistence—in this passive, nonideological sense—during the course of the world revolution.

The Chinese believe that peaceful coexistence can be maintained only by encircling the capitalists from the underdeveloped countries, by waging a constant struggle against the capitalists, just as the Chinese communists maintained a united front (a form of peaceful coexistence) with the Kuomintang from 1937 to 1945 by waging a constant limited struggle against the government forces in order to prevent them from engaging in offensive actions that might escalate into even more serious conflict. They also believe that an aggressive policy of supporting revolution around the world will not increase the risk of military escalation in the conflict between socialism and the capitalist paper tigers. Peaceful coexistence can be forced on the capitalists by the very

[3]See Tang Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence," ORBIS, Spring 1964.

[4]Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 42. (Emphasis added.)

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success of the revolutionary movement. As Liu Shao-ch'i, Chairman of the People's Republic, states in the misleading terminology of the communists: "We have the spiritual atomic bomb." According to the Chinese communists it is the very success of the world revolutionary movement that is the key to the avoidance of military escalation and to conflict control in the modern age.

The Dispute Over Weapons as a Deterrent Force

Despite this Chinese emphasis on the human factor as the decisive element both in prosecuting and protecting the world revolution, the Chinese also emphasize the deterrent value of modern weapons. In fact the Chinese place greater reliance than do the Soviets on the deterrent power not only of revolutionary leadership but *also* of advanced weapons.

Neither the Chinese communists nor the Soviets believe that general nuclear war can be a valid instrument of policy. They both do believe, however, that the concept of nuclear war and its supporting military doctrines can be manipulated to support political offensives. They believe that uncommitted nuclear power can be used in the psychological realm to accomplish the conventional ends of military conflict without ever actually waging war. This is an art which is particularly important during the present period of offensive-defensive imbalance, when even the strongest country has very little military power which it can actually use except in the defense of its vital interests.

Although the Chinese communists and the Soviets agree in their basic beliefs about the political nature of war in the modern era, the Chinese assert that Soviet hesitancy in putting these beliefs into practice constitutes a denial of the Leninist doctrine that war is a continuation of politics. The Chinese are more confident than the Soviets in the political power of nuclear weapons: for almost forty years they have specialized in exploiting the links between military and political power to achieve results which far exceeded their objective military potential. Mao believes that he is a better strategist than the post-Stalin Soviet leaders because he has achieved great success in integrating military doctrine and military considerations into a nonmilitary strategy designed to facilitate the victory of communism without the actual commitment of his main military power.

Thirty years ago Mao Tse-tung expressed the basic premise of his military strategy when he said in the telegraphic style com-

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mon to Chinese writing: "Our strategy is 'to pit one against ten,' while our tactic is 'to pit ten against one.'" In 1948, he refined this doctrine into his famous dictum of "strategically despise, tactically respect" the enemy. In the age of nuclear weapons, this strategy calls for an aggressive policy of maximizing the political exploitation of nuclear weapons to deter hostile responses to communist initiatives, while minimizing the risks of the military use of nuclear weapons by carefully limiting the initiatives which the communists undertake.

The Chinese communists pursue this policy of strategically despising the enemy by emphasizing the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and by asserting that "if the imperialists insist on a nuclear war with the possible sacrifice of hundreds of millions of people . . . the future of mankind will nevertheless be a bright one."[5] As Mao phrased it in November 1957, "while imperialism would be razed to the ground, the whole world would become socialist."[6] In a now classic editorial in the April 19, 1960 issue of *Ren-min-Rih-bao,* the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed: "On the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious people would create with extreme rapidity a civilization thousands of times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves." Mao not only thinks the unthinkable, he pretends to enjoy it.

When the question comes to the actual military use of nuclear weapons, or indeed of any Chinese weapons, the Chinese firmly believe, and without exception have acted in accordance with their belief, in the policy of "tactical respect." This means that military initiative should never be taken until the commanders are sure of victory.[7] In the simple terms of Maoist doctrine, Chi-

[5] *Peking Review,* July 26, 1963, p. 27.
[6] *Ibid.,* September 6, 1963, p. 10.
[7] The Chinese intervention in Korea in 1950 resulted from Soviet insistence that the Chinese intervene in order to prevent a Soviet confrontation with the nuclear-armed United States. The Chinese communists made this fact public in November 1963 in order to counter the distorted Soviet charge of Chinese adventurism in a war which from its first planning stage was directed entirely from Moscow and from Marshal Rodion Malinovskii's headquarters across the border in Siberia, and was commanded down as far as battalion level by Soviet officers.
Two of the best summary statements of Chinese communist military policy are the following: "Mao's first law of war is disarmingly simple: to preserve one's self and annihilate the enemy. . . . One fights only when victory is certain." Samuel B. Griffith, II, "The Glorious Military Thought of Comrade Mao Tse-tung," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1964, p. 673; "Peking believes that its domestic requirements demand the attitudes and internal loyalty of an aggressive posture without its risks and costs. . . . Regardless of enemy 'challenges and incitements,' China must 'avoid a decisive battle until the objective conditions are favorable.'" David B. Bobrow, "Peking's Military Calculus," *World Politics,* January 1964, pp. 297 and 300.

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nese strategy vis-à-vis a nuclear power is *doctrinally* "to pit one against ten." Chinese tactics against the same power are *militarily* "to pit ten against one."

In summary one can say that the Chinese do not dispute the role of Soviet advanced weapons as a powerful deterrent force. They dispute merely the Soviet insistence that these weapons are inadequate to give meaningful support to an expansionist revolutionary movement when the Soviet Union is demonstrably inferior strategically to the United States. Similarly, the Soviets do not dispute the importance of revolutionary action—Chinese or otherwise—to intimidate the capitalists and to terrify the "neutral" nations. They question merely its adequacy as a deterrent force. The Chinese do not want to risk nuclear war any more than do the Soviets. They differ from the Soviets on the subject of war only because they have greater confidence in communist power to deter armed Western opposition to communist expansionist moves in the intermediate areas of the world. Although both the Chinese communists and the Soviets believe in the necessity to respect the United States tactically, they differ in their evaluation of the best way to despise the United States strategically. Although they both attach decisive importance to conflict control in the pursuit of world revolution, they differ on the best way to control conflict.

The Cuban Crisis and the Failure of Communist Conflict Control

These two opposing strategies of deterrence and of world revolution were nowhere better revealed than in the recriminations which followed the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. This crisis served only to confirm both the Soviet and the Chinese communists in their respective beliefs that only their own strategy of conflict control is ideologically, politically and militarily correct.

Newspaper accounts of Chinese reaction to the Soviet withdrawal of strategic missiles from Cuba referred almost exclusively to the charges of Soviet "capitulationism." Much more significant were other Chinese statements issued immediately after the Cuban crisis. They asserted that the real doctrinal error illustrated by this crisis was Soviet "adventurism" in deciding to emplace strategic missiles in the heart of the traditional Western sphere of influence. In a particularly bitter attack in *Ren-min-Rih-bao* on November 19, 1963, the Chinese communists accused

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Khrushchev of "nuclear fetishism," and of "recklessly playing with nuclear weapons." Simultaneously they said that Khrushchev was guilty of "fawning before imperialist nuclear blackmail." This was the point the Chinese were making: By sending strategic missiles to Cuba the Soviets were risking a military confrontation with the United States and thereby failing to show sufficient "tactical respect" to a capitalist country which was overwhelmingly more powerful than the Soviet Union, particularly in the area surrounding Cuba. Much more significant for the future of the world revolutionary movement, however, was the Soviet willingness to take the risk of having to withdraw the missiles. This withdrawal would seriously undermine the communist strategy of "strategically despising" the capitalist enemy, which is basic to the revolutionary thinking of Mao Tse-tung. It might show, as the Chinese communists themselves stated in a different context in July 1964, that the Soviet leaders, on whom the Chinese communists had hoped to rely for an Asian nuclear umbrella, were nothing but "paper tigers." This degradation of the nuclear umbrella by the abortive Soviet missile gambit in Cuba was a particularly serious blow because the umbrella was designed, in the Chinese view, to serve only for areas in which the United States was less vitally committed than in the Caribbean.

The Chinese undoubtedly were incensed also because the Soviet withdrawal of strategic weapons from Cuba in 1962 might seem to support the point that the Soviets themselves had made at the beginning of the acute phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute during the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1958: that the manipulation of nuclear weapons for offensive political purposes required a more credible force structure than the Soviets had yet produced. In fact, as Arnold Horelik has pointed out, even the decision to deploy strategic missiles to Cuba, ostensibly in order to defend it from imperialist attack, "would admit, if true, that the threat posed to the United States by Soviet weapons based in the USSR lacked sufficient credibility to deter a U.S. attack on socialist Cuba."[8] This interpretation might provide a partial refutation of Chinese claims that USSR-based missiles could and should provide a nuclear umbrella for the more aggressive pursuit of revolution elsewhere in the world, particularly along the periphery of Communist China.

[8]Arnold Horelik, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," *World Politics,* April 1964, p. 372.

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The Soviet answer to the Chinese was that the Chinese could well call the withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba "fawning before the enemy," because they had no missiles to withdraw. Although the Chinese could afford to maintain their policy of "strategically despising" the enemy by calling him a "paper tiger," the Soviets no longer had this option. Furthermore, the Chinese perfectly well knew it. But this was precisely the point that the Chinese communists were trying to convey in their assertion that Khrushchev was guilty of the worst sort of adventurism by deploying strategic missiles to Cuba in the first place.

The obvious disadvantages of a failure of the Cuban missile gambit were undoubtedly weighed carefully by the Soviets. Their decision to go ahead with their plans is eloquent testimony to the Soviet commitment to their basic position: that the progress of world revolution must be determined by the struggle for power between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Soviets had agreed with the Chinese communists in the late 1950's that a new era of communist advance was dawning. It would compare with the conquest of Eastern Europe and China after World War II. At the second communist summit conference in December 1960, the Soviets and Chinese jointly announced in the "Declaration of 81 Communist Parties" that a new, third stage of the general crisis of capitalism had started.

The importance of this basic Soviet shift toward the offensive in international affairs was underlined by Khrushchev's report of January 6, 1961, on the summit conference of the previous month. Here for the first time he officially and explicitly differentiated his earlier blanket rejection of the "inevitability of war." He introduced a typology of war which recognized world wars, local wars and wars of national liberation. Khrushchev announced that "liberation wars . . . are not only justified, they are inevitable." "National liberation war" was a very flexible term. Ostensibly it was geographically restricted to wars of an intrastate rather than interstate character. In actuality it was restricted only to wars of specific social-political purposes so as to leave room for the support of almost any type of war which the Soviets might consider "just." Khrushchev was confident of the prospects of liberating vast parts of the world not only from colonialism but from Western economic and political influence. He was so confident that he embarked on a policy of providing noncommunist governments with shipments of modern arma-

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ments for possible use in pursuing policies which would support the larger interests of the "socialist commonwealth."

Khrushchev was further encouraged because the resoluteness of U.S. foreign policy in opposing communist advances was brought into question during the first year of the new Kennedy Administration. Of particular significance for the power-oriented Soviet leaders were the American failure to follow through with the invasion of Cuba in April, the Geneva agreement to neutralize Laos in June, and the failure in August to take any action, other than verbal protests, in response to the erection of the Berlin Wall. By 1962 the Soviets seemed to be well on the way to supporting the Chinese in their insistence that the time had come for bold steps in promoting world revolution.

By 1962, however, two countervailing developments forced the Soviets to re-evaluate their strategy. First, progress in fomenting "national liberation movements" was much less spectacular than either the Soviets or the Chinese had anticipated. This would indicate that the Chinese argument for reliance on the success of the national liberation movement as a principal deterrent to U.S. counterintervention was losing its validity—at least temporarily. Second, the United States had ascertained, with the assistance of its space reconnaissance satellites, where the Soviet strategic missiles were and thus had rendered them vulnerable to attack. Furthermore, the United States had learned how many operational missiles the Soviets had. The result was a reversal of the "missile gap" concept, which, as Khrushchev had found out to his satisfaction and perhaps to his surprise at Camp David in 1959, had injected an additional element of caution into U.S. foreign policy planning. This reversal would indicate that neither the Chinese nor even the Soviets could rely on Soviet strategic weapons to deter U.S. counterrevolutionary moves.

This compromise of Soviet security in the field of strategic missiles had serious implications for the Soviets, because their entire revolutionary strategy is based on the thesis that the rate of progress of world revolution must be determined by the technological and doctrinal requirements of nuclear deterrence. The Soviets were faced with a dilemma. They could embark on a period of pause in order to build up their strategic power relative to that of the United States. This would strain the Soviet economy and might forfeit Soviet leadership of international communism. Or else the Soviets could try to take advantage of

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the irresoluteness in U.S. foreign policy and attempt to achieve a so-called quick-fix, by deploying a sizeable quantity of cheap intermediate-range strategic missiles to Cuba. Success of this venture would compensate for the slow development of the world revolutionary movement and establish the Soviet Union as the principal revolutionary force in the world.

The Soviets believe that the principal contradictions in the world are between the leading industrial and military countries of the communist and capitalist camps. Therefore to them their missile gambit was a legitimate attempt to promote favorable conditions of world revolution. The Chinese communists believe that the principal contradiction is between the "oppressers" and the "oppressed" in the intermediate areas of the world, for example, in Brazil and Africa. Therefore they conclude that there can be no justification for such Soviet adventurism.

Conclusions

The respective conclusions which the Chinese communists and the Soviets seem to have reached are of vital importance for Western strategists. The Chinese communists seem to have concluded that the failure of the Cuban missile gambit reaffirmed the correctness of their ideological, political and military doctrines on revolution. The decisive element in world revolution is not the quality of the military weapons which are needed to defend revolutionary gains, but rather the human factor and the quality of the revolutionary leadership which achieves these gains. The Chinese communists, in effect, have condemned what they consider to be a Soviet containment philosophy. Furthermore, they consider that the bankruptcy of this philosophy was proven by the Cuban crisis.

The Soviets seem to have learned several things from their Cuban experience. First, they learned that their political leaders had correctly estimated the chances of controlling the risks of escalation sufficiently to permit the withdrawal of their missiles without any direct military confrontation with the United States. The Soviets thereby obtained additional verification of the basic communist tenet that crises which create a risk of escalation to nuclear war are susceptible to management in the hands of statesmen who recognize the primacy of politics over the purely military accidentals of war.

Secondly, the Soviets may have concluded from U.S. foreign

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policy following the Cuban crisis that advanced weapons are useful to consolidate "socialist" gains. The Soviets know that the U.S. government did not greatly fear the risk of escalation when it conducted a policy of removing Castro by force in 1961. They know that after the 1962 Cuban crisis most Americans concluded that the removal of the Castro regime by force would be highly risky. Part of the reason for this change is that in 1961 U.S. intervention could easily have been considered as a defensive measure to contain communism. After the Cuban crisis, according to the statements of some leading American statesmen, including Senator J. William Fulbright, the removal of the Castro regime by force would constitute the "rollback" of communism from a position which had already become consolidated as part of the communist sphere of influence. As Charles Burton Marshall has phrased it: "One must await what events may disclose as to the power of precedent in the pattern of seeing a Communist regime put into power by whatever means, having the stakes raised, then guaranteeing the position in return for having the stakes lowered."[9]

The third lesson which the Soviets seem to have learned from their Cuban missile gambit is that the direct "psycho-political" exploitation of advanced weapons under conditions of strategic inferiority or even balance may support a policy of "capitalist containment," but that these weapons cannot serve directly to further communist expansion. They may have concluded that the utility of advanced weapons for expansionist purposes can be restored only by adopting a policy of deterrence which not only will enable the Soviets to control conflict defensively during the near future but will also provide them with an opportunity over a more extended period to gain military advantages over the United States. They may hope that these advantages, even if only of a marginal military nature, might at some future time be parlayed into a type of conflict control that would bring important political gains.

The evidence is strong that the failure of the Cuban missile gambit has not caused the Soviets to abandon the basic strategy which called for the deployment of strategic missiles to Cuba. Rather, the ease with which the United States forced the removal of Soviet missiles may have served merely to reaffirm the correct-

[9]Charles Burton Marshall, *Cuba: Thoughts Prompted by the Crisis* (Washington: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1962).

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ness of this strategy, because it might prove—to those who otherwise might have doubts—the importance of strategic military superiority.

Despite the fluctuations in the international political climate, Khrushchev demonstrated remarkable constancy, at least after January 1960, in maintaining the priority and direction of his advanced military research and development. This was consistent with his basic strategic views on war. They called for reliance on strategic military power to prepare the objective political conditions for the successful prosecution of world revolution. The future success of the strategy developed by Khrushchev during the late 1950's and early 1960's would require another period of *détente* similar to the one he initiated soon after coming to power. The new period of *détente,* however, would have to be basically different in purpose. It would not be designed merely as a temporary measure to gain time for building up the defenses of the Soviet Union against outside pressures. Rather it would have to make possible a long-range program of basic military research and development to gain relative military advantages for the Soviet Union. This military R&D program in turn would rely on political and diplomatic support in the form of a "strategic dialogue" on arms constraints. This would require Soviet advocacy of self-denial based on tacit understandings, false assumptions, and sufficient secrecy to permit Soviet evasion in the critical areas of weapons development.

A deeper understanding of the Cuban missile crisis and its role in the Sino-Soviet dispute on war is particularly important for those who are engaged in conducting a Soviet-Western strategic dialogue. Erroneous evaluations of the Sino-Soviet dispute could result in highly misleading estimates of the accomplishments which Western governments have achieved and might achieve in this dialogue. A proper understanding of the Sino-Soviet dispute is especially important for any Western attempts to strengthen the alleged "mutual Soviet-Western recognition" of the uselessness of the arms race.

The arms race will continue until the expansionist power which has caused this race either recognizes the uselessness of military power to pursue its expansionist aims or else abandons these aims. Only a *coordinated* Western policy of firm determination to maintain superiority in advanced weapons development can remove the incentives for Soviet reliance on future weapons

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as instruments of political expansion. We must convince the communists that their expansionist aims—whether militarily or politically based—are utopian. Only then can we hope to succeed in our long-range policy of peaceful engagement designed to promote the evolution of the communist system. Only when the communist system evolves and the communist countries lose their unlimited expansionist aims can the peoples of the world succeed in their efforts to construct an international order based not on the management of conflict but on its resolution.

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SOME NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET MILITARY DEBATE

by Thomas W. Wolfe

SLIGHTLY more than a decade has passed since Stalin's death helped to set in motion a process of change and ferment in Soviet military thinking. The opening of the post-Stalin period happened to coincide with the beginning of the scientific-technological revolution and nuclear age in the Soviet Union. One of the first fields in which the Soviet outlook tended to break away from the tight conformity of the Stalinist era was that of military theory and strategy. Even before the "de-Stalinization" drive brought revision and innovation into various areas of Soviet life following the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, some Soviet military men had already begun to question the sanctity and permanence of Stalinist military theory. Indeed, Khrushchev's own initial venture in the role of "creative developer" of Marxist-Leninist theory was addressed to nuclear-age strategic problems, when he amended the Leninist thesis of "inevitable war" at the same Twentieth Party Congress.

Until fairly recently, however, the existence of internal debate and controversy over problems of military theory and strategy has not been readily acknowledged by Soviet spokesmen. It was left largely to Western students to argue that, in Soviet military affairs, the image of the monolithic Soviet mind needed considerable revising, and to try to decipher the issues over which Soviet strategists and the political and military leadership elites were evidently at odds among themselves. But recent Soviet military writing now provides a retrospective view of the postwar process of change in Soviet military theory. In particular, it confirms the stubborn internal debate centering upon efforts during Khrushchev's administration to reorient Soviet strategic thinking and force structure around nuclear-missile weapons.

Among the relevant Soviet discussions in the open literature, the two Sokolovskii editions of *Military Strategy* in 1962 and 1963, and a *Military-Historical Journal* article in early 1964 by Colonel I. Korotkov, are especially noteworthy in documenting

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the process of change. Since the present writer has dealt elsewhere at length with the successive Sokolovskii editions,[1] this paper will be concerned mainly with the Korotkov article and other recent Soviet discourse. The Korotkov article affords a particularly concise survey of the principal landmarks in the postwar development of Soviet military theory. It is one of the most frank admissions on record of a continuing debate in the Soviet Union over fundamental strategic issues. It may be useful at the outset to describe briefly the several stages of development of postwar Soviet military thought, as distinguished by Korotkov.[2]

Korotkov's Survey of Soviet Military Theory

The first major period, according to Korotkov's account, was from the end of World War II through 1953, the year of Stalin's death. In this period, "historical truth about the war was trampled upon for Stalin's advantage," and the development of Soviet military theory suffered. Such important new concepts as the critical nature of the initial period of a modern war and the greatly increased significance of surprise attack with atomic weapons were neglected, owing partly to Stalin's depreciation of the atomic bomb as a "serious force" and his insistence that outdated issues like "active defense" and "the counteroffensive" should be at the center of theoretical study.

Early in the postwar period, according to Korotkov, this might be excused on the grounds that the Soviet Union "did not have the atomic bomb, therefore theory was not able to orient cadres toward the employment of nuclear weapons." Even so, military theory should have been more far-sighted: "It is always important for theory to promptly discern the possibilities of new weapons and to bring out their probable influence on methods of warfare." Later in the postwar period while Stalin was still alive, however, and despite the military-technical work then being devoted in the Soviet Union to creation of nuclear weaponry and missiles, Soviet military theory continued to lag behind events.

[1]See U.S. Editors' Analytic Introduction to Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, *et al.*, *Soviet Military Strategy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 1-78, and the present author's *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). See also his "Shifts in Soviet Strategic Thought," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964, pp. 475-486.

[2]His article is entitled "The Development of Soviet Military Theory in the Post-War Years," *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal* (*Military-Historical Journal*), No. 4, April 1964, pp. 39-50. The quotations in the following section are taken from Korotkov's article.

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In particular, recounts Korotkov, it continued to cling to the view that a future war would be "inevitably of a long and protracted character."

The second major period in the postwar development of Soviet military theory began in 1954, says Korotkov, and in its first stage from 1954-56 a "gradual" change of views occurred, as the impact of nuclear weapons on warfare began to receive more attention. While this was a major turning point in Soviet military thought, the employment of new weapons was still conceived of "within the framework of previous methods of warfare." Aircraft were at first the principal delivery means contemplated. Although the radical changes in war brought about by nuclear weapons were far from being appreciated by all Soviet military theorists, and the new views "only slowly and with difficulty made their way against the old outlook," such problems as surprise attack and the initial period now came under study. By 1956, for example, "it was already considered that warfare would be characterized by massive employment of air forces and various missile and nuclear weapons"; at the same time, however, the opinion persisted that the "newer weapons did not diminish the decisive significance of [traditional] ground, naval and air forces, and consequently, missile-nuclear weapons were still not recognized as the main, decisive means of waging war."

In particular, Korotkov states, the idea of a long war persisted, partly explainable by the fact that "neither we nor our probable opponents yet possessed sufficient quantities of long-range missiles." Only when intercontinental ballistic missiles were to become available would "the conditions be created for a quick, nonprotracted war."

The next turning point, marking a new "independent stage in the history of Soviet military thought," came in 1957 with the appearance of missiles and their progressive introduction into the armed forces. The situation now demanded a "radical transformation of views on the character of a possible war, on methods of warfare, and on the roles and significance of all types of armed forces." The years 1960-61 saw the "invigoration of military-theoretical thought," as theoretical discussions were pursued in conferences, military academies and journals, and practical problems were defined and studied. These years also saw the laying down of new principles and concepts of modern war in important statements by Khrushchev and Malinovskii, and the creation of a new

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type of forces—the strategic missile forces. Even after these evidences of recognition of a "qualitative leap" and "radical" change in the realm of modern war brought about by the creation of ballistic missiles, "some comrades" continued in the early 1960's to judge the new weapons in terms of the experience of the past war.

While Korotkov's account is focused in large part on the evolution of thought on the problems of general nuclear war, it contains a brief but significant comment on the question of limited war. "One must admit," Korotkov writes, "that our military thought, while devoting the necessary analysis to the problems of waging missile-nuclear war, gave insufficient attention to the study of limited (local wars)." Suggesting that this omission was now being rectified, although still not fully worked out by Soviet theorists, Korotkov added: "Only in recent times has this shortcoming *begun* to be corrected." (Emphasis added.)

Korotkov's review of the postwar development of Soviet military theory includes the observation that the latter stages of the process have been marked, "after long stagnation," by the output of a series of works on Soviet military strategy. Among these, the Sokolovskii work, *Military Strategy*, was described as one of "the most fundamental" and "despite some shortcomings . . . a notable phenomenon on the military-theoretical front." With regard to achieving a unity of views on the subject matter and issues confronting Soviet military science, Korotkov's account frankly acknowledges that today, "even as before, no unified view yet exists." While regarding this as "unfortunate," Korotkov at the same time concedes that controversy should be recognized as a "normal phenomenon" accompanying the "constant process" of change in military technology. He concludes his survey of postwar developments on the hopeful note that Soviet military theory will arrive at the truth through the "clash of conflicting opinions."

Implications of the Korotkov Account

The foregoing commentary by Korotkov is of notable interest on several counts. It illustrates, for one thing, the tendency of Soviet military theory and doctrine to lag behind the development of weapons technology. This tendency seemingly persists despite the admonition by Korotkov himself, and other Soviet

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writers, that it is important for theory to anticipate the influence of new technological developments.

Among other Soviet military theorists who have similarly stressed this point are Colonel V. Konoplev and Major General S. Kozlov.[3] The latter made an interesting distinction between military doctrine and military science in their respective adaptation to new developments. According to Kozlov, military doctrine is based on "a unified system of state views," and thus there cannot be "two contradictory doctrines." Once accepted, doctrine changes relatively slowly and should not be subjected to continued question, for rejection of established views on which it is based "causes a serious breakdown in all military development." Kozlov did not make clear precisely how changes in doctrine are to be brought about, but he implied that change comes only after considerable pressure. Doctrine, he said, "is forced to . . . disregard new phenomena in military affairs until they have gathered force." On the other hand, military science "does not have the right to decline to analyze new phenomena." Military science looks farther into the future than doctrine, according to Kozlov, and it may properly include differing propositions and hypotheses, only some of which will be accepted as military doctrine in the course of time.

Returning to the Korotkov account, it is clear that on substantive issues Korotkov himself speaks largely from the viewpoint of the "modernist" school of Soviet military thought, associated with Khrushchev's strategic views and military policies. Three of the cardinal propositions of this school, singled out by Korotkov as the substantive points around which controversy has centered, are: the primacy of the strategic missile forces, the view that nuclear-missile weapons would be the decisive instruments for waging a modern war, and the contention that such a war would tend to be short and conclusive rather than protracted. The first two points would appear to have become established tenets of Soviet military doctrine, acknowledged if not wholeheartedly embraced by all schools of military opinion. On the third point, however, the effort to establish the modernist view in what Korotkov describes as "the struggle with dogmatism and with old, outmoded ideas of military theory"[4] seems to have fallen short. Pre-

[3]Colonel V. Konoplev, "On Scientific Foresight in Military Affairs," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (*Communist of the Armed Forces*), No. 24, December 1963, pp. 28-34; Major General S. Kozlov, "Military Doctrine and Military Science," *ibid.*, No. 5, March 1964, pp. 9-15.

[4]Korotkov, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

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vailing military doctrine, even in the face of Khrushchev's rather frequent assertions that if a nuclear war comes it is likely to be short and decisive, continues to sound a precautionary hedge as to the possibility of a long-drawn-out conflict and the consequent necessity to make provision for both kinds of wars.

The disparity of view on the short versus long war issue is more than academic. It keeps open the door to differences on a number of other quite fundamental issues. These include, for example, the central problem of the size and composition of the armed forces which should be maintained in peacetime and the corollary question of how successfully additional forces could be mobilized in wartime under nuclear conditions. Implicit throughout the debate on such doctrinal questions as whether "mass, multi-million man" armies will be needed any longer in the nuclear age is the competition over allocation of resources among various claimants. Also at issue is the broad question which seems to divide Khrushchev's nuclear-age philosophy from the professional thinking of many Soviet military men: namely, whether the criteria for developing the Soviet armed forces should stress mainly their deterrent and intimidational functions, or their actual value in war. A substantial military group, embracing not only the traditionalist point of view but many modernists as well, apparently feels that a military posture patterned strictly in accordance with Khrushchev's strategic ideas would leave the Soviet Union in an unsatisfactory position if deterrence should fail.

The Korotkov account, though it stops short of a full-fledged exposure of other likely areas of contention, clearly bespeaks the fact that an internal Soviet military debate continues, and that Soviet military theory is still in a process of transition. By accepting the notion that controversy over military issues is a fact of life, which, even though regrettable, "must be recognized as a normal phenomenon," Korotkov seems to be admitting that presently accepted propositions of Soviet military thought do not necessarily represent the last word, and that further questioning and opposition to established doctrinal tenets can be expected.

As depicted by Korotkov, the modernist viewpoint has succeeded in establishing itself as the orthodox line on at least some of the most basic strategic issues. However, while Korotkov affirms the validity of the modernist position and claims Party backing for it in the continuing effort since the Twentieth and

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Twenty-second Party Congresses to establish a "genuinely creative atmosphere on the military-theoretical front,"[5] he concedes the propriety of further debate and hence of the development of countervailing trends in Soviet thinking—such as the recent reaction against the doctrinal emphasis on missile primacy.

Signs of Reaction Against the Prevailing Emphasis on Missiles

Over the past few years the primacy of the strategic missile forces as "the main branch of the Soviet armed forces" has become an established tenet of Soviet military doctrine. This trend, closely associated with Khrushchev's strategic views and military policies, has been carried to the point where the missile forces have come to be treated in both professional military literature and in the popular press as a kind of new absolute. The unique cachet bestowed on these forces as a "mighty shield" of Soviet security and a major tool of Soviet foreign policy has even been extended to the personnel of rocket units, whose special qualities —in contrast to those of run-of-the-mill Soviet personnel of other services—have been glorified in a number of accounts.

It would now appear, judging from some recent signs in Soviet military discourse, that a counter-trend has begun to set in, representing as it were a reaction in some quarters against the new "orthodoxy" embodying such Khrushchevian strategic notions as the absolute primacy of nuclear-missile weapons. In part, this reaction to the exceptional emphasis placed on both the military and the psycho-political aspects of the strategic missile forces may represent merely a continuation of the familiar "modernist-traditionalist" debate of the past few years in which proponents of Khrushchev's modernist theories and policy find themselves still being resisted by defenders of traditionally-oriented interests. However, a new element also appears to have been introduced into the modernist-traditionalist dialogue, blurring somewhat its familiar lines. Some military writers of both schools have begun to suggest that such concepts as the unquestioned primacy of ballistic missiles have been carried too far, threatening to create a "new orthodoxy" that could cripple the "creative development" of Soviet military theory and of other forces.

[5] *Loc. cit.*

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Exponents of the Recent Trend—Rotmistrov and Bolotnikov

Two representative exponents of this recent counter-trend in Soviet thinking, the first associated more or less with the traditionalist outlook and the other evidently of modernist persuasion, are Chief Marshal of Tank Forces P. A. Rotmistrov and Major General of the Air Force Engineer-Technical Service V. Bolotnikov. Although their views appear to differ in a number of respects, they converge upon one and the same point: Both argue that, in the nuclear-missile era, forces other than strategic missile forces retain a significant role in war and still have an important potential for development.

The best-known voice thus far to challenge the new orthodoxy is that of Marshal Rotmistrov. This is not the first time in his career that he has been cast in a bellwether role. This colorful figure, a hero of tank warfare in World War II and a military scholar to boot, was one of the first open critics of Stalinist military doctrine in the mid-fifties. Like some of the other standard-bearers of a "progressive" approach at the time of breaking away from Stalin's military theories, Rotmistrov, in the military debate of the early sixties, frequently took the conservative side. While he cannot be described as a hard-rock traditionalist, Rotmistrov nevertheless in the past few years has not joined ranks with the outright modernists. For example, his writing in 1962 and 1963 noticeably tended to favor the theme that, despite the important role of strategic missiles, other arms—including his beloved tank forces—still have a vital contribution to make in modern war.[6]

The publication of two articles by Rotmistrov in the spring of 1964 in *Red Star* marked a sharper turn than hitherto in his criti-

[6]See Marshal P. Rotmistrov, "Modern Tanks and Nuclear Weapons," *Izvestiia*, October 20, 1962. An interesting exposition of Rotmistrov's views on the relationship between modern weapons trends and traditional values and methods in military affairs is to be found in his Foreword to *A History of Military Art*, a major two-volume work, of which he was the editor, published by Voenizdat Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, Moscow, 1963. Here, Rotmistrov emphasized the importance of historical study of the military art as an aid to understanding and solving contemporary military problems. He chided unnamed colleagues who "think that studying the experience of past wars . . . has no great meaning at the present time, because a future war will be conducted under completely different circumstances." While, in Rotmistrov's view, "worship of this past experience would be a great mistake," still, "whatever from the experience of past wars . . . has preserved its relevance should be used, and whatever has become antiquated should be rejected." Furthermore, the Soviet Union now has a new generation of officers who "did not go through the bitter school of war and who have no personal combat experience." Rotmistrov concluded that "studying the history of military art helps to make up to a considerable extent for this lack of personal combat experience."

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cism of modernist trends in Soviet military thinking.[7] These articles ostensibly dealt with the need to improve research and teaching in higher military schools. In fact, however, they were used by Rotmistrov as a vehicle for attacking one-sided emphasis on missiles, and they came close to being an indictment of the new military concepts and doctrine associated with Khrushchev's name in the past few years. In the first and most significant of the two articles, Rotmistrov opened his attack on the shortcomings of the modernist school by charging that some military theorists "express their views as categorically as if they had already been validated by the practical experience of war."[8] Many problems are in fact still unresolved "and require further deep research." To accept presently established views as the last word in military theory apparently is one of the modernist vices, in Rotmistrov's opinion.

Suggesting that some of the modernist thinking of the recent past has already become subject to question, Rotmistrov said: "Today, as a result of military-technical research already carried out . . . certain established views and propositions of military art already are beginning to lose their original significance in light of further development of armaments and military technology." While not spelling out the "established views" in question, Rotmistrov later made it amply clear that his criticism was germane not only to the modernist school in general, but also to Khrushchev's own approach to the subject of modern weapons and their influence on warfare: "In defining the roles [of weapons and forces] in warfare, calculations based on the anticipated re-

[7]The two articles were: "Military Science and the Academies," *Red Star,* April 26, 1964, and "Methodical Experiments or the Pursuit of Sensations," *ibid.,* May 20, 1964.

[8]*Red Star,* April 26, 1964. In the second article of May 20, 1964, Rotmistrov dealt not with current problems of military theory but with teaching methods. The article was a critique of "programmed training"—a cybernetics method of teaching favored by modernists and advanced schools of thought among military pedagogues. In early 1964, *Red Star* and other media published articles urging improved training methods and adoption of "programmed training." These originated mainly with modernists and missile commanders, including Colonel General V. E. Tolubko, deputy commander of the strategic missile forces. See his article, "Missiles and Methodologies," *Red Star,* April 11, 1964. Rotmistrov did not deny that "programmed training" had promise. However, he asserted that it could not replace more conventional methods either, and he charged that it sometimes led to pursuit of sensational but harmful results. In this connection, he singled out for criticism the staff of the Kiev Higher Engineering Radiotechnical School for using "all sorts of dreamed-up teaching contraptions." This school has pioneered in cybernetics research and theory, including the use of various kinds of teaching machines. In general Rotmistrov's article seemed to be intended to support his argument against throwing traditional values and methods overboard, which he apparently regards as a vice of the modernist school.

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sults of using a single new type of weapon alone can lead to erroneous conclusions."

Castigating further what he apparently regards as one-sided modernist emphasis on new weapons and unverified theories of warfare, Rotmistrov observed at another point:

> We should not be diverted by any sort of fruitless theorizing, and forget about reality. It should be remembered that an over-estimate as well as an under-estimate, or worse still, a contemptuous attitude toward old types of forces or toward the old weapons is not only impermissible, but even harmful, especially within the framework of tactical operations, where the need for "old" weapons will continue, evidently, for a significant time.
>
> As the history of war teaches, new forms of warfare replace the old not at one stroke, but gradually, since the new cannot manage without the old for a long time. This situation also pertains to the development of armaments and military technology.[9]

Similar references to the theme that new weapons and forces cannot replace the old all at once have appeared in other recent Soviet military writing, as, for example, in a book by Colonel S. I. Krupnov, *Dialectics and Military Science,* published in late 1963. Krupnov cited two reasons for the validity of this proposition: "First, even old weapons are very expensive, and no government can afford to throw them on the scrap heap until general and complete disarmament occurs; second, no matter how powerful nuclear weapons and missiles may be, they cannot decide all the tasks of modern war."[10]

Role of Aviation Singled Out by Rotmistrov

In Rotmistrov's April 26th *Red Star* article, he noted that in addition to numerous research problems concerning the employment of new weapons, "many problems still require resolution in regard to the theory of employment of conventional weapons." The main tenor of his remarks, however, was not to argue the case of conventional versus nuclear weapons, but rather to support the contention that modernist emphasis on the strategic missile forces has been overdone. In doing so, Rotmistrov used an interesting polemical technique. He first accorded the strategic missile forces their standard due as "the decisive forces for attaining the main goals of military operations and of the war as

[9] *Red Star,* April 26, 1964.

[10] Colonel S. I. Krupnov, *Dialektika i Voennaia Nauka* (*Dialectics and Military Science*) (Moscow: Voenizdat Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1963), pp. 109-110.

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a whole." However, he then went on to dilute this tribute by singling out for special appreciation the role of the air force—of which he had not hitherto been an especially ardent advocate.

Rotmistrov's remarks on aviation were cast mainly in the context of the use of air power in support of theater operations. In this connection, he said that in a future war,

> despite the employment of missiles, aviation also will play an important role, especially in operations of tank forces and other strike groups separated from the remaining forces.
>
> In a war of maneuver, aviation will become not only an irreplaceable means of reconnaissance, but also a reliable and adequately effective means for suppression of mobile targets, through use of both nuclear and conventional bombs.

Aircraft, Rotmistrov affirmed, will be able to carry out their ground support missions despite the development of surface-to-air missile defenses. "Consequently," he said, "notwithstanding the rapid development of missiles and missile technology in general, it seems that aviation in a future war will also be given a significant role." By way of advice, Rotmistrov urged that specialists of the air force higher academies should "apply themselves to working out methods for employing aviation under conditions of modern war." Furthermore, he admonished, they should undertake this task imaginatively, by "working out new questions, with real future significance, freeing themselves from fruitless repetition of even the 'established propositions' of staff manuals."

Different Approach Taken by Bolotnikov

Not all of the recent reaction against the prevailing emphasis on the strategic missile forces has been specifically critical of modernist tendencies per se. It is noteworthy that some critics have complained precisely on the grounds that missile advocates have stopped short, as it were, of exploiting the full potentialities afforded by other forms of modern military technology. Indeed, there is some flavor of this view in Rotmistrov's observations. A better case in point, perhaps, was furnished by a *Red Star* article by Major General Bolotnikov, which appeared at about the same time as Rotmistrov's commentary.[11] The Bolotnikov article was one of a lengthy series by various military authorities which began in *Red Star* in January 1964 under the general title of "The

[11]Major General V. Bolotnikov, "Man, Altitude, Speed," *Red Star*, April 25, 1964.

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Revolution in Military Affairs: Its Significance and Its Consequences." In his article, Bolotnikov clearly established his credentials as an advocate of the modernist point of view by saying:

> Weapons and methods of employing them have changed. The truth is obvious, and most commanders have learned it well. But one still encounters people with peculiar views about modern weapons. To the bitter end they still do not understand that one cannot approach the problem of employing the new weapons with the old yardstick.

Bolotnikov, whose article was addressed specifically to the impact on aviation of the revolution in military affairs, argued that adaptation to new weaponry should include full exploitation of the potential of aircraft. While sharing Rotmistrov's thesis that the strategic missile forces do not hold a monopoly on important roles in modern warfare, Bolotnikov directed his attention at a somewhat different set of questions. For example, whereas Rotmistrov's comments on the future of aviation virtually ignored the issue of the long-range bomber versus the strategic missile, Bolotnikov insisted that aircraft are as good as, and in some instances better than, missiles alone in performing essential military tasks. However, Bolotnikov chose to stress the interdependence between missiles and aircraft, rather than, as he put it, making "an absolute" of one or another type of advanced technology—a fault which by implication could be laid at the door of a good many of his fellow modernists. In a passage directed toward the interdependent aspect of missiles and aircraft in an offensive delivery role, he said:

> It is easy to destroy airdromes with missiles. It is easier still to strike launching pads with aircraft. Missiles need reconnaissance by aircraft. A peculiar collaboration arises. A clear example is the capability of launching ballistic missiles from heavy aircraft.

Elsewhere, Bolotnikov voiced the view that the effectiveness of air operations might be enhanced not only by such advances as the employment of air-to-surface missiles by bomber aircraft, but also by the adoption of new operational techniques. In this connection, he asserted:

> The development of military technology of all kinds has made it necessary for aviation not only to storm the "high altitudes," but also to "press itself" close to the earth. Military air operations at very low altitudes can yield precisely the most appreciable military effect; they are more suitable for overcoming the enemy's air defense system.

Bolotnikov stressed the "fantastic growth" in the significance of the time factor in missile and air operations. No matter how

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wise and well-informed decisions might be, they would be useless if arrived at too late. The time factor imposes high demands of "organization and discipline" on the decision-making process.

Despite expressing himself generally satisfied that new paths were being opened for manned aviation by advances in technology and operational techniques, Bolotnikov betrayed some concern that not all quarters might share his confidence in the future of aviation. At several points he commented that there are still "some people strongly attached to the old ways" and that it "is not so simple" to break old habits. In one revealing passage he remarked ruefully:

> How strange it is that the triumphant demonstration of the almost limitless capabilities of aviation has led to a peculiar pessimism about aviation. Some foreign figures, for example, are inclined to assert that aviation has put itself out of business. They say that with modern speeds and altitudes the advantage of human presence aboard aircraft is quite doubtful, and that to assure life-support conditions is both expensive and creates design complications. Such ideas are abetted by the stunningly rapid development of missile technology.

While attributing these pessimistic sentiments about manned aviation to "foreign skeptics," in the manner often employed by Soviet writers when dealing with questions which have controversial implications on the domestic scene, Bolotnikov may well have had in mind some home-grown skeptics, among whom not the least, on the basis of some past utterances, might have been Khrushchev. Bolotnikov went on to say that no matter what people abroad might think of the future role of man in the air, "we have our own well-defined point of view on this score." This view General Bolotnikov summarized as follows: "However rapidly the development of military technology may proceed, including aviation, we do not make an absolute of it. With us, man stands in the foreground . . . life repeatedly underlines the never-to-be-forgotten role of man in directing the newest means of warfare."

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VIETNAM: THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR VICTORY

by Frank N. Trager

THE communist attack on the Republic of Vietnam has reached the stage where it is misleading to continue to speak of the war in the singular. To understand the military situation and the military requirements for victory in that beleaguered country, it is essential to realize that the South Vietnamese and their American advisers today confront three different types of warfare. Each type calls for separate, though related, strategic and tactical planning and the deployment of appropriate kinds and numbers of armed forces. This article is concerned primarily with analyzing the military problems deriving from these three levels of conflict and recommending measures to cope with the communist insurgency.[1] The following assumption underlies this analysis: the United States is determined to honor its pledge to defend South Vietnam, and therefore the goal of the counterinsurgency effort is not continuing deadlock but the defeat of communist forces and the building of a stable and progressive Republic of Vietnam.

Background to Confusion

The communist leaders of North Vietnam (DRVN), with characteristic zeal and effort, have sought to infiltrate, subvert and—by insurgency and guerrilla warfare—take over South Vietnam. The DRVN communists have made no secret of their intentions. At their Third Lao Dong (Communist) Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960, they set forth twin goals: "to carry out the socialist revolution in North Vietnam," and "to liberate South Vietnam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country. These two strategic tasks are closely related to each other and spur each other forward." At this same meeting they called for the creation of a "broad national front" (in South Vietnam) directed against

[1]One cannot write about the military aspects of the insurgency without reference to the important political, social and economic problems, but the latter will be treated here only as they directly affect military operations.

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the "U.S.-Diem clique." By the turn of the year, Hanoi could announce that the "Front for the Liberation of the South" in fact existed. It already had instructions from Ho Chi Minh, communist leader of the North, "to step up the national democratic people's revolution in the South."

This Front for the Liberation of the South comprises a variety of organized units from each significant segment of Vietnamese society—soldiers, peasants, youths, workers, women, intellectuals. In May 1961 the Front's clandestine radio broadcast its acceptance of and readiness to carry out the decisions of the September 1960 Third Congress of the Lao Dong Party "concerning the revolution" in South Vietnam. The broadcast added that the "exigencies of the revolution" demanded that "cadres and members of the Front as well as those who love their fatherland and the revolution in South Vietnam must strictly execute the basic and immediate mission determined by the Party" (North Vietnam). And, as the Hanoi resolution indicated, this "is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility. . . ." The Viet Cong, the armed communist forces operating in the Republic of Vietnam, are the chief instrument of this revolution.

Since then the fighting in South Vietnam has been sharply intensified. In 1961 President Kennedy sent to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) first Vice President Johnson and, later, his military adviser (now Ambassador), General Maxwell D. Taylor. The reports of these missions served to heighten official American concern for the defense of the RVN. By the beginning of the summer of 1964, U.S. military advisers to South Vietnam, restricted to 327 officers and men according to the Geneva Accords of 1954 (to which neither the United States nor South Vietnam were signatories), had been increased to approximately 16,000. At the end of July, the U.S. government indicated that some five to six thousand additional forces, including aid and information personnel as well as military personnel, would be sent to Vietnam. Casualties among these U.S. military advisers have already mounted to about 3 or 4 per cent per year. They are likely to climb higher before the war's outcome is decided. In recent years, U.S. aid of all types to South Vietnam has ranged from one to two million dollars per day—usually closer to the latter figure.

Reports on the fighting in Vietnam for the most part describe Viet Cong-initiated "incidents" and "attacks," and Vietnamese

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counterattacks and defensive operations. Raids, ambushes, assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, terror, bombings in Saigon, hit-and-run guerrilla actions and small-scale skirmishes follow one upon the other with little, if any, apparent meaning. We hear of far-off places where these occur and try to locate them on unfamiliar maps. We read about the communist ability to supply men and material through Laos and Cambodia,[2] across the northwestern corner of the 17th Parallel and even, though in diminished effectiveness, by sea. The Viet Cong are said to occupy large parts of Vietnam in strength, to control areas of the countryside at night even when they do not have such control by day. We learn of the organization of protective "strategic hamlets," now renamed "New Rural Life Hamlets," reputedly numbering between 4,000 to 6,000 by November 1963, with a total of 12,000 to 14,000 then planned. We learn of the distrust which exists between various ethnic and religious groups in South Vietnam, and are distressed by some questionable political and military decisions made by successive Vietnamese governments, which play into the hands of the communists. We are given both optimistic (three years) and pessimistic (ten to fifteen years) estimates of the time required to put down the communist insurgency. How these estimates are reached is never made clear, so we have to provide our own analyses. We are also advised by a leading Senator, Wayne Morse (D., Ore.), to get out of Vietnam altogether. And the Majority Leader of the Senate, Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), has suggested that we should examine sympathetically President de Gaulle's vague proposal for "neutralization." A highly placed CIA official suggested in a recently published but nonofficial paper that the United States should seek "some kind of negotiated settlement" of hostilities in Vietnam. Meanwhile the "Liberation Front" has called for an immediate offensive to "expand . . . the liberated areas."

All this compounds the general confusion. The American public should be better acquainted with the nature of the conflict in remote but strategically important Vietnam. Surely the United States has committed its prestige, its men and its treasure to the ultimate defeat of the communist revolution in Vietnam. This is

[2]Department of State, *A Threat to Peace, North Vietnam's Effort to Conquer South Vietnam,* Parts I and II, Publication 7308, Far East Series 110, December 1961. The *New York Times,* September 22, 1964, reported a "frontal engagement" between the South Vietnamese First Infantry Division and "about two companies, more than 200 men," at the border region. These communist units came both by land and by sea from North Vietnam.

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especially the case since President Johnson sent in his "first team" of Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor and Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson. The war in Vietnam does not concern solely the sovereign nation of the Republic of Vietnam. The United States cannot afford to be defeated, not only because of national honor and pride, but even more because a communist take-over in Vietnam, coming on the heels of communist successes in "neutralized" Laos, would mean eventual communist domination and control of all of mainland Southeast Asia.[3]

Geographic and Population Factors

The geography, topography and climate of the area, and the social, religious and ethnic background and distribution of the population form the setting for the conflict in South Vietnam. Let us look at these factors in terms of their strategic and tactical significance. South Vietnam, some 66,000 square miles, is about as large as New England or the State of Washington. It extends in a direct line almost 750 miles from north to south, attaining widths of from 25 to 130 miles. Its coastline is approximately 1,200 miles long—about 300 miles longer than that of California. Its boundaries include a 50-mile border with North Vietnam at about the 17th Parallel; some 575 miles with unfriendly Cambodia; and 275 miles with helpless Laos, through which runs the Ho Chi Minh Trail (or trails). The latter provides the communists with a supply route into South Vietnam and enables them to utilize the airstrip facilities at the Laotian town of Tchepone. These boundaries, especially those with Cambodia and Laos, are generally undemarcated, are difficult to reach in places, and are largely indefensible with means *now* available to South Vietnam. Nor can the RVN eliminate or neutralize communist guerrilla bases and sanctuaries in "neutral" Laos and Cambodia. Unless Hanoi can be subjected to some form of retaliation, the DRVN will continue to employ the Clausewitzian strategy of imposing perpetual defense upon the enemy, leading to the eventual defeat of South Vietnam. These factors create what is here called Military Requirement I for the RVN and the United States.

Equally significant is the effect of the topography and climate on the military situation. South Vietnam is divided broadly into four major geographic sectors: the Central Highlands which extend from the northern border as a spine to the next region, the

[3]See this author's "Laos and the Defense of Southeast Asia," Orbis, Fall 1963.

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Central Lowlands, followed by the Mekong Delta, and finally the Coastal regions fringing the Central Highlands and Lowlands. The Highlands are a series of eroded plateaus dominated by random isolated peaks. Movement is limited by these mountains and their narrow, heavily forested valleys. The Central Lowlands contain an open, rolling plain and rising plateaus which extend from Saigon to Dalat with dense vegetation and jungle. On the east these two regions slope to the coastal lowlands, occasionally divided by spurs from the interior massifs. To the south is the low-lying, monotonous, poorly drained plain of the Mekong Delta which includes the relatively less fertile area of the Plain of Reeds at the border with Cambodia, seldom rising more than ten feet above sea level, cut by innumerable waterways moving seaward. The southwest monsoon, June to September, dominates the tropical alternating wet and dry seasons. Temperatures, except at mountain tops, vary from the annual mean at Hué of 74 F. degrees to 81.5 F. at Saigon. Rainfall during the monsoon climbs from about 80 inches at Saigon to 150 inches in the Central Highlands. In short, this is a difficult terrain and climate—for men and modern equipment.

These natural obstacles are accentuated by the distribution of the 14.5 million population, dense in the Delta, less dense in the Lowlands and Coastal regions, and sparse in the Annamite mountainous Highlands. About 85 per cent of this population is Vietnamese; the rest is divided among Chinese (more than one million), various hill tribes referred to as Montagnards (600,000), Cambodians (500,000), and several other non-Vietnamese minorities (Malayans, Indians, French). Included among the Vietnamese are some 900,000 chiefly Roman Catholic refugees from the north who came down after 1954. They have been resettled largely in the Delta and in the coastal lowlands. Undoubtedly, though no one has reliable estimates, there were communist agents planted among these refugees.

Historically the Vietnamese of the South did not get along well with their compatriots of the North, and both held the Montagnards in very low esteem. The communists have exploited these feelings to recruit guerrilla and related forces from among minorities. The communists also benefit from the fact that most Vietnamese and others of the predominantly rural areas look with suspicion on any central government, whatever its indigenous or foreign source. The government—one of the "five evils"—imposes

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

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

PROVINCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM

1 Quang Tri
2 Thua Thien
3 Quang Nam
4 Quang Tin
5 Quang Ngai
6 Kontum
7 Binh Dinh
8 Pleiku
9 Phu Bon
10 Phu Yen
11 Khanh Hoa
12 Darlac
13 Tuyen Duc
14 Ninh Thuan
15 Binh Thuan
16 Binh Tuy
17 Lam Dong
18 Quang Duc
19 Phuoc Long
20 Binh Long
21 Phuoc Thanh
22 Long Khanh
23 Phuoc Tuy
24 Bien Hoa
25 Saigon
26 Binh Duong
27 Tay Ninh
28 Hau Nghia
29 Long An
30 Go Cong
31 Kien Hoa
32 Dinh Tuong
33 Kien Tuong
34 Kien Phong
35 Vinh Long
36 Vinh Binh
37 Phong Dinh
38 An Giang
39 Kien Giang
40 Chuong Thien
41 Ba Xuyen
42 An Xuyen
43 Phu Quoc
44 Con Son

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taxes, levies and other forms of oppression and restraint upon the villagers. The latter can be won over only by new programs and attitudes.

Communist and nationalist Vietnamese, enlisting the villagers by persuasion or threat, were in effect aligned during the long struggle against the French. During this war the communist-controlled Vietnam Independence League (Vietminh), based at Hanoi and led by Ho Chi Minh, was regarded as the major instrument in the north for the anti-colonial struggle. Since then Vietnamese communists in the south (the Viet Cong) and infiltrators from the north (the Front for the Liberation of the South) have kept up the struggle even though Vietnam has gained its independence. They still frame their appeals in terms of nationalism and anti-colonialism, and they blame the fight on the "imperialist" United States and its Vietnamese "puppet."

In this context the war-weary population of South Vietnam, unevenly distributed throughout the forty-two provinces (forty-four if the two offshore islands are counted), remains uncertain of the future. They have not been rid of war since the Japanese arrived in 1942. Certainly as much as 20 per cent of the population inhabits provinces over which the Viet Cong exercise substantial control. A larger percentage lives in territory subject in the main to national government rule. But a majority of the people, Vietnamese and other, must be won over by guaranteeing them security and hope for a better, peaceful life. This is the prime task today for the Vietnamese government and its American ally.

The Three Military Requirements

The Viet Cong in South Vietnam are organized into three main groups. The regulars comprise the hard-core, highly trained units of paid soldiers organized into platoons, companies, battalions and regimental headquarters. In 1962 it was estimated that there were between eight and ten thousand of these professionals operating in the provinces of Vietnam. By September 1964 this number had grown to some 28,000 to 32,000 men—mostly by infiltration from the north and some recruitment from the more highly-trained members of the second group, the territorial forces. The latter are usually organized in the provincial districts in groups of fifty. They work on a part time basis, receive some pay, and are eligible for promotion to the regular forces. The third group of local guerrillas, farmers-by-day and fighters-by-night, are organ-

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ized on a squad basis of four or five to as many as sixteen per village. They are not paid and are usually poorly armed, but they are the suppliers, the drawers of water and hewers of wood, for the Viet Cong regulars and territorials. The number of territorials and local guerrillas reportedly had declined during 1963-64 in proportion to the success of the central government. Their numbers had been estimated at more than 100,000 but they may have lost as many as one-fifth of their forces. Backing the Viet Cong in North Vietnam are at least 300,000 well-trained, disciplined and modestly equipped armed forces, with a common experience dating back to the early 1940's. These regular forces are reinforced by a local militia.

The regular forces of the Saigon government, mainly army, number in excess of 200,000 and are supported by paramilitary bodies such as the Civil Guard, Self-Defense Corps, and Citizens Irregular Defense Groups, which may total another 200,000. Thus, in mid-1964, the forces of the RVN outnumbered those of the communists in South Vietnam roughly four to one. Prior military experience with communist insurgency under more favorable conditions in Malaya and elsewhere in Southeast Asia indicated that a successful campaign required ten to fifteen patriotic troops to one communist guerrilla.

The forty-two provinces of Vietnam have been grouped by the RVN into four military corps areas and the capital area, all closely related to the military-civilian provincial chiefs. But the communist "war of liberation" ignores such provincial arrangements. Communist military operations are based on strategy and tactics applied in "areas of concentration" and "areas of opportunity." To carry out their plans in the first of these, they have concentrated on establishing a "four corner" or quadrilateral stranglehold on the capital city—on the well-founded assumption that, if Saigon falls, the country or most of it would be theirs. Thus they have invested heavily in the provinces surrounding Saigon. Tay Ninh, Kien Tuong and Kien Phong—from the northwest to the southwest of Saigon—border on Cambodia and thus provide the Viet Cong an easy sanctuary. Cambodian "neutrality" in this area (which includes the so-called Duck's Bill, pointing at Saigon, and the Plain of Reeds, to the west of Saigon) is a fiction carefully nurtured by Prince Sihanouk and his Chinese and French friends—and unnecessarily tolerated by the U.S. Department of State. To the north and northeast of Saigon the communists control considerable sectors of the three provinces of

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Long Khanh, Phuoc Thanh and Phuoc Long. Along the coast, especially in the dense so-called mangrove swamps of Phuoc Tuy, Go Cong and Kien Hoa, they have strong forces and have been able to conceal camps and small arsenals. The Viet Cong have also moved in force along the southern line of the quadrilateral from Kien Tuong to Long An, Ding Tuong, Kien Hoa and Go Cong. If they were to win permanent control over this line they would not only split South Vietnam but would also dispose over the fertile, food-rich section of the Mekong Delta.

This roughly quadrilateral zone is here designated as Military Requirement II. Considered as part of the same military problem are the Camau Peninsula at the southern end of South Vietnam and a small section of the northern coastal zone in the provinces of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. Thus the zones of Military Requirement II include significant portions of the coast, the Central Lowlands and the Mekong Delta, including the Camau Peninsula.

Military Requirement III is created by communist operations in "areas of opportunity." These include the Central Highlands stretching north from the province of Tuyen Duc—the provincial seat of which is the well-known hill station, Dalat—in a random pattern to the province of Quang Nam. In this sparsely inhabited area are a number of towns which occasionally appear in the news, such as Ban Me Thuot, Pleiku, An Tuc, Kontum and Ban Het, all close to the Laotian border and the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They are accessible to the Lao town of Tchepone, its airstrip and motorable road.[4] The Central Highlands is the home of the Montagnards and other minorities; it is also perfectly situated for communist hit-and-run raids and for large-scale infiltration via Laos and, to a lesser extent, by sea.

These three Military Requirements, in the border areas, the areas of communist concentration, and the areas of communist opportunity, require three different sets of war plans and forces because they represent three different types of warfare.

The War of the Border Areas

Military Requirement I, the war of the border areas, is initially a garrison and patrol war designed to seal off the boundaries and simultaneously to serve as a defense against an invasion from Com-

[4]Reports indicate that the airstrip has been allowed to deteriorate. However, the motorable road, from Hanoi to Vinh to fifty miles south of Tchepone, is in good repair and *is* used. At its termination point in Laos it joins the Ho Chi Minh Trail into Vietnam.

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munist North Vietnam. This is a very difficult and costly undertaking, but it is a traditional military task clearly set forth in classic treatises on warfare. Vietnamese and allied naval forces have already given considerable though incomplete protection to Vietnam's long irregular coastline. If the current effort is sustained, very little more will be required to secure the sea flank—as the recent encounters in the Gulf of Tonkin demonstrated. Similarly, regular Vietnamese armed forces trained and supplied by U.S. military assistance teams provide security along the fifty miles of the northern border of Quang Tri province close to the 17th Parallel—except where at its northwest corner the RVN abuts on Laos. It is the 800-mile Vietnamese border with Laos and Cambodia that represents the major problem in Military Requirement I. The task here is assigned to the Vietnamese Special Forces—counter-guerrilla forces capable of military and civic action—supported and advised by U.S. Special Armed Forces trained for this type of warfare. They are the "advance" troops of the four RVN military corps areas mentioned above.

Communist regular forces in South Vietnam can be resupplied with trained manpower from the North across these borders. It has been estimated that from 3,500 to 6,000 communists have entered annually in this way. The soldier, whether a recruit from the South trained in the North, or a northerner, requires about five pounds of supplies a day, half in food, half in ammunition. Though he lives partially off the land and captures weapons and ammunition, his supply of "quality" matériel must come by bearers over the trails or by sea. Hence it is necessary to seal the western borders of Vietnam and close the sea lanes. However "classical" in military tradition, the task is enormous because of the terrain. All the lessons of the Chindits, Marauders, Rangers and other World War II Special Forces active in the China-Burma-India theater should be reapplied here; additional doctrine can be derived from related experiences in Malaya and the Philippines. There are no "secrets" about this type of warfare; it is the oldest form known in history.

The RVN needs specially trained, equipped and well-led air and ground forces and labor battalions to clear, hold and patrol these 800 miles of border terrain. To do this, the RVN should create a border defile or sanitary cordon by relocating the inhabitants on the Vietnamese side of the boundary. This will interrupt the traditional, trans-border village trading pattern, but it is a

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small price to pay for security. The sparse Vietnamese-Montagnard population near the border can be easily moved to new villages which will have the protection and the civic action services of the Special Forces. *All* persons then found in or seeking entrance to the border defile—except at prescribed checkpoints—would be regarded as enemies and so treated.

The creation and defense of this border is regarded in some quarters as an operation so large as to force the United States to withdraw some of our forces from NATO. This is nonsense. The build-up of the U.S. armed forces under the Kennedy-Johnson Administration, to a large extent influenced by General Taylor, now Ambassador to Vietnam, has prepared the United States to cope with this type of unconventional warfare. This was confirmed by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in his speech at the Forrestal Memorial Awards Dinner in Washington on March 26, 1964.[5] The task is difficult but feasible. It requires a large-scale effort at bulldozing and defoliating the jungle—carving out a zone of visibility—and building a long north-south military road and intercommunications base system. On a comparative basis, the similar jobs in World War II of building the Ledo Road between India and Burma and the Burma Road from Lashio to Kunming were infinitely more difficult and expensive. Allied forces had to conquer higher mountains and more dense malarial jungles than their Vietnamese counterparts. They contributed, however, to the victory of the Allies in the China-Burma-India theater.

If Vietnamese Special Forces are assigned to garrison and incessant day and night patrol duties, and engage in the necessary road-building, transportation, communication and related logistic and

[5] "I have pointed out on other occasions the enormous strategic nuclear power which the United States has developed to cope with the first of Mr. Khrushchev's types of war [world war]. . . . With respect to our general purpose forces designed especially for local wars [Khrushchev's second type], within the past three years we have increased the number of our combat-ready army divisions by about 45 per cent, tactical air squadrons by 30 per cent, airlift capabilities by 75 per cent, with a 100 per cent increase in ship construction and conversion. . . . President Kennedy and President Johnson have recognized, however, that our forces for the first two types of wars might not be applicable or effective against what the communists call 'wars of liberation,' or what is properly called covert aggression or insurgency. We have therefore undertaken and continue to press a variety of programs to develop skilled specialists, equipment and techniques to enable us to help our allies counter the threat of insurgency." Pp. 5-6 of the mimeographed text of Secretary McNamara's address, released by the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Doc. No. 249-64, March 26, 1964.
The military requirements for Vietnam demand the kind of U.S. forces Secretary McNamara describes as available in the latter two categories, i.e., "local wars" and "wars of liberation."

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civic operations, the regular armed and auxiliary forces of Vietnam will have to be enlarged. For these purposes there is *no* shortage of available manpower, although there is a shortage of training facilities. U.S. Engineer, Signal Corps, Transportation and related elements of our active and reserve military forces will be needed to accomplish this task. In addition, the sea patrol for close coastal defense must be stepped up. Above all, the U.S. Special Armed Forces in South Vietnam must be augmented. They now represent a very small fraction, perhaps no more than 10 per cent, of U.S. forces in Vietnam.

This classical approach to border defense is easier to describe than to achieve. It is not quickly accomplished, and could lead to interim war-weariness, loss of American patience and deflation of Vietnamese morale. Thus, in order to fulfill Military Requirement I, it might behoove us to heed Von Clausewitz's advice and proceed to the "swift transition to the attack [as] the most brilliant point of the defensive."

This calls for a major decision, beyond the defensive action in the Gulf of Tonkin, to reject the notion that the war must be fought solely on RVN soil. The way to defend Saigon is by threatening, penetrating, undermining and attacking North Vietnam.[6] If this "swift transition" is confined to a limited objective—namely, the defense of South Vietnam—the risk of escalation is small. Interdiction of communist resupply of men and matériel, not the conquest of North Vietnam, is the goal. In February 1964 Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D., Conn.) called for "unleashing" the Vietnamese against the North by covert and overt means. The Vietnamese cannot be unleashed effectively for this type of action unless the United States shares in the operation by means of a unified command. Such a unified command need not mean U.S. domination of Vietnam; it could take the form of a Joint War Council with a majority of senior Vietnamese officers. The Council would make decisions based upon the planning of a Vietnamese-American operations staff. In mid-August 1964 a similar scheme was being examined in Saigon, but at this writing there is no indication that a decision has been reached. It is strongly urged here that a unified command for offensive and defensive action be established in South Vietnam.

The accomplishment of this strategic mission—sealing off the

[6]See the author's chapter, "The Far East," in David Abshire and Richard V. Allen, editors, *National Security, Political, Military and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

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borders against infiltration and invasion by offensive and defensive tactics—would eventually lighten the Vietnamese burden in countering communist insurgency, for the Viet Cong would henceforth be deprived of external land and sea resupply of trained manpower and matériel.[7] It would advance the timetable for victory.

War in the Areas of Communist Concentration

Victory against insurgency in areas of communist concentration, designated as Military Requirement II, calls for another type of warfare. In its present stage this form of conflict is on the threshold of becoming a species of conventional land warfare in the Central Lowlands and Mekong Delta regions. The enemy holds certain salients in the quadrilateral outside the capital and in the Camau Peninsula. He has been there so long that he can now levy taxes, control food and shelter, and infect sectors of the population with his propaganda. In these areas the Viet Cong has demonstrated a capability of mounting battalion-strength attacks on the RVN and, when these attacks are successful, of acquiring U.S. weapons. Here he holds what the clandestine radio of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam calls his "liberated areas." These are such Viet Cong bases as Duong Minh Chau in Tay Ninh province, and elsewhere in Phuoc Thanh and Phuoc Long provinces, north of Saigon; various clusters in the Dong Thap Muoi, the swampy Plain of Reeds in the Mekong Delta, southwest of Saigon; and U Minh at the end of the Camau Peninsula.

This type of warfare can best be illustrated by describing the present situation in the five provinces composing the southwest to southeast line of the quadrilateral bounding Saigon. Of these Kien Tuong, the largest and least dense in population (about 56,000) is located at the Cambodian border in the Plain of Reeds. Any Viet Cong forces here have easy access into the sanctuary of Cambodia, particularly in the "Duck's Bill" salient. During the monsoon the "roads" of this province are waterways. The two center provinces, Long An and Dinh Tuong (with populations, respectively, of 382,000 and 528,000) are rich agriculturally and have main north and south as well as some lateral roads, all of which are frequently mined by the Viet Cong. Dinh Tuong is

[7] It should be noted that the day of the "home-made" Viet Cong weapon is past. The Viet Cong have acquired a wide variety of captured American weapons from the RVN and from Korea, and others from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Their heavy and successful mortar attack on the Bien Hoa American air installation (*New York Times,* November 1, 1964) gives evidence of their modern equipment.

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the regional headquarters for the rapidly expanding RVN Seventh Army Infantry Division. The U.S. advisory team in that province is headed by an army colonel. The two coastal provinces, Go Cong (population 171,000) and Kien Hoa (population 587,000) are equally rich in resources. It was only in the summer of 1964 that the provincial capital of Go Cong and nearby areas were made secure by an RVN Marine Battalion. More progress has been made in Kien Hoa, a province divided into three main "fingers" or peninsulas. Here, as in Go Cong, the Viet Cong is capable of establishing production centers and military bases in the "mangrove" swamps on the edge of the waterways entering the sea. The swamps, dense with foliage of many kinds including scrub oak and palm, effectively conceal human activity.

The Viet Cong rarely disturb the farmers in these provinces. They grant them safe conduct to the provincial capitals and even to Saigon. But they tax them in both cash and crops, and terrorize them whenever necessary by making an example of a collaborator, i.e., one who rejects Viet Cong control. In these five provinces the Viet Cong military and civilian cadres control at least one-third of the population; the RVN controls at best one-third; and the rest have no permanent political overlord. In order to cope with this situation, the Diem regime began to build "strategic hamlets" —a good idea badly executed—throughout the countryside on an irregular pattern. Unfortunately, RVN officials, seeking to please U.S. officials, carefully exaggerated the progress of this program, engaging in what became known as "the statistical hamlet numbers game." U.S. officials (State, CIA and DOD) were frequently "taken in" by this. They ignored or rejected the advice of U.S. advisers in the field who repeatedly pointed out that the hamlets were neither strategically located for security nor adequately supplied and prepared for self-defense. The decision, taken after the fall of Diem, to change the name to "New Rural Life Hamlet" and to inaugurate the "pacification" program (described below) was designed to help the farmers to forget past mistakes.

These five provinces are treated as a single region by the Viet Cong command. It has at least one highly trained, mobile (over land and water) inter-provincial battalion composed of several companies and subdivided into two sections totaling more than 600 men. These are the best equipped and best trained communist soldiers. From squad leader on up, they received their training in North Vietnam. Their mobility and equipment permit each sec-

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tion, even if physically separated by a day's journey, to strike simultaneously. In these strikes they may join with the regular provincial battalions and district companies. Each province has a Viet Cong battalion and one or more district companies of about 120 men with cadre-trained leadership down to the platoon leader. Because of the tri-peninsular character of Kien Hoa province, the Viet Cong maintain there three separate battalions and related district companies.

Other areas of the Viet Cong quadrilateral around Saigon are similarly staffed and provisioned, for the Mekong Delta is the critical food area of South Vietnam and the life-line of Saigon. Without its products the South Vietnamese government would lose whatever authority it still possesses in the countryside. Hence the primary task of the RVN is to clear the Mekong Delta area step by step and then hold it. This is the purpose of the "pacification" program, which seeks to identify the Viet Cong and their supporters in control of the villages, draw up an inventory of the human and other resources of the area, ferret out and destroy the Viet Cong and replace their infrastructure with a loyal civilian regime capable of winning the villagers' support. The task of identification in any village or district is carried out by repetitive private interrogation about every fifteen days by different squads. This is followed by recruitment among the villagers for local services and regular RVN forces, while government forces provide defense and social services to the area.

An experienced RVN colonel in Kien Hoa province summed up for this writer the task to be done:

1. Separate the people from the Viet Cong,
2. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure and units,
3. Encourage the Viet Cong to return to legitimacy,
4. Strengthen security and government for the people, and
5. Reconstruct and redevelop the life of the people.

He hoped to achieve these objectives through securing firm "intelligence," carrying on psychological and military warfare, creating self-defense militia and paramilitary local forces, and establishing a number of model villages and districts with tight security and socio-economic improvement programs.

With U.S. aid the RVN has continued to mount its conventional and anti-guerrilla attacks in the general area of communist strongholds in the Mekong Delta; it also has attempted to woo the villagers, to build or rebuild new, secure hamlets, and to deny

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the enemy food and shelter. It has initiated an amnesty program designed to encourage defections among the Viet Cong forces and to assure villagers who may have been forced to assist the communists that if they come into the protected hamlets they will not be punished for past activities.

Yet even a successful program of this sort would not be enough. After pursuing these anti-guerrilla tactics, psychological warfare and economic deprivation campaigns, the RVN, with U.S. assistance, will have to mount large-scale conventional warfare operations against Viet Cong bases such as Duong Minh Chau in Tay Ninh province, and especially U Minh in the Camau Peninsula. These and other areas must be treated as enemy sectors. Some innocent people will inevitably be killed in this war. But large-scale, continuing attacks on the enemy will cost him casualties which he will be increasingly unable to replace quickly and deprive him of further logistic support. It may be argued that a campaign of this magnitude will merely "scatter" the enemy and permit him to regroup elsewhere or encourage him to go underground for the duration only to reappear later. This possibility cannot be dismissed. But the break-up and destruction of Viet Cong "Yenans" or "liberated areas" is so necessary for the attainment of victory that we must accept the risks attendant on a communist decision to "scatter" and go into temporary hiding.

Even this is not enough. No government in Saigon has yet been able to assure the ordinary peasant that loyalty to it will obtain for him *security* and require him to pay only *one* set of taxes. Nor has any government provided the villagers with sustained police protection to establish and maintain ordinary law and order which they have a right to expect. During Diem's rule and under succeeding regimes, strategic hamlets have been overrun by the Viet Cong. In late July 1964, for instance, the Viet Cong attacked and executed some forty village women and children whose menfolk were out on duty for the RVN; to point up the lesson, the "neutral" villagers were left unharmed. If the present pacification program is to succeed it must move only on a "clear and hold" basis with sufficient "hold" to guarantee to the villager at least two or three crop years under single taxation —the government's. No Vietnamese government has yet mobilized sufficient resources, human and material, on such a sustained, 24-hours-a-day, 365-days-a-year basis. Until this is carried out concurrently with a major effort to wipe out the Viet Cong and its

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supporters, there will be no victory in Vietnam. In the quadrilateral area this does *not* require U.S. army divisions. But it does require some form of joint RVN-U.S. command and some additional U.S. combat teams at battalion or regimental strength. These should buttress enlarged regular RVN armed forces deployed on an around-the-clock patrol.

The RVN and U.S. military in Vietnam are fighting against a foe supplied with sophisticated conventional weapons which include recently manufactured Chinese 75mm recoil-less rifles and heavy machine guns, 90mm rocket launchers, 60mm mortars, carbines and rounds of appropriate kinds of ammunition and explosives. They are also fighting against an enemy who has put some 30,000 trained troops into a relatively small area, troops who can rely upon another 80,000 secondary forces. The 10-to-1 or 15-to-1 proportion which has thus far obtained in other successful campaigns against communist insurgents in Southeast Asia cannot be achieved by the RVN. At best it musters a 4-to-1 advantage. It would be unwise to attempt to reach the proportion which the British were able to use in Malaya, for such an effort would "bleed" Saigon. Alternatively, therefore, in addition to a modest increase in RVN-U.S. force levels, North Vietnam must be interdicted and hurt if the Viet Cong are to be defeated.

In the areas of communist concentration, Military Requirement II, the RVN and the United States must create a military organization and command and control system capable of dealing with this form of conventional land warfare and the more mobile counterinsurgency warfare. Provincial chiefs appointed by Saigon to rule within their province must be subordinate to a unified military command responsible for carrying out pacification missions which may overlap several provinces. The quadrilateral area and the Camau Peninsula must come under government control by day and by night to prevent the "choking" of Saigon. The political significance of this undertaking far outweighs that of any other military plans in South Vietnam. Until the Saigon area, its environs, the Delta and the Camau Peninsula are firmly under government rule, the fight against the Viet Cong cannot be won.

War in the Areas of Communist Opportunity

The areas of "communist opportunity," especially those in the Central Highlands, the area of mixed Vietnamese and Montagnards, constitute Military Requirement III. It is here, in contrast

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to the "border areas," that RVN and U.S. forces must employ the doctrine and practice of "counterinsurgency"—a term in popular usage since the spring of 1962 when President Kennedy ordered the Departments of Defense and State to study this type of warfare and train special forces for it. This concept embraces the application of political, economic, psychological, military and paramilitary techniques to maintain government control where it exists, to restore it where it has been lost, and to acquire it in the "back country" where it had not previously been established. In these areas, too, the RVN is competing with the communists for "the hearts and minds" of men, especially for those of minority groups. In this form of contest, Vietnamese of *all* political persuasions have, in the past, been notoriously inept. Until recently the RVN did not have the opportunity or ability or inclination to establish a presence in the Central Highlands which would win for it the loyalty of the inhabitants. The conflict which erupted at Hué in May 1963—and which still continues—between the majority Buddhists and the minority Roman Catholic leadership, who controlled the power structure in part of this area and in Saigon, is the best known example of this difficulty. Trust and harmony in a society containing minority groups can exist only where there is toleration and mutual respect. These qualities have been lacking in the attitude of the Vietnamese toward all other groups in the society. Like "lowlanders" elsewhere in mainland Southeast Asia, they must make an effort to establish friendlier relationships with the "hill peoples" whom they have commonly disregarded and even despised.

There is no dearth of material on the ingredients of a counterinsurgency campaign. The phases of intelligence gathering and analysis, military operations, securing each area before advancing to the next, and instituting civic action programs to gain and retain the loyalty of the population are too well known to require further comment here. Nearly everyone engaged in the war in Vietnam knows "the book" on this subject. The task is to carry it out as effectively as possible, without corruption or favoritism. But this task is rendered more difficult because the undermanned RVN and U.S. armed forces must not only execute their military duties but also serve as doctor, teacher, policeman, judge, rural sociologist, tax-collector, recruiter, trainer and general factotum. Military administration along a "front line" is relatively simple, for there military command and control are clear-cut and enforce-

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able. Military administration is a far more complex and difficult task where there is no front line and where it must create a new, secure civil administration responsive to local needs and desires. The military must gradually and with sensitivity merge with and then give way to the civilian authority which it has created and whose loyalty and support it must win. In addition, these basic RVN detachments consisting of nine to eleven men, supported by larger detachments in corps regions and by a general headquarters in Nha Trang, and supplied by air-drop, boat and foot, must be on constant day and night patrol to flush out and capture or kill Viet Cong units.

Military Requirement III rates as the hardest task for the RVN Special Forces, for the government and for the assisting U.S. Special Forces. For it is essentially the task of nation-building under the constant threat of communist insurrectionary activity. It would be difficult under any circumstances; in the present Vietnamese case in the Central Highlands and the relevant portions of the Central Lowlands, it is a herculean task.

Conclusion

The successful implementation of Military Requirement I would for the most part choke off Hanoi's supply lines to the Viet Cong. It is unlikely that the North Vietnamese communists would risk an open attack south of the border, for they would invite a swift counterattack. The implementation of Requirement II would reduce, if it did not destroy, the Viet Cong's strike-force (company to battalion strength) capability. This in itself would not eliminate the Viet Cong, for they have demonstrated their ability to execute the classical guerrilla tactics of surprise, mobility, concentration for attack, and rapid withdrawal and dispersal. In these the enemy has had the advantage of the terrain, the climate and the as yet shaky reach of the RVN government into the countryside. In addition, the Viet Cong has had the advantage of forced and voluntary intelligence, superior thus far to the government's, on which guerrilla action so heavily depends. Finally, the RVN must give high priority to Requirement III, providing security and socio-political programs designed to weld all the peoples of the countryside, Vietnamese and ethnic and religious minorities, into a loyal nation. In this arena the strategy and

[8]These detachments normally consist of a leader, two medics, and two experts each in communications, explosives and psychological warfare.

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tactics of "clear and hold" military operations followed by effective civic action programs in the provinces, districts and villages—whether these be "strategic" or "new life" hamlets or anything else—must be executed by sympathetic, ably-led, mobile Vietnamese army and paramilitary forces.

These requirements must be viewed as related parts of one concerted set of war plans under a unified military command. RVN forces may be capable of successfully executing these war plans while U.S. forces remain, as at present, "advisers," but this entails considerable risk for the future of South Vietnam. The longer we wait for eventual success in South Vietnam, the greater the risks. On the other hand, if U.S. forces were modestly augmented and permitted to become active partners of the Vietnamese, the length of time required for victory could be reduced and the risks diminished.

The United States is pledged to sustain the Republic of Vietnam which has not enjoyed one full day of peace since its emergence as a sovereign state in 1954. That pledge can be honored if Americans and Vietnamese are able to meet the military and socio-political demands of these three types of warfare in Vietnam. Ultimate success against Viet Cong subversion, insurgency and regular warfare can be achieved only by a clear-cut military victory over the Viet Cong and by winning the political loyalty of the population. If President Johnson's extraordinary appointments of General Maxwell D. Taylor and U. Alexis Johnson as Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam signify a U.S. intention to win, the loss of life and the expenditure of treasure during the past decade will not have been in vain.

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A NATO NUCLEAR DETERRENT?

by J. I. Coffey

IN February 1963 President Kennedy's Special Ambassador, Livingston Merchant, a former Under Secretary of State, flew to Europe to explain the U.S. proposal for a multilateral NATO nuclear force (MLF). As envisioned by the United States, this force would consist of some twenty-five surface ships, carrying nuclear-armed Polaris missiles with a range of 2,500 miles. The ships would be manned by crews of mixed nationality, and subject to the control of a multinational board drawn from those NATO powers which provide the ships and crews, make available port facilities, or otherwise contribute to the upkeep of the force, estimated to cost about $500 million per year.

Reactions to Merchant's mission were varied. The West German government approved the concept, and agreed to bear 40 per cent of the cost of such a force; however, Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder indicated that, while Germany would accept for the present the principle of unanimity in decisions with respect to the employment of the force, ultimately such decisions should be made by a majority—which presumably need not include the United States.[1] The Italians, in view of the forthcoming national elections, listened but did not commit themselves. The British pressed for a multinational NATO force consisting of U.S. and British bombers rather than the gradual development of a multilateral force of armed ships with crews of mixed nationality. As De Gaulle had indicated in advance, the French would have nothing to do with a multilateral NATO nuclear force and he reaffirmed his determination to build a national *force de frappe*. These questions remain: What prompted the United States to propose a nuclear deterrent for Europe? What factors motivated such varying responses from the NATO allies? And what are the prospects for the establishment of a NATO nuclear force?

[1]For a discussion of West German Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel's reaction to the MLF, see Wallace C. Magathan, Jr., "West German Defense Policy," ORBIS, Summer 1964, pp. 301-308.

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A NATO NUCLEAR DETERRENT?

U.S. Views on a European Deterrent

The proposal pressed upon the Europeans by Merchant had received a good deal of attention from both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy Administrations, beginning with the 1960 offer to provide medium-range ballistic missiles to NATO; continuing with President Kennedy's Ottawa speech of May 1961, in which he hinted at the possibility of a multilateral NATO seaborne force; and culminating in a series of presentations to the North Atlantic Council and other NATO bodies in late 1962. The impetus to further action with respect to a NATO nuclear force derived from the so-called Nassau Agreement, wherein Prime Minister Harold Macmillan undertook to make available to NATO British nuclear-powered submarines for which the United States would provide Polaris missiles, and the U.S. government pledged "at least equal . . . forces." In addition, the United States accepted the British proposal to make "allocations [to NATO] from U.S. strategic forces, from U.K. Bomber Command, and from tactical nuclear forces now held in Europe."[2] Following President de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, in which he rejected any French participation in the arrangements made at Nassau, Washington apparently changed its mind with respect to the nature of the NATO nuclear deterrent. Instead of national force contributions, the United States reverted to the Ottawa concept of a self-contained and indivisible multilateral force, which at first was envisioned as consisting of submarines. In part because of cost, in part because of the difficulty of manning submarines with crews from different nations, the United States subsequently returned to its earlier scheme for missile-carrying surface ships, and it was this proposal which Merchant presented to the principal NATO allies.

In this as in other proposals, the United States has placed severe restrictions and conditions on its support for a NATO nuclear deterrent. In the first place it desires that the bulk of the costs be borne by the European allies, hopefully without affecting their planned expenditures for conventional forces. Second, it proposes that the United States retain custody, at least for the present, of the nuclear warheads available to the proposed multilateral nuclear force. In the third place, Washington maintains that the plans for the employment of the NATO nuclear force, and its operations in time of war, should be "integrated" with

[2]"Joint Communiqué of 21 December," reprinted in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives,* January 5-12, 1963, p. 19175.

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those of U.S. strategic strike forces; in short, it does not desire either independent targeting or uncontrolled launching of weapons by the NATO force. And finally, it insists upon a U.S. veto over decisions with respect to the use of this force.

Although this is only one in a long series of U.S. responses to European pressures for the build-up of NATO's nuclear capability, it is no exaggeration to say that the United States has been cool toward the idea of European nuclear forces, national, multinational or multilateral.[3] While the United States has accepted the existence of British nuclear forces, and has to some extent assisted in the modernizing of those forces through exchanges of information and through joint development programs in non-nuclear fields, it has from the beginning opposed French efforts to build a national nuclear force and has attempted to prevent the further diffusion of nuclear weapons. Essentially, the argument has been that the United States possesses nuclear delivery capabilities of such magnitude that the development of similar forces by its European allies would be duplicatory and largely ineffectual. As President Kennedy said in his television interview of December 17, 1962: "We don't want six or seven nuclear powers in Europe diverting their funds to nuclear power when the United States has got this tremendous arsenal. . . . Why duplicate what we have already done and are doing in Western Europe today as long as our guarantees are good?"[4]

Moreover, the United States has been concerned with the increased risk of war by accident resulting from the proliferation of nuclear weapons; with the possibility of escalation should clashes occur between communist bloc forces and allied forces possessing nuclear weapons; and with the difficulty of controlling or directing nuclear strikes involving allied units. Thus the United States has acquiesced in, rather than endorsed, the concept of a European deterrent, and has done so only because it considers such a force the lesser of two evils—the greater being the growth of independent nuclear capabilities.[5]

[3]Cf. Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," *The Reporter,* March 28, 1963, pp. 22-37.

[4]Transcript of Interview with the President, mimeographed, Office of the White House Press Secretary, December 17, 1962, p. 18.

[5]Cf. The Remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at the Commencement exercises, University of Michigan, wherein he argues the sufficiency of U.S. strategic strike forces, condemns "limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently," and significantly fails to endorse regional or multilateral deterrent forces. (DOD News Release No. 980-62, June 16, 1962, pp. 10-12, and *New York Times,* June 17, 1962, p. 26.)

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A NATO NUCLEAR DETERRENT?

Differing Strategic Concepts

One of the fundamental causes for varying views on the desirability of a European nuclear deterrent lies in the differing opinions of NATO military problems held by the United States and by many of its NATO allies, and the correspondingly divergent strategies which have been developed. Despite semi-annual communiqués from the NATO ministerial meetings affirming a continuing (or increasing) Soviet threat to Western Europe, some members of NATO are apparently unconvinced that this threat will materialize in the form of unprovoked Soviet aggression. In part this disbelief stems from analyses of the fundamental changes in Soviet society, communist ideology and intra-bloc relations that have taken place since the death of Stalin; in part it rests upon the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent. To the extent that Europeans are concerned with warding off Soviet military action, they seek to do so by strengthening the U.S. commitment to NATO, in the belief that they will thereby enhance the credibility of the deterrent. Thus, a multilateral NATO nuclear force (or, in the final analysis, national strategic strike forces) are militarily desirable because they virtually ensure U.S. involvement, pose the possibility of escalation, and presumably induce greater caution on the part of Soviet decision-makers.

Conversely, the United States is more fearful of Soviet military action and more concerned with devising safe means for defending Europe in the event of Soviet aggression—preferably without resorting to any kind of nuclear weapons and, above all, without initiating thermonuclear war. Accordingly, the United States has pressed its NATO allies to boost their conventional forces, particularly those available on the German front, and has of recent years paid considerable attention to ensuring that U.S. forces will not automatically employ nuclear weapons in the event of conflict. Indeed, the United States has been so concerned over the possibility of escalation that it has refrained from equipping its front-line troops with short-range nuclear delivery vehicles, such as the Davy Crockett, and is placing electronic locks on all air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons, so that these could under no circumstances be detonated at the whim of an individual, or on the orders of a small unit commander.

Given European views on the importance of deterrence, such measures immediately created differences within the Alliance. Thus the Germans, who are concerned with precluding Soviet

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probes or quick thrusts into German territory, have called for the distribution of tactical nuclear weapons to front-line units on the assumption that this will strengthen the deterrent posture. Moreover, the Europeans are seemingly unconvinced of the feasibility of defending Western Europe with conventional forces, in part at least because they are unwilling to pay the political and economic costs of raising such forces. They seriously doubt that it would be possible to keep a war in Europe conventional, and they know full well that the use of nuclear weapons on even a modest scale would mean the virtual devastation of Europe.[6] In short, the Europeans see their salvation in avoiding war and are therefore much more concerned with deterrence than with defense.

This difference in emphasis makes many Europeans singularly unresponsive to U.S. arguments that all nuclear forces should be integrated, controlled and directed by a single authority: the President of the United States. First, the Europeans know that they cannot ensure U.S. involvement so long as nuclear forces (and particularly nuclear warheads) remain under U.S. control. In the second place, many Europeans doubt the efficacy of U.S. plans for controlled strategic operations. As Henry Kissinger points out: "Europeans, living on a continent covered with ruins testifying to the fallibility of human foresight, feel in their bones that history is more complicated than systems analysis."[7] Furthermore, they note that the U.S. strategy offers no guarantee that the hundreds of mobile or semi-mobile Soviet missiles which can reach European targets could be eliminated by U.S. strikes; as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara testified, in the event of a full-scale nuclear exchange, the fatalities in Western Europe would approach 90 million. . . ."[8] Thus, the Europeans are unconvinced by arguments that the conduct of military operations requires that they deny themselves—or be denied—free choice with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons.

[6]Even a relatively few "tactical" nuclear weapons can cause heavy civilian casualties. In the 1955 NATO exercise *Carte Blanche,* 355 nuclear bombs were theoretically "dropped" on enemy bases and lines of communications. Observers calculated that at least five million Germans would have been killed or wounded had these weapons actually been employed. Gordon A. Craig, "Germany and NATO," in Klaus Knorr, editor, *NATO and American Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 240.

[7]"NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," *op. cit.,* p. 27.

[8]U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on the Military Posture and H.R. 2440* (Washington: GPO, 1963), p. 392.

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Political Differences

In addition to divergent opinions concerning the best way to cope with the communist military threat to Western Europe, some of the allies have other reasons for seeking a greater degree of control over decisions with respect to the deployment and employment of nuclear weapons. In part, these reasons derive from the prestige accruing to a nuclear power and from a desire not to be considered "inferior," but in large measure they derive from a belief that the United States has not in the past supported, and will not in the future always support, their national interests. As Prime Minister Macmillan stated earlier in the House of Commons, Britain requires a national nuclear force because there "may be conditions, there may be some areas, in which the interests of some countries may seem more vital to them than they do to others. It is right that a British Government, whatever the conditions and the principles under dispute, should be able to make its own decision without fear of nuclear blackmail."[9]

As long as the European allies are dependent upon the backing of the United States for the attainment of their foreign policy objectives, they will understandably seek to commit the United States to the support of these objectives. When and as they become convinced that the United States will not in all circumstances continue such support, they will inevitably turn—as the British and the French have turned—to other ways of bolstering their power and increasing their prestige, so that they may be in a better position to maintain unilaterally their national interests.

Coupled with this is an understandable distaste for being at the mercy of American decisions with respect to peace or war. Although most allied governments have staunchly supported the United States in times of crisis, vocal and potentially important segments of European public opinion have taken a quite different line.[10] Nor is official support always indicative of personal views; even as firm a friend as Prime Minister Macmillan reportedly felt that in the Cuban crisis there was nothing Britain could do but wait and see what would happen.[11] Proud peoples do not take kindly to having matters of life and death determined by others,

[9]Reprinted in *Survival,* March-April 1963, p. 49.

[10]For a report on reactions in the United Kingdom, see H. A. DeWeerd, "British Attitudes in the Cuban Crisis" (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1963).

[11]*Ibid.,* p. 2.

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a feeling which is evidenced by the popular slogan, "No annihilation without representation."

These European concerns over lack of U.S. support for their national interests, and over the ability of the United States to reach and enforce decisions without regard for the views and the feelings of its allies, have prompted demands for a greater voice in policy formulation. Thus, President de Gaulle, in the fall of 1958, proposed the establishment of a U.S.-U.K.-French triumvirate to determine policies on a world-wide basis; furthermore, he asked for a veto over U.S. decisions to employ nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. Failing to obtain this triumvirate, he turned to the development of a national nuclear force because, among other things, this would give him a more effective voice in European and world affairs: the French *force de frappe* may be even more useful in negotiating with allies than in dealing with enemies. Other countries, which cannot or do not choose to build national nuclear forces, are interested in a European deterrent, not because of its military capabilities (which would be comparatively small) but because membership on the control board would enable them to participate in crucial political-military decisions now made unilaterally by the United States.

The Horns of the Dilemma

So far the United States has sought to answer the needs and calm the fears of its European allies primarily by giving them a larger voice in the deployment and the targeting of U.S. nuclear strike forces, while reserving to itself the final decision concerning the employment of nuclear weapons. Although this policy has had some success, it has not precluded the development of independent British and French nuclear strike forces, nor has it fully met the aspirations or calmed the fears of other NATO allies, notably the Germans. What, then, are the alternatives?

One is, of course, to abandon opposition to the French *force de frappe* and to acquiesce in (or even to promote) the acquisition by France, Germany, and perhaps Italy, of significant nuclear strike forces. While this might enhance the sense of security of these countries, it would do so at the expense of NATO as a whole, which would be further divided into nuclear "haves" and "have nots." Moreover, the development of national nuclear capabilities is not compatible with the U.S. aim of maintaining "unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and

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central direction [of nuclear strike forces]."[12] Nor is this proliferation of nuclear weapons likely to appeal either to the Soviets or to other Europeans, many of whom share the aversion of the new British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, to seeing nuclear weapons in the hands of any Germans, East or West.

An alternative which would avoid this last danger would be for the French and the British, as well as the Americans, to hold custody of nuclear warheads which could, in an emergency, be mated with tactical delivery vehicles in German hands; in this way the dependence of Germany on the United States could be reduced. However, even if the French should agree to this (which is doubtful), such half-measures would probably not relieve the sensitivity of the Germans to being treated as "second-class citizens," and might well impel them to revitalize the Franco-German Agreement of 1962 as one way of achieving at least the shadow of nuclear power, as well as firm French diplomatic support for German interests.

The undesirability of alternatives centered around national nuclear forces has led the United States to propose the creation of a multilateral NATO nuclear force, in the belief that this will give evidence of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe and thereby increase the credibility of the deterrent in European eyes. Furthermore, to the extent that the European members of NATO can sway decisions with respect to targeting, deployment of forces, and guidelines for the conduct of nuclear operations, their fear of being left at the mercy of Soviet medium-range missiles and aircraft may well be allayed. It is also possible that participation in a NATO nuclear force may satisfy desires for national prestige, inhibit the further development of national nuclear forces, and bring the Europeans closer to acceptance of a unified West European deterrent linked with U.S. strategic strike forces. Thus, the United States has weighty reasons for promoting a multilateral NATO nuclear force.

These reasons are apparently also persuasive to many European governments, which are manifesting increasing interest in a NATO multilateral deterrent. It is, however, apparent that not all NATO countries will support the decision to create such a force, and that the decision will not be speedily implemented. Despite British participation in the working group on the multilateral nuclear force, and in the manning of an experimental ship,

[12]Remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara . . . , *loc. cit.*, p. 11.

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the *USS Biddle,* the Conservative Government of Sir Alec Douglas-Home was lukewarm toward the MLF and the new Labour Government is pressing vigorously for a revision of the concept.[13] The Norwegian government has swung from passivity to opposition, while the French Premier, Georges Pompidou, has reportedly charged that the MLF was directed politically "more or less against France" and has warned that German participation would be incompatible with the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation.[14] In the face of these moves, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have agreed to defer action on the establishment of the MLF, even though both have reaffirmed their devotion to the concept. Given these divergent national approaches, as well as differences within many countries over the nature and the structure of a NATO deterrent, the future of the multilateral nuclear force is at best uncertain.

Furthermore, the United States must realize that a multilateral NATO nuclear force as now proposed will neither achieve U.S. objectives nor satisfy all its NATO allies. For example, as long as the French proceed independently, the United States will be unable to control, directly or indirectly, all decisions with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons in the NATO area. Moreover, unless the United States is prepared to renounce its veto over the employment of weapons belonging to the European deterrent force, and yield physical custody of the nuclear warheads allocated to that force, the desires of other allies (notably the Germans) will not be fulfilled. While the allies may be able to increase marginally their influence on decisions, they will not be able to determine issues of peace and war or to ensure that they can brandish nuclear weapons in support of their own national interests.

Nor is it likely that a multinational force, composed of contingents from the United States and the United Kingdom, will fare much better. Although De Gaulle has hinted that the French *force de frappe* "could be combined with similar forces of her allies . . . ,"[15] he has also indicated the price of such cooperation:

[13]*New York Times,* November 16, 1964, p. 1, and November 19, 1964, p. 13. For the views of a prominent Labour Party M.P. on the MLF, see Frederick W. Mulley, "NATO's Nuclear Problems: Control or Consultation," ORBIS, Spring 1964, especially pp. 29-35. Mr. Mulley has been appointed Deputy Minister of State for Defense in the new Labour Government.

[14]*New York Times,* November 6, 1964, p. 1.

[15]Press Conference of January 14, 1963, translated and reprinted in *Survival,* March-April 1963, p. 59.

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U.S. acceptance and support of an independent French nuclear force and modification of the NATO structure to give France a greater voice in decisions.[16] Furthermore, the Germans are not likely to be satisfied for long with arrangements which deny them nuclear weapons, particularly if the control of the multinational force remains in the hands of an Anglo-American-French triumvirate or in NATO bodies where Germany has only one vote out of fifteen. Most importantly, while a multinational NATO nuclear deterrent might constitute a psychological sop, the time is probably past when the establishment of such a force could in itself be expected to have a profound impact on the policies and the attitudes of the NATO allies.

Although cool toward multinational NATO nuclear forces, which presumably would incorporate substantial elements of the Strategic Air Command, the United States has endorsed in principle an "integrated" European deterrent. While this concept has not been spelled out, it apparently envisages a multilateral force without U.S. participation, staffed, supported and directed by the European members of NATO and linked with U.S. strategic strike forces. To some, this concept appears empyrean, since, as Under Secretary of State George Ball has pointed out, Europe is not "sufficiently far advanced toward political unity . . . [to] manage and control an atomic deterrent."[17] Moreover, to the extent that the "integrated" force was responsible to a European decision-maker, and hence independent of U.S. control, the Europeans would be capable of precipitating or escalating a nuclear war which would almost inevitably involve the United States. Thus, unless the use of the integrated European deterrent were subject to an American veto (which would negate all the political and psychological advantages of such a deterrent), the United States would not control the conduct of any war in Europe, conventional or nuclear.

The Prospects for the Future

It would seem, then, that the promotion by the United States of an integrated European deterrent is, for different reasons, as unlikely to secure U.S. strategic aims and achieve U.S. political

[16]See, for example, the reports of conversations between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and President de Gaulle, which indicate that the latter may in fact be seeking a *modus vivendi* along the lines indicated. *Washington Post,* April 10, 1963, p. A-14.

[17]Talk at the Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, May 7, 1964. *New York Times,* May 8, 1964.

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objectives as is the present program for the development of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, the British concept of a multinational force, or the French plan for the "coordination" of national nuclear forces. What options still remain?

If U.S. objectives continue unchanged, the answer is: none. The only way to devise meaningful alternatives is to alter U.S. policy in two highly significant ways. The first of these is to abandon the position that the United States, and the United States alone, is entitled to full and final control over all nuclear strike forces, in and out of NATO, in peace and in war. While this position may have some abstract validity in terms of strategic concepts, it does not take account of the interests, the aspirations and the felt needs of our European allies. Moreover, it is unrealistic, in that the French and the British now have—and probably will maintain—independent nuclear capabilities.[18] Thus the United States must accustom itself to an alliance in which final decisions on the use of nuclear weapons are *not* solely an American prerogative.

Paradoxically, unified control over nuclear strike forces is likely only if the United States is prepared to share that control with other NATO nations, which implies much greater political cohesion among *all* the allies than has so far been achieved. If such cohesion is to come about, the United States will have to abandon a second premise: that alliance policy must be synonymous with U.S. policy. While the strength, the military expertise, and the world-wide commitments of the United States certainly entitle it to be something more than "first among equals," they do not entitle it to dictate the policies and the programs of its allies, whether on Cuba, on world trade or on nuclear strategy. If, as Secretary Rusk has stated, Americans reject "the notion of absolute independence in dealing with affairs within the free world,"[19] then they must reject it for the United States as well as for France. Only if the United States is prepared to share its nuclear power with its European allies, and to pay greater heed to the concerns and the interests of its NATO partners, are any steps toward a NATO nuclear deterrent likely to be fruitful. It is in this context that the Administration's insistence on a multilateral nuclear force must be judged.

[18]See, for example, President de Gaulle's strong speech of April 16, 1964, in which he again told the French that they must build a nuclear force at whatever cost. *New York Times,* April 17, 1964.

[19]*New York Times,* May 10, 1964.

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A FORWARD-PAUSE DEFENSE FOR EUROPE*

by H. B. Malmgren

THE governments of the NATO nations and their defense strategists, military and nonmilitary alike, have debated for some fifteen years the question: What is the best strategy for the defense of Western Europe? The discussion has ranged over alternative strategies and deployment of forces without the emergence of a consensus. At the cost of some oversimplification, the various positions may be subsumed in two categories. There are those who argue that a forward defense designed to yield no territory is essential, and that the means toward this end is automatic use of tactical nuclear weapons. There are those who argue that a defense characterized by a pause is essential, and that the means toward this end is a much strengthened conventional fighting capability.

The main arguments for a forward defense based on automatic tactical nuclear reaction are: Nuclear automaticity is the most effective guarantee that no aggressive action, however limited, will be taken by the Soviets. If the deterrent fails, tactical nuclear weapons are essential to hold defensive positions against superior Soviet forces. Tactical nuclear deployment is the only sensible strategy, for a conventional mode of deployment is highly vulnerable to enemy use of tactical nuclear weapons, and a tactical nuclear defense deployment is not feasible for conventional defense against conventional attack.

The arguments for a conventional pause concept are several: Since the use of tactical nuclear weapons involves a very high probability of escalation to full-scale thermonuclear war, and since both the United States and the Soviet Union are highly vulnerable to each other's offensive thermonuclear forces, the threat to use nuclear weapons against limited adventures of any kind is not credible. The pause provides an intermediate step between overt but limited military action and intercontinental

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thermonuclear war, during which space can be traded for time. The time bought by yielding space may be used to negotiate to stave off mutual annihilation. The time may also be used to redeploy forces either to counterattack at points of penetration or to assume a tactical nuclear battle formation.

It is possible to argue that the defense of Europe is a strategic matter for Europeans and a tactical matter for the United States. Many Europeans do not wish to trade space for time, or for anything else; they tend to be interested in preventing any kind of fighting, rather than in being able to win a fight if one breaks out. The desire of the U.S. government to adopt any measures which diminish the risk of total destruction to itself tends therefore to be antithetical to such European interests.

Some Static Defense Concepts

Among the arguments posed by various defense strategists are some which involve, in essence, a trade of offensive capability for improved defensive capability. This trade is implicit in some recent discussion of plausible defense deployments. For example, a recent study by several European defense analysts reported on by Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor[1] suggested an alternative to the thin defense crust "shield": The twenty-five existing NATO divisions should be divided among ten highly mobile counterattack divisions and other divisions whose functions would be to provide a pattern of strong points behind which the mobile divisions could form and move. In addition, strong militia-type local defense forces should be established in the countries most exposed to Soviet attack. Such local defense systems with an intimate knowledge of the terrain could effectively decelerate the pace of attacking units and force their dispersion, enhancing the ability of mobile regular divisions to counterattack.

Another example is some recent work by James E. King, Jr., concerning the case for fixed defenses along the Central European front.[2] King's concept involves four elements: a fixed standing element of permanently occupied fortifications; a fixed non-standing element of prepared but not permanently occupied defense

[1]Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, *Arms and Stability in Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1964).

[2]James E. King, Jr., "The Case for Prepared Defenses on the NATO Central Front" (unpublished paper, February 13, 1964), and discussion in a paper, "Towards Stability in Central Europe," published in *Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West,* Arnold Wolfers, editor (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964).

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positions arranged in depth; a mobile standing element similar to the present NATO standing force for maneuver and counter-attack; and a mobile non-standing element of reserve forces to augment, reinforce and support the standing maneuver force. The main function of these fixed and mobile defenses would be to compel an enemy attacker using non-nuclear means "to engage in extensive preparations and probably to employ a very high concentration of force for direct attack upon them, or else to expose his flanks if he tried to infiltrate rather than attack them." This would also diminish the attacker's chances of achieving surprise.

More explicit recognition of the possibility of trading offensive for defensive capability is the broad "defense emphasis posture" currently being worked on by the Stanford Research Institute (SRI).[3] This concept involves the interposition of "receptive defenses" between the enemy and his objectives in Western Europe: "By 'receptive defenses' we refer to those military means which repel or destroy enemy forces that come to them; they would not ordinarily be suitable for use for deep strikes calculated to 'defend' by pre-emptive or spoiling attack upon the enemy's means of providing, marshalling, or moving his offenses." The SRI interest in this concept is basically with regard to its arms control characteristics: it may be less "provocative" without sacrificing the ability to defend.

These defensive concepts and other similar proposals which have been made[4] are not out of line with the avowed purpose of NATO as a defensive alliance. What we need is some means of evaluating the feasibility and the cost of these concepts relative to more flexible defense postures.

A Conceptual Framework

The first step in building a general conceptual framework to evaluate these ideas is to examine the role of defense. A defensive formation or posture may yield one or more of several benefits. These benefits must be measured against the situation that would exist without the defense system in question: no defense can

[3]Carl H. Amme, Jr., *Arms Control Concepts and Selection of Strategic Projections for Arms Control Analysis*, Research Memorandum DAC-RM-16 (Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, Defense Analysis Center, November 1963).

[4]Among earlier proposals was the so-called Von Bonin plan, drawn up by Col. Bogislav von Bonin in the Blank Office in Germany, calling for a fortified zone manned by a special elite force of relatively small size. His proposal was discussed in A. Weinstein, *Keiner kann den Krieg gewinnen* (Bonn, 1955) and in E. Hinterhoff, *Disengagement* (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1959), pp. 172-173.

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ever be made impenetrable to all possible attacks, thus benefits cannot be measured against an ideal defense which halts any and all attacks. One benefit may be to raise the requirements and costs—the offense-to-defense ratio for a successful enemy attack. A defense system may also provide strategic warning by forcing the attacker to mass forces. It may be designed merely to buy time by slowing the pace of enemy penetration. It may increase the enemy's uncertainty concerning the chances of success for his attack. A defense system may, as a consequence of some or all of these effects, reduce the expected net gain of an attack, thus decreasing the aggressor's incentive to attack. These and other objectives of defensive systems are well known; the purpose here is to point up their relative rather than absolute character in the analysis of particular defense postures.

Static defense concepts are often discounted because of a general inclination to disparage "Maginot-mindedness" or because of a belief that fortification and barriers can be easily overrun or overflown in modern warfare. The relevant question to pose is not whether a particular defense formation can be overcome but what does the formation buy, and is it worth the cost in relation to other alternatives? If a barricade or fortified position along the Central European front buys an increase in offense-to-defense ratio required for successful penetration, its cost and value have to be compared with additional front line divisions or means of mobility, and their possible effectiveness against the various plausible attacks. (Obviously the cost is not calculated merely in monetary terms, and the effectiveness is not necessarily quantifiable.)

Consider, then, the concept of static defense. In commenting on the ratio of troops to space and offense to defense, Liddell Hart has argued that one important element in evaluating a defense position is the ratio of mobile reserves to the troops holding the forward position, and that there is an important trade-off between the two.[5] His analysis suggested that up to one-half of the whole force might be a proper proportion for the mobile reserves, "even where it entails thinning the forward defence to a hazardous degree." A second trade-off he considered implicitly is that between well-trained, mobile combat forces and citizen militia:

[5]B. H. Liddell Hart, "The Ratio of Troops to Space," *The Royal United Service Institution Journal,* May 1960.

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The required number of divisions [along the Central European front] would be somewhat less if there was a citizen militia, of the Swiss type, available to man a deep network of defence posts in the forward zone as a means of helping to delay the enemy's advance while the divisions of the mobile reserve converged upon the threatened sector. This militia would need to be so organized that the posts could be manned at short notice by militiamen living or working nearby. It would also be desirable to have such a militia available in the rear areas as a check on an enemy airborne descent to seize key-points there and block the counter-moves of the N.A.T.O. mobile divisions.

If a militia force of this kind were available for local defence, the requirement for the main "shield force" might be reduced from 26 to 20 divisions, that is, a one to two basis *versus* the enemy's possible maximum in a surprise on the Central Europe front.[6]

Consider the trade between mobile reserves and forward defenses. It has been argued that if all NATO forces deployed in Central Europe were fully combat ready and highly mobile, and there were some increase in the number of divisions, conventional defense of Europe would be possible. This posture requires additional divisions so as to maintain some defense-in-depth, but basically it involves a fluid defense which will allow trading space for time during which the forces for a counteroffensive can be organized. The experience of the last war showed that military planners favor this type of fluid defense. However, it has some unfortunate characteristics in the present context. For many Europeans trading space for time is inadmissible because it permits the overrunning of NATO territory and would probably convert most of West Germany into a battlefield. It requires increased conventional contributions by the NATO nations in terms both of manpower and equipment—a step that is unlikely to be taken.[7] Such a force is not only effective for defense, but is also capable of large-scale offense. Many defense analysts argue that such a stronger, more mobile NATO force would therefore tend to be provocative, compelling the Soviets to increase their combat forces deployed in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, with resultant adverse effects on the political

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 211.

[7] While the argument that other NATO nations cannot afford increased defense contributions is discounted, European parliaments believe this to be the case. Europeans also cite the substantial pressures from the shortage of labor and consequent wage inflation. In addition, the phasing out of conscription in more European nations is highly probable. (Canada and the U.K. do not now have conscription.) There are also many who argue that European forces should be large enough to avoid U.S. displeasure and withdrawal, while at the same time small enough to make it necessary for the United States to maintain a substantial standing force in Central Europe, thus ensuring a U.S. commitment.

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situation in the bloc countries and on the stable military situation. A large-scale fluid defense capability would also tend to preclude thinning out of forces in Central Europe in possible arms control negotiations, since reductions below something on the order of twenty-five to thirty divisions would not provide either sufficient defense-in-depth or coverage of the front under a fluid defense strategy.

On the other hand, a deployment which places some of the total force in a static defense posture well forward, with a substantial portion in mobile reserve at the rear, is much more favorable in these respects. The static defense posture would have to involve a "mix" of substantial digging in, barricades, fortifications and alternative equipment. Thus static defense may employ completely different equipment and tactical concepts as compared to the mobile forces, e.g., emphasizing anti-tank weapons as opposed to tanks for anti-tank warfare.[8] If barricades raise enemy penetration requirements, they would be equivalent in that sense to the alternative of increasing the number of divisions. Static defense does not depend so much upon trading space for time. Rather, time is bought by forcing the enemy to give strategic warning in massing for penetration and by slowing the pace of his penetration. Static defense can reduce the number of divisions required to hold a position, and thus accords more closely to the realities of Europe's defense contributions. It is not as capable of offense as the fluid defense posture, but consequently it may tend to be less provocative. Thinning out of forces under arms control agreements would be more feasible, i.e., less destabilizing, behind a static defense posture.

With regard to the trade-off between militia and regular forces, the fluid defense concept requires a very large, well-trained standing army, larger than that which presently exists; static defense does not impose such stringent requirements. The importance of continuous experience among men and units for effective mobile combat cannot be overemphasized; again, static defense is not so demanding. The functions of each man in a static defense posture are far more limited in number than when he is being used in mobile combat formation.

If the other NATO nations do not increase their conventional

[8]Cost-effectiveness analysis of such weapons as one- or two-man anti-tank guided missiles (e.g., TOW and ENTAC) would have to be based on their extensive use as substitutes for, rather than complements to, tanks and other more mobile anti-tank capabilities.

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contributions, or even further reduce their contributions, the development of complementary militia forces for a static defense role may be an acceptable means to build a plausible defense posture.

A static defense concept with alternative combinations of fixed forward forces and mobile reserve forces, standing forces and militia forces, and defensive equipment and positioning, may consequently be described as a strategy of "forward pause": forward defense, conventional, with a built-in pause. This is the broad concept of defense which can provide a framework for analysis of particular mixes like those mentioned earlier.

An appropriate defense mix does not necessarily require a barrier extending the full length of possible fronts. Whenever the defenses in any sector are strong enough to make the costs of the enemy's penetration bear the same relationship to his anticipated gains from penetration elsewhere along the front, the defense mix in that sector will be appropriate. In other words, the enemy should find his gains per unit of effort the same regardless of his point of attack, so that no one, or more than one, point is relatively more attractive.[9] Thus a forward defense zone might be composed of fortifications at some points and forces deployed similarly to the present pattern at other points along the East-West border. There are also many possible combinations of fixed and mobile forces in the forward zone.[10]

So far the discussion has involved conventional defense only. What are the possibilities for deploying tactical nuclear forces as complements to the conventional forces? Tactical nuclear weapons could be used by an attacker to create gaps in a static defense formation, but this would place the onus of first use on the attacker. Thus a possible benefit of the static defense posture is that it may shift to the attacking forces the need to make initial use of nuclear weapons.

[9]Andre Maginot himself understood this when, as French Minister of War, he intervened in the budget debate on December 10, 1929: "We could hardly dream of building a kind of Great Wall of France, which would in any case be far too costly. Instead, we have foreseen powerful but flexible means of organising defence, based on the dual principle of taking full advantage of the terrain and of establishing a continuous line of fire everywhere." Quoted in Vivian Rowe, *The Great Wall of France* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1959), p. 49. The problem of the Maginot Line in 1940, in this sense, was that it offered relatively more attractive avenues of penetration at points along the defensive frontier other than the Line itself.

[10]The static defense concept also provides a framework within which to discuss alternatives to the extremes of a simple trip-wire strategy or the U.S.-supported strong conventional fluid defense force.

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If the enemy does not use nuclear weapons at the outset of a military engagement, the static defense posture would compel him to mass his forces for penetration. Even during the course of penetration it will be necessary for the attacking force to remain compressed in order to maintain momentum through a static defense area and to deal with mobile reserve forces if the static area is broken through. Defensive forces in prepared positions will be far less vulnerable to "self-kill" by nuclear weapons employed in close proximity by the defenders. The enemy will therefore tend to remain a prime nuclear target for a substantial period of time, so that the opportunity to use tactical nuclear weapons in defense would not be entirely lost as a consequence of any pause. Thus the proponents of tactical nuclear defense for certain contingencies would not necessarily find their nuclear options precluded. If, on the other hand, the enemy uses nuclear weapons at the outset to destroy defensive positions, he will be forced to use them in significant numbers, a move which would invite retaliation in kind and probably escalation. A quick conventional grab for territory would be denied to him by his own actions.

Another possible feature of a static defense posture might be the employment of tactical nuclear weapons as complements to the defensive forces, rather than as substitutes for an adequate defense. Thornton Read recently suggested that a working rule might be to employ nuclear weapons only on one's own territory, creating a sanctuary for the enemy on his side of the border and an area of nuclear destruction on the defense side.[11] While establishing clear-cut limits as to when and where tactical nuclear weapons would be used, and thereby increasing the chances of avoiding escalation, this concept would also prevent the enemy from massing for penetration of the static defense system. The nuclear destruction zone between the border and the static defense positions would provide an area through which the enemy could advance in mass only at great peril. The combination of a nuclear threat against massed forces and the extreme difficulty of penetrating static defenses without massing might add up to a very effective defense system.[12]

[11]Thornton Read, "Nuclear Tactics for Defending a Border," *World Politics*, April 1963.

[12]It may be observed that some of the very real difficulties of creating a plausible dual-capable force in a fluid defense mode may be less serious under a static defense concept of this kind.

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A FORWARD-PAUSE DEFENSE FOR EUROPE

The Value of Pause

Does a defender obtain valuable advantages by delaying an enemy? As a first step in answering this question, a distinction should be made between the value of delay in a tactical context and its value in a strategic context. In a tactical context, delay buys several things: Additional time enables intelligence to improve. The longer the pause, the greater are the chances of obtaining and confirming "correct" information and rejecting incorrect information. With additional time, better sources of intelligence can be employed, such as aerial photographic reconnaissance, which is slower but more accurate than many other types of information acquisition. With additional time, in other words, there is a better chance of locating an enemy, defining his posture, identifying his likely pattern of attack, acquiring targets and identifying them with greater precision.

Delaying or slowing up the attacker's penetration makes defensive tactics more effective: The enemy loses the advantages of mobility and momentum; targeting is much easier with a slowly moving enemy; counterdeployment by mobile reserve units at points of intended penetration is enhanced; attrition of attacking forces is likely to rise more rapidly than that of defending forces as the fighting is prolonged; and, in relation to tactical nuclear weapons, additional time enables defensive forces to maneuver in order to assume a tactical nuclear mode when necessary. If the aggressive move appears to be an attempt at mass penetration rather than a limited (accidental or intentional) border incursion—a fact that can be established only over a period of time—then the defensive forces can redeploy for a possible tactical nuclear riposte. Slowing the speed of the enemy's attack is also important in terms of the safe and successful use of nuclear weapons: If the aggressor's rate of advance is swifter than the defender's ability to acquire a target, and then fire and hit it at a range beyond the minimum safety distance, it will not be possible to strike at the enemy with tactical nuclear weapons.

In the strategic or political-military context, time is critically valuable. Additional time produces better decisions and reduces the need for automatic response and reliance on pre-planning or hasty judgments under fire. Additional time means time to negotiate, or at least to make threats and demonstrations of intent to move to a higher level of conflict. Additional time enables the adversaries to feel each other out and determine just how far

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the other is prepared to go and what the objectives are. It has been argued that once overt conflict begins it must be assumed that the attacker has weighed all the risks and costs, otherwise the conflict would not have been initiated. But that need not be true. An attacker may have misjudged the defender's resolve or the defender's view of his vital interests in various parts of the globe. Once a limited conflict is under way, the probability of general war rises perceptibly, and the reactions of governments when confronting the imminent specter of general war are likely to be quite different than when general war appears remote or inconceivable.

As the conflict continues, longer run effects become more important, in particular the ratio of friendly to enemy reserve and mobilizable forces which can be brought to bear, and the risks of escalation in prolonged stalemate. The length of delay a defender ought to be willing to buy is therefore limited by the constraints imposed by enemy reserves and the risk that stalemate will lead to escalation. Although a defense system ought to be constructed to achieve a "significant delay" or "significant pause," the duration of that pause will depend upon how long the defender estimates any limited central war can last in the modern era, and what he will do with the time.

The Relevance of the Forward-Pause Concept

There are important reasons for a serious discussion of the forward-pause concept as described in this article.

(1) There is a very real question whether any defense other than a full forward defense along the border between East and West Germany will be acceptable to the West Germans in the long run.

(2) If there is eventually some reduction in the conventional contributions of other NATO nations, including the United States, the necessity for some kind of plausible forward-pause concept will become more crucial to the Germans.[13]

(3) The European configuration of forces is likely to change substantially in the next few years. The French are not only reducing the size of their army by one-third, they are also shifting to a territorial deployment concept for a substantial

[13]Thus if one argues that a "wall" or anything which symbolically resembles a wall on the Western side of the border between the two Germanys is politically unacceptable to West Germany, one will have to match this argument against the political need for a forward defense with forces possibly below present levels.

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portion of their ground forces (the so-called Operational Defense Forces of the Territory, or DOT).[14] The British may well find the world-wide demands on their fighting forces so burdensome as to compel them to reduce further, or at best not to fulfill the target strength of, the British Army of the Rhine. The Germans are now beginning to develop a Territorial Army in addition to the standing forces,[15] and this may well be the pattern of further development beyond the present twelve standing divisions. A concept of defense which fits in with this coming configuration of forces may be better than one which ignores it.

(4) With regard to questions of arms control and military stability in Central Europe, the forward-pause concept may turn out to have certain advantages over other possible defense configurations. Thus the current interest in setting up observation posts to prevent surprise attack, and perhaps later a revived interest in the possibilities of some form of disengagement or "thinning out," may result in serious discussions about increasing stability at the NATO central front. A defense concept which relied less upon offensive capability but did not reduce defensive capability, or better, one which increased defensive capability in a forward mode without increasing the chances of conflict or of the need to use tactical nuclear weapons with the attendant dangers of escalation, would make thinning out a far less risky undertaking for the defender. If the defense concept provided strategic warning (as described earlier) and substantially raised the enemy requirements for penetration, so that the ratio of offense to defense needed for an attack would virtually preclude attack—especially surprise attack—in a thinned out area, then stability would have increased measurably. If this is true, the argument that disengagement would increase military instability would lose much of its strength. Thus a shift to a forward-pause defense strategy for the forces remaining at the Central Front may permit a reopening of the question of disengagement and supply new impetus to a consideration of other forms of European arms control.

(5) If domestic pressures for some reduction in U.S. forces based in Europe grow, whether for balance of payments reasons or because of the failure of the Europeans to increase their con-

[14]See Pierre Messmer, "The French Military Establishment of Tomorrow," ORBIS, Summer 1962.

[15]See Wallace C. Magathan, Jr., "West German Defense Policy," ORBIS, Summer 1964, especially pp. 308-312.

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ventional contributions, the administration might find it possible to argue that there are some realistic defense concepts which do not require such extensive American commitments in Germany.

(6) If there is any way in which a forward defense capability can be achieved without reliance on the automaticity of tactical nuclear defense in a provocative mobile defense-offense mode, as is necessary at present, then substantial progress toward avoiding escalation will have been achieved.

Perhaps it should be added, as a warning, that two important questions must be kept in mind when discussing the benefits and costs of a forward-pause defense concept: First, simple calculations of offense-to-defense ratio for achieving various levels of defense effectiveness can be misleading. Requirements for penetration vary greatly with terrain, weather, morale, strategy of attack, pace of attack, and their relation to the various elements which make up the defense system. Measures of combat effectiveness or combat firepower of attacking and defending units can only be crude estimates for average conditions. Other considerations may be of equal importance, such as an increase in the enemy's uncertainty of the possibilities for successful attack. In the modern context, where the risk of escalation is so great, any increase in the aggressor's uncertainty about his ability to penetrate is a gain to be sought in itself.

Second, no defense system can be considered adequate if there is no offensive capability whatsoever. If an enemy does penetrate and consolidates his position, the defender must have the means to take the offensive and regain the lost territory, or to seize enemy territory and bargain for the lost territory. A defense posture must not encourage the enemy to make a concerted push to achieve a *fait accompli*. If the enemy should break through the static defense system, the defending forces must have a rapid counterattack capability to prevent consolidation of the enemy position. There is no getting around the need for fluid tactics involving space-time trades once a large-scale penetration is achieved. This capability must exist so as not to tempt the enemy to concert all his energies for one large-scale penetration, after which he might be free to disperse and harass the static defense as well as increase the momentum and area covered in his attack. There is, in other words, a limit to the degree to which static defense forces may replace mobile reserve forces capable of taking the offensive.

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PROBLEMS ALONG NATO'S FLANKS

by Eugene Hinterhoff

THE North Atlantic Treaty Organization was set up in April 1949 to ensure the defense of Europe against the danger of aggression from the East. After the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade and, above all, the Korean War, the threat of Soviet aggression in Central Europe—where even the slightest armed conflict is fraught with the danger of immediate nuclear escalation—became the major concern in the West. The determined effort of the allies to build a reliable system of defense in Europe in due course engendered a feeling of security and contributed to Europe's economic progress and prosperity. Yet the security of Western Europe rested primarily on NATO's strength on the central front, i.e., Germany, which represents only a sector of the NATO defense system stretching from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern frontiers of Turkey. The NATO flanks—the Scandinavian countries together with the Baltic approaches, and the Mediterranean area—abound in a multitude of military and political problems. The aggravation of some of these problems, for example, neutralist tendencies in Scandinavia and the Greek-Turkish struggle over Cyprus, could severely weaken NATO.

An examination of the two NATO flanks reveals several similarities. In both cases the Soviets, in case of war, will attempt to carry out their naval strategy of "controlling the narrow waters" by seizing the Danish Straits and the Dardanelles in order to ensure outlets for their navy from the "bottled up" Baltic and Black seas. The West will be able, without much difficulty, to shut these two outlets, thus preventing any substantial exit of Soviet naval forces, especially submarines, into the North Sea or the Mediterranean, where they could seriously jeopardize allied lines of communication. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Soviet forces might break through one or the other straits, they would be met by powerful allied naval units capable of putting them out of action.

Since the end of World War Two, Western military and

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political analysts have speculated about the strategy the Soviets would employ if they were to attack Western Europe. They have generally agreed that Soviet aggression would take the form either of local "brush fire" conflicts seeking limited objectives and presenting the defenders with a *fait accompli,* or of a major offensive which would employ the favorite Soviet strategic concept, a double pincers maneuver, directed at the outset at both NATO flanks. Each of the flanks, in isolation, could be overrun without much trouble by the Soviets; the final outcome of operations would depend upon the degree of strategic and tactical interdependence within NATO.

The present U.S. strategy of "flexible response," with its wide spectrum of military options to be used in fulfillment of U.S. commitments toward Europe, seems to provide the answer to these problems. In both areas there is full confidence in the U.S. deterrent as well as in American readiness to come to the help of any European nation, however remote, threatened by Soviet aggression. During my travels in the Scandinavian countries and in Greece and Turkey, I have been deeply impressed by this supreme confidence in the military guarantee of the United States. During the various talks which I had in the United States, I was equally impressed by American dedication to the idea of an immediate and commensurate response to any Soviet attack on America's Continental allies. In the light of this spirit of interdependence, without which the most elaborate military plans remain academic abstractions, the problems of both NATO flanks are not insuperable.

The Northern Flank

The northern part of the NATO defense system, designated in the NATO lexicon AFNORTH (Headquarters: Colsas, near Oslo; Commander-in-Chief: British Army Lieutenant General R. Bray), extends from the northern tip of Norway to the southern border of Schleswig-Holstein on the Jutland Peninsula, with the front line about 1,200 miles long. Its delimitation is already a matter of controversy. The leading British military writer, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, warned in 1960 that "the present boundary between Northern Europe and Central Europe is bad tactically and strategically."[1] According to him, it

[1]His letter to the Editor of *The Tablet,* February 20, 1960, p. 66.

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would have made more sense to extend the boundary southward to the line of Bremen and the Aller. He also suggests that the defense of the land approaches to the "Baltic gateway" should be entrusted to the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), which ought to be moved northward from its present sector so that its left flank rests on the Baltic coast, covering the approaches through Schleswig-Holstein to the Jutland Peninsula. A similar suggestion was put forward by a distinguished British soldier, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, in his letter to the Editor of *The Tablet*.[2] However, these suggestions met with strong opposition in BAOR circles for purely logistical reasons—not the least of which was the difficulty of moving "married quarters."

This controversy indicates the complexities of defending such a vast expanse—of land, sea, mountains, fjords, estuaries, straits and flatlands—by the armed forces of several nations. Liddell Hart provides a gloomy assessment of the defense problems of this NATO front: "The northern flank is NATO's weakest spot in Europe—and in every sense. It is the weakest in actual forces available for defence, the weakest in strategical vulnerability, and the weakest in organisation. Such a combination of glaring weaknesses is enough to make any realist shudder."[3] This criticism would be fully justified were the problems of Northern Europe to be treated in isolation, but in this article we will view the whole picture against the background of NATO's doctrine of interdependence.

Although we cannot know for certain how the Kremlin's military strategists view the northern flank, it seems logical, as mentioned before, that the Soviets will try to secure an outlet for their Baltic fleet into the North Sea, and for their Arctic and Baltic fleets into the Atlantic. This task could be accomplished by "uncorking" the Danish Straits and by establishing submarine bases in the Narvik-Tromso region along the western coast of Norway, some 800 miles west of the Soviet main base at Murmansk.

At present, the 200-mile-long northernmost NATO frontier is guarded near Kirkenes by two reinforced companies from the brigade "Nord," which is deployed several hundred miles to the rear in the area of Bardufoss, not far from Narvik. Behind those

[2]This letter appeared in *The Tablet* in February 1962 as a comment on my article in the same publication, "The Defence of the Baltic," December 16, 1961.
[3]*Deterrent or Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 149.

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gallant companies lies the vast, empty, undefended province of Finnmark. In case of a Soviet push in this sector, brigade "Nord" would have more urgent tasks than coming to the assistance of its outlying companies; it would have to prevent Soviet attempts to land in any one of many fjords. Under the circumstances, a Soviet drive toward the Narvik-Tromso fjords, combined with amphibious operations, would be a textbook maneuver crowned with easy success. Furthermore, the defense of the area would be complicated due to the existence of only one small airfield in Bardufoss, which could be easily taken out by a few Soviet bombs, or even occupied by Soviet paratroopers; the lack of airfields would make it difficult for a NATO "fire brigade" to arrive on the spot in time.

This hypothetical tactical situation points up the difficulties of defense on the northern flank. The most obvious solution would be to station more troops in peacetime in that forward area. According to the study published by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, *The Military Balance 1964-1965,* Norway has in peacetime one active brigade situated in northern Norway and units of less than brigade strength in southern Norway. In case of mobilization Norway can raise ten brigades as well as local militia. Unfortunately, under the present Socialist government in Norway, there is no chance for any increase in the armed forces or the military budget, especially in view of the much heralded East-West *détente.*

One solution which quickly comes to mind would be to station in Norway, as a token of NATO solidarity, a small NATO force—say, one brigade—with sufficient means of transportation. It is most unlikely, however, that Norway would ever permit the stationing in peacetime of foreign troops or bases on Norwegian soil. The same situation governs NATO's defense of Denmark. In view of this obstacle, a suggestion made by Liddell Hart in his book, *Deterrent or Defense* (p. 154), deserves close scrutiny: "the best answer to the danger of a surprise attack would be a floating fire brigade—an amphibious force, based upon harbours in Northern Germany or those in the North British islands, which could throw strong and well coordinated reinforcements of marines ashore at short notice."

Taken alone, Norway's position facing overwhelming Soviet power is hopeless. Yet nothing could be more dangerous to the cohesion of NATO—indeed, to its whole *raison d'être*—than to

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permit the Soviets to encroach upon northernmost Norway without drawing a "deliberate and selective" response. The most likely NATO intervention would take the form of a landing by marines, perhaps under the umbrella of SACLANT's "strike fleet" consisting of five or six carriers, each carrying some 100 aircraft. The naval exercises, "Swordthrust" and "Teamwork," held off the shores of northern Norway in September 1960 and October 1964, dealt with such tactical situations.

From the Soviet point of view, operations in northern Norway would be of an auxiliary or diversionary nature. No doubt the main thrust would be directed against the "Baltic gateway": the Danish Straits and the land approaches to them.[4] Should the Soviets succeed in breaking through the Straits, some seventy of their submarines could penetrate into the Atlantic, and if these were joined by 140 submarines belonging to the Soviet Arctic fleet—of which thirty are nuclear—the effect upon "the battle of the Atlantic" would be significant. The considerable strength of the Soviet Baltic fleet confirms that it has been designed more for offensive operations than for protecting the long Baltic coastline.[5]

Whether such an ambitious Soviet plan could ever succeed is another question; it has been a problem of intense studies and war games on both sides of the Iron Curtain. German Admiral Heye, speaking before the General Assembly of the Western European Union on October 25, 1960, said:

> As things are today, I am by no means convinced that the Central European bridgehead in the area between the North Sea and the Baltic, with Denmark in its center, is capable of preventing Soviet aggression.

[4]Admiral Heye, a former German senior naval commander and at present a member of the Bundestag, in a defense debate in the General Assembly of the Western European Union on June 16, 1959, expressed the following view: "The Soviet long-range submarines at present in the Baltic are of practically no military importance in the Baltic area itself—they are too large. Their real purpose is to thread their way through the Danish islands out of the Baltic Straits into the North Sea, and thence into the Atlantic and possibly the Mediterranean. Their task would be to disrupt the sea communications of the free world at the main concentration points. . . . There is no doubt that the occupation of Jutland and the Danish islands would be one of the first aims of Soviet military operations. . . . Otherwise the free passage of Soviet submarines to and from their operational bases could not be assured. Without such an operation at the very beginning of hostility, the heavy cost to the Soviet Union of building this assault fleet and the installation of the shipyards necessary for the purpose would have been in vain." *Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments,* Document 128, p. 93.

[5]See Rene Vallet, "La defense de la Baltique," *Revue de Defense Nationale,* April 1962, and Captain Malcolm W. Cagle, "The Strategic Danish Straits," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* October 1960, p. 40.

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Captain Liddell Hart wrote:

> The Baltic could be all too easily uncorked. . . . It was palpably impossible to hold Zealand, the main island, where Copenhagen lies, and I pointed out how easily the capital could be seized by a surprise coup from the Baltic by seaborne and airborne forces. . . .[6]

On the other hand, a distinguished Swedish admiral, E. Bjorklund, writing in 1961, asserted that

> a passage of Russian submarines through the Sounds in wartime would probably lead to disproportionate losses. Great parts of the Kattegat are not deep enough for a submarine to dive and other parts can be obstructed by modern bottom mines.[7]

Under conditions of nuclear war, any attempt to sneak through the Straits would amount to suicide. Even assuming that the Soviet surface fleet succeeded in breaking through the Straits—an unlikely event—it would still have to face the powerful allied naval task forces waiting for it. The situation would resemble the battle of Tsushima, when the Czarist fleet under Admiral Rojestevensky, emerging from the narrow straits, was met and destroyed by the Japanese fleet under Admiral Togo.

According to Admiral Bjorklund's hypothesis, a Soviet attempt to seize the Straits could take the form of either (1) a local offensive launched against one or both of the NATO flanks while limiting hostilities in Central Europe to a defense of the present front line, or (2) an all-out offensive, which would call for supporting operations in the Baltic in order to protect Soviet land thrusts toward the Jutland Peninsula. Obviously, a major thrust along the coastline, perhaps supported by Soviet landings in the rear of Western troops fighting a delaying action, would enhance the chances of success in a "limited" operation.

The flatlands of Schleswig-Holstein have been viewed as the Achilles heel of NATO's northern front. In an interview with a *New York Times* correspondent on March 21, 1960, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, then President of the State of Schleswig-Holstein and now German Minister of Defense, termed this "a defenseless area."[8] The solution might be to build a deep zone fortified with minefields and saturated with modern anti-tank weapons so as to

[6] *Deterrent or Defense, op. cit.*, pp. 150-151.
[7] E. Bjorklund, "On NATO's Northern Flank," *Revue Militaire Générale*, June 1961.
[8] In a conversation with the writer in Kiel in the autumn of 1961, Von Hassel emphasized "the inadequacy of the force earmarked for the defence of this important sector of the front." Quoted from E. Hinterhoff, *op. cit.*, p. 1204.

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doom to failure a Soviet attempt at an armored blitzkrieg. The Germans used such fortified zones—the so-called hedgehog system—with remarkable success during their campaigns in the Soviet Union and in Italy, often fighting their rear-guard battles against a ten-to-one superiority. One of the leading Continental military writers, Colonel F. O. Miksche, has put forward a similar suggestion in his book, *The Failure of Atomic Strategy*,[9] where he states: "Fortified installations offer the cheapest possibility of being simultaneously adjusted for two types of war—atomic and conventional." He adds, however, that "It is questionable . . . whether such ideas will ever make headway in the West."[10]

The Germans, in large part for psychological reasons, have been hostile to the idea of this deep fortified zone. Apparently to the German public the building of fortifications, even of a field type, would amount to recognition of the division of Germany as permanent, and, *ipso facto*, to renunciation of the fundamental goal of German national policy: reunification. It is for the same reason that West Germany has been raising objections to any plan for regional disarmament—in particular, disengagement—because it would mean by implication official recognition of the present frontiers in the East. In other words, strategic considerations here are subordinated to those of a political and psychological nature.

All these complicated problems are at present the special concern of a new command, established in January 1963: a unified command for Baltic approaches called COMBALTAP, with headquarters in Karup, Denmark, and with Danish General Anderson as its commander-in-chief. The establishment of this command, covering Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein as well as the Danish Straits and the naval approaches to them, represents a further step toward unity and cohesion among NATO member-nations. The island of Bornholm, however, one of the most important of Denmark's holdings, has not been put under COMBALTAP's competence. If this small, rocky island, protruding some eighty miles into the Baltic, with a garrison at present of about battalion strength, were to be fortified and included in the NATO defense system, it could play, in case of war, the role of a Gibraltar or Malta—or even a pro-Western

[9] (New York: Praeger, 1959.)
[10] P. 181. Colonel Miksche adds that his suggestion met with the sharpest criticism in Germany.

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Cuba—threatening the Baltic with its nuclear launchers. Any Soviet amphibious operation on the Baltic coast would thus be an extremely risky gamble.

In this context it is interesting to quote Colonel Pawel Monat, former Polish military attaché in Washington, who a few years ago "chose freedom" and disclosed in his book, *Spy in the U.S.*, some details of the Soviet war plan. According to him, in case of war "the Poles will deploy their Navy and Marines to capture the Danish island of Bornholm and deny it to the allies."[11] Today this would be an easy task because of the size of the present garrison. When, during discussions on military matters in Copenhagen in 1963, I raised the question of Bornholm I felt that I had almost committed a breach of etiquette. I was told politely that the island is not included in NATO's planning. As ascertained later, the Danes believe that any attempt to fortify the island would be considered by the Soviets as an unfriendly act, even a provocation, and the Danes care very much to preserve their good relations with their mighty neighbor. Consequently, although fortifying Bornholm would improve NATO's defenses and "put teeth" in its "forward strategy," political considerations here again have the upper hand over those of a purely military character.

In this review of some of the more important problems of the northern flank no more than a brief mention can be made of Sweden. Although not a member of NATO, Sweden, by reason of geography, is an important factor in the defense of Western Europe—and by reason of her neutrality, a major problem. Colonel Monat warns that

> If the Russians decide to go to war, they will attack across Europe with Polish and Czech troops firmly anchored in the center of the line—in front of and between Soviet divisions. . . . while the Hungarian and Bulgarian satellite armies do their share by attacking across southern Europe—again with Soviet help—the Russians themselves will overrun Sweden. . . .[12]

Although the Swedes are obsessed with their idea of neutrality, they realize that an attack on their country can only come from the East. Since the end of World War Two they have been preparing for such a contingency so as to avoid the need for improvising defenses as they were forced to do in the two world wars.

[11](New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 187.
[12]Pp. 186-187.

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PROBLEMS ALONG NATO'S FLANKS

The Southern Flank

The southern NATO flank, called AFSOUTH (Headquarters: Naples; Commander-in-Chief: U.S. Admiral John S. Russell), comprises Italy, Greece, Turkey and the Mediterranean, with a front line of some 1,700 miles. Along this highly sensitive flank, NATO likewise faces many military and political problems. The Middle East has been the target of successful Soviet penetration efforts. This leapfrogging over the Western defense system is attributable in large part to the chronic Arab-Israeli conflict; should this explosive situation erupt into a shooting war, the Soviets would have a new opportunity for active interference in the area. Furthermore, the solidarity of NATO has been severely tested and found wanting in the second Cyprus crisis, resulting from President Makarios' unilateral abrogation in January 1964 of the Zurich and London agreements of February 1959, which defined the Constitution of Cyprus and under which it became an independent republic within the Commonwealth.

What are Soviet intentions in the Mediterranean? According to the Report presented to the General Assembly of the Western European Union on April 29, 1961, by the Rapporteur of its Defense Committee, Mr. Goedhardt, of the Netherlands:

> The main objectives of Soviet strategy in the Mediterranean would be the elimination of allied nuclear delivery capabilities, the securing of the Turkish Straits and the occupation of the South European countries. An attempt by the Soviet Union to achieve these objectives would mean the beginning of World War III. There would then be two possibilities: an attack by conventional or by nuclear weapons.
>
> If the attack were with conventional weapons, the logical and historical invasion of Northern Italy would be through the Alpine Passes. The Soviet forces would have to go through neutral Austria and Yugoslavia in order to reach the Po valley.
>
> The main thrust, however, would come through Bulgaria to Greece and Turkey to try to control the Straits. . . . In any kind of sea war, the real threat comes from submarines.[13]

Yet the Soviet Black Sea fleet, should it succeed in breaking through the Straits, would find itself in a position similar to that of the Baltic fleet—facing the deployed allied naval task forces waiting for it. As far as the threat of submarines is concerned,

[13] *State of European Security—Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments* by Mr. F. J. Goedhardt, rapporteur, Document 201, pp. 113-114.

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they must be reckoned with more seriously here than in the North because many of them could slip through either the Gibraltar Straits or the Suez Canal, the latter under the benevolent eyes of President Nasser. Fortunately for the West, as a result of tiny Albania's quarrel with the USSR, the former Soviet submarine base on the island of Sasseno, opposite Vallona, has been disbanded. On the other hand, because of Soviet political penetration into many countries of the Middle East and North Africa, Soviet submarines may soon have at their disposal facilities in several ports along Africa's Mediterranean coast. Soviet strategy would undoubtedly aim at seizing the outlets to give its Black Sea fleet access to the Mediterranean.

Another, more ambitious plan would be a sweep through Turkey and Syria into the Middle East and North Africa to link up with Soviet-trained and -equipped—and, in a few cases, pro-communist—armed forces in various Arab and African states. Were there an African Command embracing several Arab and African states—a long-standing suggestion by the pro-Soviet President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah—it could play an important role in such an operation. Coordinated with a similar operation in the North, through Scandinavia, this would amount to a gigantic pincers movement.

General Lyman Lemnitzer, Supreme Commander, Europe, speaking at the Ninth General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Ankara on September 10, 1963, viewed the situation more optimistically:

> . . . it could be very misleading to consider any one part of Allied Command Europe in isolation. . . . On land, Southern Europe is indispensable to NATO. For one thing, Southern Europe constitutes NATO's right flank. NATO's strength in this key area is a major obstacle to any attempt at strategic envelopment of NATO on the south. For another, our position here would render any Communist offensive against Central Europe seriously vulnerable to a counter-blow on its left flank. Similarly, a Communist offensive into the Middle East would leave itself exposed on its right.

He might have gone on to say that, in view of the so-called Vistula-complex of the Soviets, any Western threat to the flank of Soviet armed forces, either in a tactical or strategic sense, would act as a powerful deterrent against aggression. This "Vistula-complex" resulted from Marshal Tukchachevsky's defeat in August 1920, in front of the gates of Warsaw, by Marshal

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Pilsudski who, by attacking the exposed flank and extended communications of the Soviet army, changed an imminent Soviet victory into a rout. Tukchachevsky's defeat became the subject of intensive study and war games in the Soviet Union. Consequently, Soviet commanders are extremely careful not to expose the flanks of their forces to the danger of attack.

Southern Europe thus constitutes a potential threat to a Soviet offensive in Central Europe, as well as against the USSR's "soft underbelly." Yet Yugoslavia remains a complicating factor along NATO's southern flank. Today neutral Yugoslavia, with its thirty divisions and hundreds of thousands of veterans and reservists ready to defend its territorial integrity, plays the role of an armed buffer between the Warsaw Pact countries and Italy. A Soviet thrust through Yugoslavia in the direction of Italy would pin down many Soviet army divisions in a difficult guerrilla-type campaign against the Yugoslavs. On the other hand, should Yugoslavia move toward closer cooperation with the Soviet Union and participate actively in a future war on the side of the Warsaw Pact, this development would dramatically reverse the whole strategic situation on NATO's southern flank.

The United States has sought since 1950 to forestall a return by Belgrade to the communist bloc by pouring economic and military aid into Yugoslavia, thus hoping to make her armed forces dependent on Western supplies. The Soviets likewise have not been idle. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's May 1962 visit to Belgrade was followed by Soviet orders placed with Yugoslav shipyards for some twenty-five tankers; a subsequent exchange of visits by Tito and Khrushchev took place against a background of improving trade and cultural relations. Speculation about Yugoslavia's likely course of action in the event of war in Europe continues to be one of the prime concerns of military analysts on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The fact that each year students of the British Imperial Defense College visit Yugoslavia on a conducted tour is an indication of the importance attached to this nation by Western governments.

As long as Yugoslavia serves as a strong buffer on the north, Italy, for all practical purposes, confronts no serious strategic problems. Its army, equipped with modern American matériel, is a modern and mobile fighting force, numbering five infantry divisions, five infantry brigades, five Alpine brigades, one cavalry

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brigade, one parachute brigade and two armored divisions,[14] with tactical nuclear support provided by a special U.S. unit of brigade strength, SETAF. Italy's big problem is morale: the Italian Communist Party is the strongest in Europe, a factor which must be taken into account by any NATO plans to stop a Soviet thrust across Southern Europe.

The most urgent and complex problems are those faced by Greece and Turkey: the growing conflict in Cyprus could push both countries, against their will, into a shooting war. Greece's most vulnerable frontier, in Thrace, prevents her northern communist neighbor, Bulgaria, from gaining access to the Aegean Sea, only some twenty miles to the south. This is the most likely direction of an enemy thrust, and the Soviet Union's success in this sector would also effect a physical breach between the Greek and Turkish forces deployed in the area. Another enemy offensive might be directed at Turkish Thrace, with the Dardanelles as the prize. This area, unlike Schleswig-Holstein, is heavily fortified and defended by the elite First Turkish Army. The remainder of this sector is the very long Black Sea coastline, open to an amphibious operation, and Eastern Turkey, where the frontier runs over difficult and well fortified mountain ranges.

The armed forces of AFSOUTH comprise twenty-four divisions in peacetime, with some fifteen more available after mobilization. Apart from the nuclear support of the U.S. SETAF brigade in Italy, they can also rely on the powerful support of 200 aircraft with nuclear capabilities, flying from the carriers of the U.S. Sixth Fleet with a range sufficient to reach the southern regions of the USSR and its satellites. According to General Lemnitzer, "the Sixth Fleet does not have the mission of naval defense of the Mediterranean. . . . its chief function is to provide carrier-based air support to the defense of the entire area."[15] The presence of the Sixth Fleet on NATO's southern flank represents one of the most important differences between this and the northern flank.[16]

The main task of the Sixth Fleet would be to execute a

[14]The Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1963-1964*, p. 18.
[15]From his speech to the Ninth General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, held in Ankara on September 10, 1963.
[16]The naval defense of the Mediterranean is the task of the navies of the area, under the command of AFMED, with headquarters in Malta. This command is operational only in case of war; in peacetime the allied navies merely have their warships earmarked to it. De Gaulle's decision in 1959 to withdraw the French Fleet from NATO has considerably complicated the planning of AFMED.

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nuclear strike in coordination with the plans of the Supreme NATO Commander; its nuclear capability has been enhanced by the assignment to NATO of three U.S. Polaris submarines, each with sixteen missiles. However, in case of a general nuclear war fought with intercontinental missiles, the situation of the fleet could become precarious. Mr. Goedhardt in his Report to the General Assembly of the WEU comments on the danger as follows:

> . . . the position of any vessel in the Mediterranean must be known to an enemy within two or three hours of a reconnaissance mission being ordered. In these circumstances, it is not clear how long naval units could operate in the Mediterranean in the event of a total nuclear war. It may be that this sea will be entirely denied to any surface vessel of either side. In such circumstances it would no doubt be the task of the Sixth Fleet to fly off its nuclear strike aircraft at the earliest possible moment before withdrawing into the Atlantic.[17]

Under these conditions, the only warships capable of remaining and operating in this area would be Polaris submarines. This fact emphasizes the importance of Spain in the defense of the Mediterranean.

Although not a member of NATO—in fact, banned from membership—Spain nevertheless has been indirectly linked with NATO as a result of a bilateral military treaty with the United States. Spain's situation to some extent resembles that of Yugoslavia from 1953 to 1955, when the latter belonged to the Balkan Pact, whose other members, Greece and Turkey, were also members of NATO. In spite of her ambiguous relationship to NATO, Spain and her Canary Islands are woven into NATO's defense system. The combined naval exercise, "Riptide III," participated in by British, U.S. and French fleets, was held off the shores of Spain in 1962 and the U.S.-Spanish amphibious exercise, "Steel Pike," was held off Huelva in October 1964.

The bilateral treaty has allowed the United States to establish on Spanish soil three major air bases, a big naval base in Rota, near Cadiz, and various ancillary installations. These bases in Spain have assumed even more significance since the abandonment of U.S. bases in Morocco in 1963—bases which had cost American taxpayers millions of dollars and which might some day be taken over by the Soviets. Another U.S. base, in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, has also been given up, and the fate of Wheelus

[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 117.

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base in Libya hangs in the balance as U.A.R. President Nasser applies heavy pressure upon Libya's elderly King Idris to abrogate his country's air base agreements with Britain and the United States. In this connection, it is of interest to note that Nasser has also been publicly condemning British bases on Cyprus, a position that happens to coincide with Soviet objectives.

Peace and stability in the southern NATO command area are dependent upon developments in the Middle East, where a strong tendency to settle differences by resort to war still exists. The forces deployed on both sides of the Arab-Israeli borders are much larger than they were during the battle of El Alamein. Even more important is the aggressive mood instilled into the Arab masses by Nasser's policies and statements. If Egyptian troops are disengaged from Yemen following a *détente* in that part of the world, it will increase the pressure on Israel, as well as on the Arab sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf which enjoy Britain's protection.

The bases in Spain are essential to the defense of Western Europe. In order to maintain them, the U.S. government has given Spain substantial financial and economic aid to bolster its flagging economy. The naval base at Rota, which has been adapted for use by Polaris submarines, must be regarded not as a duplication of a similar base in Holy Loch, Scotland, but, in view of the British Labour Party's victory in the recent elections and the possibility that a Labour Government will want to renegotiate the Nassau Agreement, perhaps as a timely substitute.

Spain has a peacetime standing army of four divisions based in Spain and overseas forces totaling three divisions,[18] equipped with modern U.S. matériel and imbued with a strong anti-communist spirit. This ideological factor should be given weighty consideration in view of uncertainties concerning the attitudes of NATO's Mediterranean allies, Italy, Greece and Turkey. In Italy, for example, the increasing strength of the large communist party and the precariousness of the balance of political power have forced the Christian Democratic Party to cooperate with the leftist Nenni Socialists. The full meaning of this "open-

[18]In his article in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, May 1964, Spanish General Gonzales de Mendoza, Commandant of the Spanish Staff College, asserted that Spain could build an army of some forty divisions, equipped with modern U.S. weapons, increase her navy by 50 per cent and double the size of her air force. However, in view of NATO's experience with the slow build-up of the West German armed forces, the NATO allies should not count on Spain's contributing to the defense of the West anywhere near forty divisions in the foreseeable future.

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ing to the left" is not yet clear, but a tendency toward a more neutral foreign policy cannot be ruled out.

In Greece, during the first Cyprus crisis, relations with Britain were severely strained; it was feared that Greece might withdraw from NATO, perhaps to reorient herself toward the East. The present Cyprus crisis has again created tensions in British and U.S. relations with Greece and increasingly with Turkey, and these tensions may well be reflected in the domestic politics of the two Mediterranean allies. Indeed, there were reports emanating from well-informed quarters that Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, shortly before he was overthrown by a military coup in 1960, was about to leave for Moscow, where Khrushchev was ready to offer him substantial economic aid, the price for which would have been Turkey's withdrawal from NATO.[19] No such neutralist tendencies exist in Spain; in this respect she could be considered a most reliable potential member of NATO. Whether Spain's membership in peacetime would be conducive to the greater cohesion of NATO is, of course, another controversial matter.

Conclusion

The northern NATO flank appears weaker and more vulnerable to Soviet aggression than the southern one. In the South there are more natural obstacles, such as the mountain ranges in the Caucasus and in Thrace, which favor the defenders, whereas the areas of direct confrontation with the Soviet army in the North are predominantly flat, suitable for lightning armored thrusts as, for example, in Schleswig-Holstein. Also, unlike the southern flank, there are no foreign troops or bases in the North, with the exception of Schleswig-Holstein on the fringe of the northern flank. The presence of NATO troops considerably strengthens the defense potential of an area and facilitates effective NATO intervention in a time of emergency. Captain Liddell Hart gets to the heart of the matter in this passage:

[19]A similar offer may have been made by Khrushchev to Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin during his recent visit to Moscow (October 30-November 6, 1964). According to the official communiqué, an expansion of trade between the two countries was discussed. Behind closed doors, the Soviets may also have offered aid to Turkey in the event the situation in Cyprus deteriorated. However, since Khrushchev at the same time was most likely offering military and economic assistance to the Greeks and to Makarios, his room for maneuver with the Turks was somewhat restricted. Mr. Erkin's visit must be regarded primarily as a warning addressed to the West: if Turkey's national interests are jeopardized, she will not hesitate to withdraw from NATO and look elsewhere for protection.

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Moreover, effective support in emergency is hindered by the unwillingness of these two countries [Denmark and Norway] to allow other NATO forces to be stationed there, or bases established there, before an emergency occurs—in order to avoid provoking Russia. Such reluctance is understandable in the circumstances, but it reduces their membership [in] NATO to the point of absurdity. Unless they are willing to accept the presence of NATO reinforcements, ready in reserve on the spot, it would be more sensible to revert to neutrality, in line with Sweden.[20]

Two recent developments permit one to be somewhat more optimistic concerning the defense of the northern flank. German Defense Minister von Hassel, long worried about the "defenseless nature" of Schleswig-Holstein, can be expected to correct this situation. And a recent reappraisal of Soviet forces deployed in East Germany suggests that they are predominantly of a defensive nature and thus not an immediate threat to Western Europe.

It would seem at first glance, then, that the southern flank is better suited for a sustained defense, due partly to the terrain but even more to the greater effort which has been made by all the NATO allies in the area, especially by Turkey, the hinge between the NATO and CENTO alliances. Furthermore, the defenses of the Mediterranean have been enhanced by the presence of foreign troops and bases and the powerful U.S. Sixth Fleet.

Yet there is a marked contrast between the atmosphere of near-serenity prevailing in the capitals of Scandinavia, based on "good neighbor" relations with the Soviet Union so recently strengthened by former Chairman Khrushchev's visit, and the feeling of anxiety, especially at NATO headquarters in Naples, resulting from the deadlocked crisis on Cyprus, a situation which could have serious ramifications for Western defenses in the Mediterranean. President Makarios seems bent on removing all external restrictions on the sovereignty of Cyprus and on his authority—i.e., the three treaties growing out of the Zurich-London agreements of 1959 signed by Greece, Turkey and Britain—so that he can declare his island a nonaligned country. This would no doubt be accompanied by the removal of the strategic British bases from Cyprus. One does not need much imagination to realize that it would probably be only a matter of time before those vacant bases were serving, or were actually

[20] *Op* cit., p. 153.

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occupied by, communist forces, thus turning Cyprus into a Mediterranean Cuba.

There is a real danger that NATO's armed forces in the Eastern Mediterranean may be incapable—despite the presence of the Sixth Fleet—of preventing the loss of Cyprus and one more Soviet leapfrog over the line of containment. It is imperative to rethink NATO strategy formulated in the early 1950's, when the danger of a Soviet direct attack in Europe could not be ruled out. Since then the Soviets, confronted with NATO's hardening military muscle especially on the central front, have altered their strategy and adopted the "indirect approach" of bypassing Western positions of strength to play upon political differences and military weaknesses along NATO's flanks. Meanwhile, NATO strategy has remained largely frozen in the face of these new Soviet challenges.

One is forced to the conclusion that both NATO flanks are unstable and vulnerable to direct Soviet aggression as well as indirect Soviet manipulation. Yet their defenses must be considered not as an isolated problem, but against the principle of "interdependence," the cornerstone of NATO strategy. There is no doubt that the countries on NATO's flanks retain an unqualified faith in the validity of "interdependence" and in the U.S. determination to stand by its solemn commitments to its allies. So long as this faith is sustained by U.S. policies and military capabilities, there are grounds for confidence.

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SOVIET AID STRATEGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

by Milton Kovner

"COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE," Soviet propagandists hasten to inform us, is far from a discontinuation of the revolutionary class struggle. On the contrary, it is viewed as a "realistic plan envisaging a struggle against imperialism by methods which do not threaten mankind with catastrophic war, and a plan which at the same time inevitably brings nearer the full triumph of Communism."[1] Trade and aid have become major weapons in this new Soviet strategy, and the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia have become the *places d'armes*. After years of denouncing Western foreign aid programs as an ill-disguised instrument of imperialism, the USSR, since 1954, has concluded agreements with twenty-five less developed countries which provide for the extension of $4 billion in economic credits and grants.[2] After a sharp retrenchment in new economic aid extensions in 1962 and 1963, the USSR has pledged more than $650 million in new economic aid to developing countries during the first six months of 1964—the highest level of Soviet foreign aid committed during any comparable period since the inception of the program more than a decade ago.

The relevance of these recent record Soviet aid extensions, at a time when the U.S. aid program is undergoing another critical examination, is clear. President Johnson, in his foreign aid message to Congress in March 1964, warned that if the United States defaults on its foreign aid obligations, communism will expand its ambitions. That, he declared, "is the stern equation which dominates our age." It is the purpose of this paper to outline the strategic objectives of Soviet economic policy in less developed countries and to assess the dividends which have

[1] *Sovetskaya rossiya*, September 13, 1960, p. 3.

[2] Initially modest in approach, Soviet economic aid to noncommunist less developed countries increased each year, from $100 million in 1955 to roughly $860 million in 1959. Soviet aid offerings tapered off in 1960 and 1961, averaging less than $575 million in those years, and then declined drastically the following year to less than $80 million. For roughly 18 months Moscow undertook no large-scale aid commitments. Since mid-1963, however, the Soviet foreign lending program has returned to its former level.

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SOVIET ECONOMIC CREDITS AND GRANTS EXTENDED TO NONCOMMUNIST LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

January 1, 1954 to June 30, 1964

Area and recipient country	*Million Current U.S. $*
TOTAL	*3,996*
Latin America: Argentina	*100*
Middle East	*1,242*
Iran	39
Iraq	184
Syrian Arab Republic	150
Turkey	10
United Arab Republic (Egypt)	833
Yemen	26
Africa	*652*
Algeria	229
Ethiopia	102
Ghana	89
Guinea	70
Mali	55
Somali Republic	57
Sudan	22
Tunisia	28
Asia	*1,999*
Afghanistan	500
Burma	14
Cambodia	21
Ceylon	30
India	1,011
Indonesia	369
Nepal	10
Pakistan	44
Europe: Iceland	*3*

Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Annual Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R.* (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 115, with additions by author. The USSR has also extended a credit of undetermined amount to Kenya.

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accrued to the USSR after more than a decade of investment in foreign aid.

The Politics of Soviet Foreign Aid

The "national liberation" of colonial peoples and their ultimate amalgamation with world communism have always been accorded high priority in communist strategic thinking. The current Soviet interest in less developed countries is unique only in relation to Stalin's postwar policies: it has a doctrinal ancestry which dates back to an early communist perspective that envisaged the growth of the world revolution as essentially a centripetal historical process in which a growing federation of "socialist" republics draws newly "liberated" countries into its orbit largely, although not exclusively, by force of "economic attraction." What is new is that Soviet leaders apparently believe current conditions enable the USSR to proceed with a policy objective which, when it was first formulated, must have seemed far out of reach.

Communist theoreticians have visualized the transformation of less developed countries to socialism as a two-stage process. In the first stage, socialist countries and local communists support "bourgeois-nationalist" elements in their fight to achieve political independence from colonial powers; in the second stage, communists actively encourage a progressive polarization of class forces within these countries with the expectation that a militant proletarian-peasant based alliance will ultimately assume control.

While political independence, i.e., the first stage, in the national liberation process is regarded as "an accomplished fact" for many less developed countries, Soviet policymakers, much to the chagrin of their Chinese comrades, seem reluctant to press on with the more militant efforts implicit in the second stage. Instead, Soviet ideologists have given greater priority to encouraging the economic independence of new states without which, they assert, political sovereignty would be "as illusory as is the half-century old independence of the majority of Latin American countries economically dominated by American imperialism."[3] It would be "absurd," they maintain, "to proclaim armed struggle in countries in which political independence has been achieved and the political position of the imperialists has basically been undermined while their economic position remains strong."[4]

[3] *Kommunist*, May 1964, p. 4.
[4] *Ibid.*, August 1963, p. 28.

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Moreover, they ask, who would heed the struggle for the creation of, say, a "people's democracy" in countries "where sometimes no industrial proletariat at all exists yet, and where—as for example in the overwhelming majority of countries in Africa —there are no Marxist-Leninist parties yet."[5]

Thus, in the Soviet view, at the present stage when "the working class is not yet prepared to lead the advance to socialism," the "question is not one of the immediate construction of socialism in the liberated countries but of the possibility of their transition to a path of non-capitalist development."[6] Accordingly, the bourgeois-nationalist leaders of new states "have not yet exhausted" their "progressive" role and it is both practically and theoretically correct for such "revolutionary democrats" as Ben Bella or Nasser, with communist material support, to guide their countries along the road of economic independence from their former "exploiters."

It was previously conceded by the Soviets, however, that the West would seek to resist the loss of markets and sources of cheap labor and raw materials on which a large part of its strength was presumed to rest; hence, the "series of frightful collisions" which both Lenin and Stalin envisaged as inevitable for this period of transition. What seems basic in more contemporary Soviet attitudes is the present leadership's assessment of the existing correlation of world forces—an appraisal that takes into account the nuclear stalemate and the growing economic power of the socialist countries. Such circumstances, in the Soviet view, effectively deny to the West its traditional alternative of reliance on military force and economic sanctions to thwart the national-liberation movement. Khrushchev recently put it this way:

> The imperialist powers, having lost the monopoly on loans and credits, on the supply of equipment and on technical knowledge, cannot, as they formerly did, exercise an economic *diktat* over underdeveloped countries. . . . As the collapse of the plans for economic blockade of Cuba, Egypt, Guinea and other countries shows, the imperialists are no longer capable of strangling economically the liberated countries that are defending their independence and national freedom. The historical significance of all this is obvious.[7]

Thus, with any effective Western response thwarted by Soviet military strength, and with Western economic and political

[5] *Pravda,* August 3, 1963, p. 5.
[6] *Azia i Afrika sevodnya,* July 7, 1963, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* October 9, 1963, p. 10.
[7] *Pravda,* December 22, 1963, p. 2.

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hegemony over the area gradually being displaced by that of the socialist countries, Soviet policymakers tend to regard their long-term prospects in less developed countries as highly favorable.

Moscow is under no illusions about the ultimate incompatibility between world communist and local nationalist goals in less developed countries. But Soviet policies in these countries are predicated on the tactical parallelism of immediate foreign policy interests and on a strategic conviction that, despite the ideological commitments or political ambitions of one or another of the current leaders of new states, eventually "the working class will exert an increasing, and in the end dominating, influence on the policy and ideology of the revolutionary democrats."[8] Khrushchev made clear his belief that:

> Those leaders who really have the best interest of the people, the working masses, at heart will sooner or later have to realize that only by leaning on the working class . . . in alliance with the peasantry . . . can they bring about victory and the correct solution of fundamental social problems. *They will either grasp this fact or they will be followed by others with a better understanding of life's demands.*[9] (Emphasis added.)

For some time Kremlin theoreticians have been uncomfortably perched on the horns of the dilemma created by Moscow's support for anti-communist regimes in less developed countries and by its need to champion the interests of local communist parties in these countries. Undoubtedly, Peking's growing challenge to Soviet policies in developing countries has accounted in large part for Moscow's occasionally strident protests against the suppression of its comrades by regimes which receive Soviet economic and military support. The USSR has protested the banning of communist parties in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and elsewhere in the less developed countries. In mid-1961, the Soviet press launched a vitriolic campaign against the UAR for its alleged persecution of local communists and pointedly reminded Cairo of the old Arab proverb: "Do not cut down the tree that gives

[8] G. Mirsky, "The Proletariat and National Liberation," *New Times,* May 1964, p. 9.

[9] *Pravda,* May 20, 1962, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* June 13, 1962, p. 7. During his recent visit to the UAR, Khrushchev was explicit in counterposing the interests of the people with those of the national bourgeoisie: "At this stage in the struggle the Arab landlords and Arab capitalists make common cause at times with the entire nation. . . . At the next stage in the struggle, when the newly free peoples set about such social measures as agrarian reform and the nationalization of banking, industry, and the railways, the interests of the working people inevitably clash with the interests of the landlords, bankers, and big industrialists. . . ." *New Times,* June 3, 1964, p. 4.

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you shade."[10] And in the spring of 1963, the USSR reacted strongly to Iraq's repressive measures against local communists and the Kurdish minority by warning Iraq that its patience, and its aid funds, were not inexhaustible. Moscow asserted that the rendering of aid to newly independent states did not mean that the USSR had "money to spare" or that such funds could not be used profitably at home. The Soviet Union warned that it could no longer remain indifferent to the objectives on which its aid funds were being spent.[11]

But such reactions have been relatively rare and generally short-lived, despite the host of similar provocations by Soviet aid recipients. Soviet "concern" over Algeria's prohibition of the communist party did not prevent Soviet aid pledges of more than $228 million in economic credits to that country. Following his recent promise of extensive economic aid to Cairo, Khrushchev felt obliged to note that "there was a time when Communists were arrested and imprisoned for their activities" in the UAR, but he assured his listeners that the UAR leaders told him "this was no longer the case. It must be assumed that the persecution of Communists is a thing of the past."[12]

The solace offered local communists is the assurance that their sojourn in the wilderness will only be temporary:

> The right wing of the national bourgeoisie, intent on consolidating its dominant position after independence has been won, may establish for a time reactionary political regimes and subject Communists and other democrats to persecution. Such regimes are short-lived, however, if only because they hinder progress. . . . This is why . . . these regimes will be swept away by the masses.[13]

In the meantime, communist parties in developing countries are warned against "undue haste" and "groundless infatuation with socialist slogans." They are enjoined to "follow the directives of Lenin" and to "strive to win over allies, even though they may be vacillating, unsteady, unreliable and conditional . . . , not to accentuate attention on what divides them, but seek to find a common ground which makes it possible to establish even-though-temporary alliances on specific questions."[14] The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) has, for example, been singled

[10] *Pravda,* May 31, 1961, p. 6.
[11] *Ibid.,* June 30, 1963, p. 7.
[12] *Ibid.,* May 28, 1964, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* June 17, 1964, p. 17.
[13] *Pravda,* April 3, 1963, p. 2.
[14] *Politicheskoye samobrazovaniye,* August 1963, pp. 33-42.

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out for special approbation for, "while approving the endeavor to follow the socialist path . . . *as a long range aim,*" the PKI "considers the task of the nation *in the present day* to be the completion of the anti-imperialist democratic revolution."[15]

Thus, within the context of Khrushchev's "creative" approach to the national liberation movement, differences in ideology, outlook and social systems need not impede the development of friendly state-to-state relations with noncommunist, indeed, even anti-communist regimes in new states. The outspoken anti-communism of Nasser or Ben Bella will be tolerated in the hope that they, with Soviet assistance, will do more damage to Western influence in the Near East and Africa in the name of anti-colonialism and Arab nationalism than the USSR could ever hope to achieve alone; and Nehru's successors will continue to be the beneficiaries of Soviet largesse as long as India remains an effective political counterweight to Chinese ambitions in Asia. Moreover, the Soviets seem to be acting on the conviction that Soviet aid programs in developing countries will serve as the most effective instrumentality to disrupt the traditional economic and political ties of these countries with the West; encourage existing socialist predispositions toward more Soviet-oriented forms of economic and social organization; promote the development of the state sector to the eventual exclusion of private enterprise; enhance the growth of a class conscious proletariat; and, more generally, to help to create the social and material conditions and the cadres deemed essential prerequisites for a later, more activist stage of Soviet policy. So conceived, Soviet foreign aid to "transitory" bourgeois governments in less developed countries is viewed over the long run as helping to build up economic systems which ultimately will become the legacies of communist regimes.

The Burden of Soviet Foreign Aid

The disproportionately large political impact of the Soviet aid program has been more a tribute to the skill with which its propaganda value has been exploited than to its size, which is, on the whole, still rather modest. Although any unrequited exports by the USSR of goods and services which have alternative uses in the domestic economy represent a "burden" in the short run, the Soviet aid program is extremely small compared to Western

[15] *Kommunist,* September 1962, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* November 7, 1962, p. 25.

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standards. During the period 1954-1963 Soviet extensions of economic aid to noncommunist less developed countries were only about one-eighth those of the United States; and the Soviet program is even smaller in terms of actual aid expenditures. There has been a wide gap between Soviet foreign aid pledges and actual aid disbursements. Soviet aid deliveries are currently running at about $400 million annually (little more than one-tenth of one per cent of its GNP), and since the program began the USSR has expended less than $1.5 billion of the roughly $4 billion it has promised. By comparison, during the past fiscal year alone, the United States actually spent about $2 billion in foreign aid. Moreover, little more than 5 per cent of Soviet economic assistance has been extended in the form of nonrepayable aid: almost 60 per cent of U.S. aid to developing countries has comprised free grants.[16]

Ironically, the disproportionately high rate of growth in basic industrial output in the USSR, which has been accomplished largely at the expense of the agricultural and mineral extractive sectors, and which has contributed in no small part to current Soviet economic difficulties, may also have added to Soviet capabilities for economic penetration of less developed countries. After forty-six years of unabated Soviet emphasis on expanding heavy industrial output, certain sectors of the Soviet capital goods industry are beginning to show a capacity to produce in excess of current requirements. While such exports find few buyers in the industrial West, they do find a ready outlet in the less sophisticated markets of developing countries, particularly if the USSR is willing to help finance such exports with long-term credits.[17] Moreover, industrial production in the USSR, and particularly in Eastern Europe, has risen more rapidly than the supply of raw materials. This has been attributable in part to bad planning in the past, geographic disadvantages, wasteful communist mining

[16]It should be noted that figures for U.S. aid cover public development aid only and exclude the large amounts of U.S. private investment in these countries. Moreover, Khrushchev declared in 1955 that the USSR "would not give a kopeck" to any joint East-West program to help less developed countries, and the Soviet Union has not contributed to such UN multilateral finance agencies as the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association which provide considerable economic assistance to the new states.

[17]The drastic decline in Soviet exports of machinery and equipment to Communist China, from almost $600 million in 1959 to little more than $40 million in 1963, may also have added marginally to the availability of equipment required for the current implementation of the Soviet aid program.

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methods and, more recently, to the diversion of Chinese mineral exports elsewhere. With gold and foreign exchange reserves already hard pressed by the need to import advanced industrial equipment and grain from the more industrialized nations of the West, Soviet economists are looking increasingly to less developed countries as a source of cheap, high grade mineral supplies.[18]

Hence purely economic criteria would seem to suggest a policy of expanding machinery and equipment exports to developing countries in exchange for needed raw materials, quite apart from the wider political aims of the Soviet leadership. And if the current regime becomes more responsive to the long suppressed desires of its people for a substantially higher standard of living, the USSR may be even more inclined to exchange industrial equipment for such staples of less developed countries as coffee, cocoa, rice and tropical fruits and vegetables.

If foreign aid expenditures themselves do not cut deeply into any one sector of the economy, however, the broad front of Soviet activities in less developed countries may now increasingly compete, even if only psychologically, with many claimants for available Soviet resources, both human and material. Soviet planners are now obliged to program the export of goods on credit—largely machinery and equipment for complete plants—of about $400 million annually, against a supply of investment goods stretched tight by competing demands of military and space technology and the burgeoning needs of an expanding chemical industry. Thousands of specialized and highly trained technicians, designers and engineers leave each year for work on Soviet construction projects abroad, amid increasing competition at home for such critically needed skills in missile and space programs and to improve technology and quality of product in industry and agriculture. And amid increasing friction with the local population, sizeable numbers of students from less developed countries are studying on scholarships in Soviet universities, whose academic facilities and housing accommodations are already heavily taxed and where many capable Soviet teenagers, directed into the labor force by government educational policies, are denied admission. It is possible that such accumulated strains

[18]"The Crisis in the Soviet Raw Materials Base," *The Many Crises of the Soviet Economy*, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964, pp. 33-41.

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contributed in no small part to Moscow's evident reluctance in 1962 and 1963 to undertake extensive new aid obligations.

Soviet Foreign Aid and Its Critics

Despite its relatively minor drain on aggregate Soviet production capacity, foreign aid, when viewed against the backdrop of increasing domestic problems over the allocation of resources and the absence of any clearly demonstrable political pay-offs in the less developed countries, may have generated a political issue incommensurate with the economic costs of the program—and in turn created a favorable atmosphere for the expression of an increasingly vocal "anti-give-away" sentiment among communist party elements at home and abroad. Evidence of communist differences over foreign aid is, of course, largely inferential; yet it seems reasonable to surmise that the frequent efforts by Soviet leaders to use public statements to justify their foreign aid ventures would not have been necessary unless the current program were being seriously questioned.

The Soviet foreign lending program is known to have been a target of the "anti-Party" group's general opposition to Khrushchev's policies.[19] It may also have provided common ground for opposition by more conservative elements who question the economic rationale of the export on credit of capital resources that might slow the pace of domestic capital formation, and by the public at large for whom often-promised improvement in its standard of living has been repeatedly postponed because of increasing strains on the nation's resources. Moreover, such dissident voices have found ample encouragement among Chinese, Albanian and other foreign communist leaders, who generally distrust national bourgeois governments in developing countries and who give only nominal support to the idea of economic aid as a significant factor in the national liberation struggle.

Soviet leaders have sought repeatedly to mollify such "anti-give-away" sentiment on the basis of the wider perspectives of "proletarian internationalist duty," maintaining that Soviet aid was not designed to be very "profitable" from the commercial

[19]In A. M. Saburov's speech of February 4, 1959 at the 21st Congress of the CPSU, he charged the anti-Party group, of which he was an admitted participant, with having "opposed the Central Committee's policy in such important problems as the necessity of developing our economic ties with the Peoples' Democracies and extending aid to these countries, to say nothing of our aiding the poorly developed and dependent countries of Asia and the Near East." *Vneocherednoy XXI s'ezd KPSS* (Moscow, 1959), Part II, p. 240.

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point of view. Khrushchev himself explained that "while the Soviet Union and other socialist countries consider it their duty to help underdeveloped countries . . . we cannot say that our economic relations are based on mutual advantage. Generally speaking from the commercial standpoint, our economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries is even unprofitable for us."[20] With specific reference to India, Khrushchev admitted that Soviet aid to the Bhilai steel mill was extended "not because we had surpluses of equipment for such mills, of course. We sent India machinery that would have been very useful in our own national economy . . . . What other countries save the socialist," he asked, "are capable of such a step, of such disinterested help?"[21]

As economic strains have increased in the USSR, the Soviet leaders have been obliged to explain their foreign aid program in a more effective fashion. Significantly, more recent Soviet comment on foreign aid has tended to place greater stress on its economic and political advantages to the USSR. In sharp contrast to an earlier underplaying of Soviet aid for home audiences, virtually all communications media—even the letters-to-the-editor columns of *Pravda*—have been employed in what appears to be an effort to "sell" the aid program in the face of lagging public and other support. *Pravda* readers, for example, have been told that Soviet credits bring in return repayments to the USSR of "commodities traditionally exported by these countries which it uses to satisfy the requirements of Soviet consumers."[22] And in a television speech to the nation in May 1964 reporting on his visit to the UAR, Khrushchev characterized the $280 million in credits he had granted Nasser as "a blow against the plans of the imperial-

[20] *Pravda* July 13, 1958, p. 4.

[21] *Ibid.*, May 31, 1962, p. 2.

[22] *Ibid.*, June 11, 1963, p. 3. Indicative of the "managed" treatment given the foreign aid program in Soviet media were the differences in the portrayal of foreign aid in the English (published in 1962) and the Russian (1963) editions of what appears to be the same book published in Moscow on *Economic Cooperation between the USSR and Underdeveloped Countries.* Among the many interesting divergencies in treatment, the English edition emphasized Soviet economic and technical aid to developing countries, whereas the Russian text, obviously designed for the Soviet reader, tended to emphasize Soviet commercial relations with these countries, even to replacing a table of Soviet credits and loans with one depicting foreign trade turnover. Moreover, the English edition stressed the major role of the USSR in communist aid giving; the Russian portrayed aid as a joint venture with the USSR as only one among many socialist aid donors. N. Derkach, *The Differences in Soviet Portrayal of Their Aid to Underdeveloped Countries in English and Russian* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, P-2853, January 1964).

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ists, against the plans of the colonialists." While admitting that "when the Soviet Union helps the young developing countries, giving them a portion of the wealth amassed by its own labor, . . . it is limiting its own possibilities for a certain period of time," he asserted that "we would be poor Communists, poor internationalists, if we thought only of ourselves." Moreover, he assured his listeners that "the assistance we are giving to the peoples of the developing countries will be repaid a hundredfold" and that "each of us well understands the meaning of the expression: 'Better to have a hundred friends than a hundred rubles.' "[23] Khrushchev's efforts to rationalize Soviet foreign aid should strike a responsive chord in any Congressman who has tried to explain to his own constituents the need for the U.S. aid program.

An undercurrent of resentment against the alleged burden of foreign economic assistance is also evident among other communist countries. In Poland, and particularly in Czechoslovakia whose commitments to foreign aid (either on a per capita basis or as a percentage of GNP) is the highest in the bloc, and where shortages of foodstuffs and consumer goods have already caused some worker dissatisfaction, there are persistent press reports of public resentment against foreign aid, especially aid to Cuba. The organ of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party, for example, has felt obliged to respond to "those comrades in our party who do not understand the necessity of aid to young national states," and who maintain "it is incorrect to support former colonial countries where they persecute progressive forces, ban the Communist Party and the democratic organizations of the worker class, and imprison and even hound to death the Communists." Although apparently denying the claims of "some" that communist countries have an obligation to increase such aid "even at the expense of their own economies (ostensibly the position of Khrushchev as expressed in quotations already cited), on grounds that such extremism would cause the socialist countries to "fall behind in the competition with imperialism," the paper did appeal for a wider understanding of the political objectives of communist foreign aid.[24]

The Chinese communists have registered the strongest objections to Soviet policies in less developed countries, including its foreign aid program. Yet the Chinese are operating their own

[23] *Pravda,* May 28, 1964, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* June 17, 1964, p. 17.
[24] *Partelet,* March 1962, p. 36.

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more modest aid program to developing countries. Apparently, Chinese objections to Soviet aid policies center more on the question of which regimes are to be aided and to what degree, rather than on the issue of whether or not to extend aid. Peking obviously has been influenced by what it believes to be its own regional and national needs when it loudly denounces large-scale Soviet aid to India, but actively seeks to compete with Soviet aid efforts, for example, in Africa. Warning the Chinese "if you are sitting in glass houses, don't throw stones," the USSR has pointedly asked: "What point of view are the Chinese leaders, who are running down the economic aid of the Soviet Union to the new countries, advocating? . . . Is it appropriate to ask, in this case, what goals China is pursuing in its aid to new states?"[25] The answer, for the USSR, is unequivocal. "Verbally claiming to be 'defenders' of the interests of the oppressed nations, the Chinese leaders are in fact not concerned with the successes achieved in the national liberation movements of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America . . . but care exclusively about assuming leadership in this movement and using it for their hegemonistic and chauvinistic purposes."[26]

Unable to compete with the larger Soviet assistance effort in developing countries, Communist China has, in recent months, launched a determined campaign to discredit the quality and intent of Soviet foreign aid. During his trip to Africa and Asia early in 1964, Chou En-lai advanced "Eight Principles" of Chinese foreign aid which he asserted governed China's economic and technical assistance program. The principles emphasized that China "never asks for any privileges or attaches any conditions" to its aid nor does it seek "to make the recipient countries dependent on China"; that Chinese aid was granted "in the form of interest-free or low interest loans" and for projects which "require less investment while yielding quicker results"; that China's aid recipients could be assured of "best quality equipment . . . at

[25] *Sovetskaya rossiya,* October 5, 1963, p. 3.

[26] *Kommunist,* September 1963, p. 41. Unquestionably, Chinese and other communist objections are based partly on the argument that the Soviet Union has treated non-bloc nations more generously than it has its own more deserving allies. Always vociferous claimants to a substantial share of Soviet economic largesse, bloc countries cannot but view with some resentment the increasing proportion of Soviet foreign aid resources directed to noncommunist regimes. During the four years of the Soviet program 1956-59, noncommunist countries received an average of less than 15 per cent of annual Soviet foreign aid expenditures; during the four years, 1960-63, this share increased to almost one third—and if Soviet aid to Cuba is included, then such countries were claimants to more than half of all Soviet foreign aid disbursements.

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international market prices," and aid in technical training; and that Chinese technicians "will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient countries."[27] The principles sought not only to cast Chinese aid in the most favorable light but to feed the latent apprehensions of many less developed countries toward Soviet foreign aid and to undermine the attraction of the Soviet program.

In a speech to the second Asian Economic Seminar held in Pyongyang, North Korea, in June 1964, and attended by representatives from most of the Afro-Asian nations, the Chinese delegate noted that not unlike the "imperialists" of the West, "the modern revisionists also talk about 'economic cooperation and economic aid.' But they have no sincere desire to help the Asian and African countries to develop their independent national economies." In dealing with the developing countries, the Chinese delegate warned, the modern revisionists "sometimes provide equipment while withholding technical knowledge, trying all they can to make the Asian and African countries dependent on them." And, in an obvious allusion to China's own experience with Soviet aid, he added: "They have even gone so far as to cancel aid, withdraw experts, and tear up contracts as a means of applying pressure."[28] During the same month, at an Economic Preparatory Meeting for the Second African-Asian Conference (Bandung II), in Geneva, a Chinese delegate again attacked the ulterior motives of Soviet foreign aid policy; in a speech interspersed with references to "we newly independent Afro-Asian countries" he maintained that "precisely because we are friends who are poor we find it easier to understand each others' needs." But perhaps betraying some sensitivity to the gap between his country's verbal protestations of support for new states and its hitherto modest aid efforts, he added somewhat defensively:

> We have done as much as our capacity permits to help other Afro-Asian countries develop their national economies. . . . But at present China's economic level is not high. What we have been able to do is limited. Having attained independence earlier and with such great manpower, China logically ought to make more of a contribution to the struggle of Afro-Asian peoples for winning and safeguarding national independence. What we have so far done falls far short of what we should have done. But we are sincere.[29]

[27] *Peking Review*, June 26, 1964, p. 10.
[28] *Ibid.*, July 3, 1964, p. 20.
[29] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1964, p. 10.

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Izvestia has countered such Chinese efforts to "defame, blacken and slander" the Soviet Union's "selfless" assistance by asserting that there are no grounds for Chinese propagandists to boast of their own aid to new states. The CPR, it was alleged, which "itself only recently started on the road of heavy industrialization" was hardly in a position to render effective assistance to developing countries. The Chinese were lagging in the implementation of their aid pledges, and Chinese plants and equipment were of a "low technical level" and failed to meet world standards. Moreover, "the volume of aid given by the CPR amounts to only 8 per cent of the aid granted to young national states by the Soviet Union and the other socialist Comecon countries." Despite the "flowery declarations" of Chinese leaders about aid to new states, the Soviet paper asserted, such people will judge their real friends "not by their words but by their deeds."[30]

Prospects for Soviet Foreign Aid

Although skeptics who raise pragmatic as well as ideological objections to Moscow's foreign aid policies can, at times, make a compelling case, foreign aid cannot have been a totally unrewarding or unprofitable venture for the USSR. While it is true that, despite substantial outlays in aid, the program has not succeeded in definitively aligning new countries with the communist bloc (Cuba became a recipient of aid only *after* its political affiliation with the bloc), it is unlikely that the Soviet leadership ever anticipated that economic assistance alone could, within the relatively brief span of ten years, exert any decisive influence on the economic and social order of developing countries. Through the aid mechanism, however, the USSR has introduced men, materials and ideas into less developed countries, thus impinging on the hitherto almost exclusive Western political and economic preserve. By its willingness to undertake such major impact projects as the Aswan High Dam in the UAR and the Bhilai steel mill in India, it has enhanced its prestige not only in the recipient countries but more generally in the less developed areas. It has sought, and not without some success, to convince the new states that it would be safe and advantageous for them to invest their economic future with the USSR along with other highly industrialized societies, both as a source of industrial equipment and as a "model" for economic development. Perhaps

[30] *Izvestia,* July 12, 1964, p. 4.

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more importantly, the Kremlin has created the basis for lasting rapport and contact which, it is hoped, will facilitate its efforts to influence and shape, at its own pace, the developing economic and political orientation of the newly emergent nations.

It is nonetheless true, however, that as Kremlin policymakers assess the returns from more than a decade of investment in foreign aid, they can reckon their dividends in most part only in the soft-currency of enhanced prestige. If the novel venture of planning and executing foreign aid programs has not been a discouraging experience, it must certainly have been a sobering one. With few notable exceptions, Soviet foreign aid administrators have encountered frustrating delays in implementing their aid projects, often as much from their own ineptitude and inexperience as from the administrative inefficiency of aid recipients in marshalling domestic resources and financing local costs. Many leaders of new states have exhibited a disconcerting lack of gratitude for Soviet aid by preserving their nonaligned status and accepting aid from both East and West; and the Soviets have failed to hold on to politically advantageous positions in Guinea, Syria, Iraq and other countries, despite substantial aid outlays. As economic stringencies within the USSR and Eastern Europe have increased, there is evidence that aid expenditures have come under increasing attack as the most expendable means of easing the pressure on internal resources. Finally, the Soviet leadership has betrayed increasing anxiety lest the ultra-revolutionary appeal of the Chinese communists make some impact on communist parties in newly emergent states where the Soviet policy of support for the bourgeois-nationalist leadership effectively excludes them from power for some time to come.

It is still too early to know whether the new Soviet regime will resolve these misgivings about the efficacy of foreign aid. Khrushchev's successors have taken great pains to assure the developing countries that "the Soviet Union will continue to strengthen friendship and cooperation with the young sovereign states of Asia, Africa and Latin America."[31] In view of reports from Moscow, however, that one of the many charges leveled against Khrushchev was his lavishness with foreign aid funds,[32] there is evident concern among the leaders of new states that as the new regime faces increasingly difficult allocation choices among com-

[31] *Pravda,* October 17, 1964, p. 1.
[32] *Washington Post,* October 22, 1964, p. 23.

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peting programs at home, it will examine much more carefully just what it can expect from its economic aid investments abroad.

Certainly, the deepening Sino-Soviet rift has added a new dimension to Soviet policies in less developed countries. Chinese communist insistence that less developed countries are now the "focus" of all capitalist contradictions, the "fulcrum" on which the success or failure of the world revolution must hinge, has been interpreted by Moscow as an ill-disguised challenge to Soviet policies in this area; even those Soviet leaders most skeptical of foreign aid may now have been persuaded that the USSR really has little alternative. Any drastic curtailment of new aid extensions would not only forfeit advantages already won but would involve a loss of Soviet international prestige. Such a move would also seriously damage what has been one of Moscow's most effective weapons in the struggle to counter Peking's bid for influence in Asia and Africa. It may be expected that the skill with which developing countries have exacted assistance from both East and West in the past will be employed with profit in the future as a polycentric communist bloc seeks to purvey competing ideologies and models for economic development.

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THE FRENCH RESTORATION OF HISTORY

by George A. Kelly

AT his press conference of January 31, 1964, President Charles de Gaulle insisted that "France merely acknowledges the world as it is." When a national spokesman justifies his policies by reference to "the world as it is," others faintly suspect that he sees only that world which is the actualization of his own desires and interests. Even admirers of General de Gaulle will concede that *his* world of international politics is not the real world that gives the lie to all competing notions. To his detractors, his world appears an odd creation engendered by dogmatism and opportunism. Yet, despite the opprobrium heaped by many on De Gaulle's vision and tactics, his uses of contemporary history have been attended by a great deal of practical success. Manifestly, the pattern of states, ideologies, alliances and alignments is changing. The General (whose intransigence is known to all, but whose speeches and press conferences are digested by few) views the world as multiple and national, and hence manipulable even by nations much less influential than the superpowers.

It is in the light of this diagnosis that we must examine De Gaulle's notion of "the world as it is" and its basic difference from the prevailing American view. De Gaulle's experience and historical bias complement the French notion of national interest, a correspondence not always recognized on this side of the Atlantic. Even if De Gaulle had never emerged from his long retirement after his first Presidency to become the leader of the Fifth Republic, his ideas about the meaning of history would be the same as they are today. Neither is it likely that post-Gaullist France will desist from pursuing, within the measure of its means, the independence of action favored by the pluralism of the world system. One must not confuse French domestic quarrels with a lack of popular consensus on the shape of the world and the nation's role in it. Whether as an international irritant or a repository of universal revolutionary ideals, or simply as a fortunate and distinctive plot of ground, France insinuates its stubborn particularity into the souls of most of its citizens.

What is needed then is a theory of international politics and the confirmation of that theory by events to legitimize national

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aspirations. De Gaulle provides the first, and history the second. France can be strong, the General says, because the world's strongest states are checkmated and disliked. Propitiously, a series of Chinas, Cubas, Panamas, Cypruses and Albanias have raised questions which the General's theory seems able to explain and by which his policy can profit. History has been dealing increasingly heavy blows to the gold standard of bipolarity, which had gone unchallenged in the Europe of the 1950's.

I

The dual concentration of power which had come to seem natural and even reassuring to the United States and the Soviet Union failed to provide the same comfort to others. Even long before the death of President John F. Kennedy, the tight system of the bipolar world was obviously coming apart. Alliance bonds were loosening—partly because of natural events and partly because of clumsy policy—and new regional centers of power were appearing. Perceiving this situation, Soviet and American leaders alike were unable to do anything about it. Curiously enough, neither side was in a position to take advantage of troubles within the other bloc; instead, defections from one tended to encourage defections from the other. Both Americans and Soviets derived some comfort—and a negative sense of community—from the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the recent series of prudent and conciliatory statements passing between Washington and Moscow.

It has often been argued that because the Soviet Union and the United States possessed such awesome power, weaker nations gained a certain flexibility and strength of their own. They could act with more latitude and self-interest in areas where the balance between the two superpowers was not at stake. If they were nonaligned nations, they could make significant gains by playing the behemoths off against each other; or, if allies, they might skillfully tilt the weight of the alliance in directions favorable to themselves. The vaunted nuclear umbrella of the superpowers allowed the small fry to play out of doors in the rain, as well protected as if the sun had been shining. Consequently, bipolarity was the very condition of flexibility. As General de Gaulle himself stated: "the American nuclear weapons, which are the most powerful of all . . . [are] the essential guarantee of world peace."[1]

[1]Press conference of January 14, 1963, Release No. 185, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, p. 9.

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The preceding interpretation is surely sound as far as it goes. But a bipolarity that permits multipolarity is, in substance, what its effects show it to be. Even at its very apogee, bipolar power, like the giant diplodocus, proved a clumsy system and, in the majority of cases, a quite helpless one. Bulk and lack of speed and cunning doomed the dinosaur; undoubtedly, he was well served by his armament—if he happened to meet another, aggressive dinosaur.

There are, however, two new corollaries to the metaphor of the dinosaur. The first is that the modern nuclear dinosaur cannot safely be exterminated nor can he exterminate his opponent without inviting his own destruction. The second is that his majesty is challenged today not only by the growing but as yet insignificant beasts that hope to inherit his kingdom, but also by a putative pack of little dinosaurs nipping at his heels. The first type we call nonaligned nations; the second are the allies from the more advanced industrial world.

Characteristically, the challenge posed to the world by the Americans and Soviets has revolved around the existence and utility of nuclear power. On the one hand, it became increasingly apparent that these weapons were too preposterous to be employed for any rational political end other than an ambiguously graded deterrence, since the destruction of one side would almost certainly mean the destruction of both in a "spasm war." For both parties, competition on terra firma was clearly preferable to nostalgia in Valhalla.

On the other hand, it seemed that no nation could ever aspire to world prominence without a stock of these weapons and a pseudo-rational strategy for their employment. This is precisely what the French military observer, returning from the Bikini hydrogen shot in 1952, reported to his government, with the chain of consequences that led France to begin work on nuclear weapons well before the advent of Charles de Gaulle. Finally, a paradox arose: no one expected nuclear war—barring an accident—and yet no one could presume to gain entrance to the concert of major powers without the nuclear passport. One allied country, i.e., the United States, did the deterring. The more its intentions were impugned, the more solemn became its protestations of reliability, since any threat to withdraw protection would be clearly self-defeating for the whole alliance structure. Then, behind arguments over credibility (similar arguments over target selection were advanced by Winston Churchill as early as 1954),

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the French commenced a vigorous drive toward independent nuclear power. They set out on the path to national prestige, and raised a banner which other drifting nations might choose to follow. Such a course would earn them a seat at future conference tables.

Though the credibility debate in the late 1950's may have been somewhat unreasonable and premature, it promised to become critical in later years if De Gaulle's vision of a multiple and flexible world of nations were realized. The idea was that behind the shield of NATO a genuinely independent Franco-European deterrent force might take shape as the earnest of an independent foreign policy. De Gaulle made no pretense about this. In September 1960 he set forward his intended course in a speech before an audience in Britanny: "France wishes to make sure of her defense; she does not want to be overrun and she has allied herself to the other free countries so as not to be crushed. But under the protection of these alliances she extends her hand to the other peoples."[2] On May 31, 1960, he had declared: "If the Atlantic alliance is presently necessary for the security of France and the other free peoples of our old continent, their task is to organize for their common power and development in the shelter of this shield."[3] One must not forget the bitter lesson De Gaulle had learned in the 1930's about the consequences of being saddled with a military posture unsuited to the nation's foreign policy and interests. Now, contemplating national policy of world-wide scope, he was determined that events would not force the country behind new Maginot lines. He grandiosely ordered the construction of a force "capable of acting anywhere on earth."

II

All this clashed with the U.S. vision of the future—with its implicit mission of leading the free nations through the perils of the communist confrontation to a vaguely seen distant shore where friend and reformed foe alike would enjoy domestic tranquillity in a world not of men, nor of nations in the narrow "realist" sense, but of laws. Great powers need spacious utopias and missions. On the other hand, many Europeans, hardened by experience, noted the discrepancy between our liberal vision and our residual chauvinism. The fact remained, however, that

[2]Speech at Vannes, quoted in André Passeron (editor), *De Gaulle parle* (Paris: Plon, 1962), p. 403.
[3]Press conference of May 31, 1960, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 427.

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the fundamental world-view of America was acceptable not only to the liberal camp, but also to a variety of schools of thought in all parts of the Free World. The consensus was inevitably based upon the notion of a continuing international bipolarity and the distant prospect of its resolution.

The dual mastery of world politics by the United States and the USSR seemed assured by their combined leap in power and resources. Washington did not anticipate the quality and consequences of the European recovery. Nor did we expect such an early disaggregation of international blocs over seemingly petty issues and through paradoxical uses of secondary power. Of course, the United States hoped one day to see some sort of federated Western Europe, strong in its own right, but still united in its defense commitment to the larger "Atlantic Community." One day there might also be a potent mainland China which, until very recently, we pictured as basically inseparable from Moscow. Perhaps in time an India or a Brazil would assume a significant role. But all of this was very far in the future. The extended present seemed to promise a continuation of established trends, with the United States and the Soviet Union increasing the tempo of their competition and leaving pursuing nations farther behind.

During the past few years, since the development of "polycentrism" in both blocs and flexibility in the international system, the U.S. government has been conducting a curious "love-hate" relationship with the Soviet Union based on the duality premise. Of course, the strands of this idea go much farther back in time. Even in the midst of World War II there were those who anticipated an eventual death-struggle between the Children of Darkness (the communists) and the Children of Light (ourselves). Some thought the eventual solution lay in the reconciliation of the two systems. Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, wrote in 1943: "Ideally, collaboration between the communist and the democratic world might lead to a wholesome exchange of political experience. . . . We have, on the whole, more liberty and less equality than Russia has. Russia has less liberty and more equality. Whether democracy should be defined primarily in terms of liberty or of equality is a source of unending debate."[4]

In the thinking of many Americans, whether of the Right or Left, the Soviet-American relationship became paramount and exclusive. Regardless of what other nations did, the two giants

[4]Reinhold Niebuhr, in "Russia and the West," *The New Republic,* January 16, 1943.

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were either doomed to struggle over the essential principles of political and social organization, or they were destined to cooperate in leading the human race toward greater and more meaningful endeavors in peace and freedom. Common battle or mutual accommodation became all-important: De Tocqueville's prophecy was borne out.[5]

It is not only the right-wing nationalists and the far-left liberals who have agreed on the premises of world duality. There are also, to use Stanley Hoffmann's apt phrase, the "engineers,"[6] and those whom we label the "ideologists." The "engineers" include those individuals of extraordinary talent who have devised our laws and systems of strategic deterrence and given us hope for organized arms control. The sophisticated analysis governing these concepts has, of necessity and design, been based on the dyad of ourselves and the enemy, as is customary in all war planning. The difficulty of plotting "systems" in which more than two independent players interact has been the determining factor in building these systems—even in an era when a wealth of mathematical knowledge has informed the science of strategy. Thus, there is a tendency to try to force the developments of the political future into the hard-won guidelines of the strategic present. The concepts of war strategy, necessarily bipolar, have their counterparts in bipolar theories of arms stabilization and negotiations with the opponent.[7] To abandon the difficult but attainable science of A and B is, to this way of thinking, to forgo the possibility of rational control and manipulation of historic forces.

It remains then for "ideology" to inform the neutral concepts of "equivalence," "reciprocity" and "interaction" with the political argument emphasizing the dual character of the world—a dualism which, moreover, our relatively weak European allies never seriously disputed until recently. Thus, strains within the alliance are regarded as basic challenges to a proper world vision,

[5]Alexis de Tocqueville's famous closing paragraphs in *Democracy in America* prophesied the Russo-American bipolar world and the character of the regimes.

[6]See Stanley Hoffmann's admirable essay, "Restraints and Choices in American Foreign Policy," *Daedalus,* Fall 1962, pp. 668-704.

[7]The literature reflecting this point of view is profuse and characteristic in the United States. Singling out one or two works for mention would therefore be misleading. Many of the best illustrations, however, center around the specific notions of stabilized bilateral deterrence by negotiation and joint action to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Nth powers. An interesting and extreme "countertechnicity" can be perceived in the defense of strategic multilateralism by General P.-M. Gallois in his *Stratégie de l'âge nucléaire* (Paris: Callman- Lévy 1960).

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and it has even been intimated that the Sino-Soviet split was a mixed blessing. An "ideology of convenience," in which the West is unified (though it never was for all purposes) and subject in military matters to the decisions of its most powerful member, became dominant in the United States during the 1940's and 1950's; it has survived into the 1960's in the form of opposition to any independent national efforts that make the world a less predictable place to live in.

The dual world concept shared in some respects and for different reasons by American warhawks, *détentistes,* military planners and responsible statesmen has been built out of sweat, dollars, lives, and a vast expenditure of intellectual resources. The Soviet Union, too, has found reassurance and opportunity in this concept. But the "love-hate" duet of the superpowers is played against the rising disharmony of secondary powers, led by France and China. The two superpowers have become, in effect, the preferred enemies of each other. They are mutually reluctant to see their stable and familiar antagonism complicated by powers willing to use the strategic stalemate to their own ends. Both sides have grown progressively weary of neutralist-nation auctioneering, and both are now challenged by revisionism in their own camps. This does not mean that the game they are playing is likely to end in an affectionate embrace. But if present patterns are any indication, we may see evidence of a mutual preference, in the words of Dostoievsky's *Notes from Underground,* for the process of the game rather than the end of it.

III

The French challenge to the American vision of Atlantic unity arises mainly from a skepticism as to whether there is a deep community of interests among the Atlantic nations and from a dissatisfaction over the present distribution of power in the West. But it is also the result of a clash between views of history which are themselves illuminations and reflections of two national interests. While the United States, through accident and habituation, has come to consider international relations in terms of the ever-present dualism, this mode is not appropriate to France or Europe in general. They are tempted to think of history as cyclical (somewhat like Fortune's wheel of Renaissance imagery), rather than as fixed, progressive and expansive. De Gaulle sees, amid the chaos of temporal events, a people "endlessly vacillating

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from greatness to decline, but revived, century after century, by the genius of renewal."[8]

Peoples, nations, genius, opportunities: this is the stuff of which De Gaulle's history is made. The French of today recall their distant ancestors.[9] The old regime, the Revolution, the Empire, the Republic, the great wars—all have flitted across the face of eternal France leaving their lasting and fearful marks—but, in the end, people and nation survive and prepare for their next manifestation. All political regimes, all ideologies—the Soviet and Chinese included—are transitory, if terrible, and it is on the base of the nation and of nations that peace and reconciliation will have to be constructed. This is especially true of the peoples gathered within the old European continent, free and communist alike, whose legacy of geography and history must prevail in the long run over the passing phenomenon of ideological hostility. The East and West of Europe are "two fractions of our old peoples, old peoples long ago civilized according to the same rules and spirit, even when they follow regimes—as it is said—different regimes."[10]

The test of a nation, then, is never its ideological virtue—though De Gaulle believes in the clear superiority of the historically engendered values of the West—but its capacity for self-mastery or nationhood.[11] Applied to particular instances, this faculty has undoubtedly impressed him about the Chinese and discouraged him about the British at Nassau. For De Gaulle, an ideologized world dualism is a long-term illusion—contrary to the American view—whereas such a dualism based on power is simple servitude.

Genius uses opportunity to revive the destiny of peoples and

[8]Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs: Salvation, 1944-1946* (translated by Richard Howard; London: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 284.

[9]Speech at Blois in May 1959, quoted by Passeron, *op. cit.*, p. 386: "We have seen lots of regimes. Still, we French bear a terrible resemblance to our fathers. The regimes have made no difference."

[10]Speech at Bourges, *ibid.*, p. 385.

[11]A comparison of De Gaulle's comments regarding recognition of Communist China and nonrecognition of East Germany is revealing: "Given the fact that for fifteen years almost the whole of China is gathered under a government which imposes its laws, and that externally China has shown herself to be a sovereign and independent power, France has been disposed to enter into regular relations with Peking." (Press conference of January 31, 1964, Release No. 201, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, p. 13.) "We are not disposed to recognize that system [East Germany] as a sovereign and independent state, for it could neither come to birth nor exist but by virtue of Soviet occupation and thanks to an implacable dictatorship." (Press conference of March 25, 1959, in Passeron, *op. cit.*, p. 416.)

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nations. History will not do it for them, nor virtue; instead, history must be understood and mastered. Furthermore, a leader may be strong, but history may be unfavorable in a given era: if so, supreme efforts are required. As De Gaulle lamented in his press conference of September 5, 1961: "Assuredly we can deplore the fact that France disposes of limited means relative to those which were hers in other periods of history. How often, I may say, have I myself experienced this chagrin and inconvenience!"[12] At another time, after his departure from power in 1946, in a mood of melancholy he was moved to declare: "Perhaps it is my lot to have written the last pages of our greatness."

De Gaulle's life in power and his life in retreat have tempered his notion of strength and helplessness. Alongside his spectacular feats for wartime Free France and the Fifth Republic, there have been moments of solitude and failure. He sat out much of World War I in the frustration of German prison camps. His campaign for the modernization of the French army during the 1930's went unheeded and failed to stave off the nation's greatest catastrophe. Again, his Cincinnatus-like dreams of returning to the helm of state by way of a "rally of the whole French people" in the early 1950's tainted him with hated party politics and came to a bitter end. History, then, is no placable ally; it is a force to wrestle with and to outwit.

There may be only one chance in an epoch to seize history. If the chance is missed, then the "cycles of greatness and decline" may mean nothing, and the national destiny may be one of slow, if honorable, decay. The thermonuclear era is such a time: pious renunciation of the prerogatives of nuclear power can doom a nation to the status of permanent disability. De Gaulle, an admirer of the French classics, is likely to be familiar with the judgment of the proto-socialist Henri de Saint-Simon:

> A system which the centuries have built and destroyed cannot be re-established. The destruction of old doctrines is complete, radical, and irrevocable. They will always be remembered with gratitude and veneration by all true thinkers and people of probity for the innumerable and eminent services they rendered civilization during the long era of their maturity. But henceforth their place is only in the memory of true friends of humanity, and they can make no claim to vigor.[13]

[12]Passeron, *op. cit.*, p. 410.

[13]*Henri, Comte de Saint-Simon, Oeuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin,* VI, "Système Industriel" (Paris, 1861), pp. 50-51.

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If we apply this image to the rising and waning of national power, influenced by the harsh law of technology, we can see very clearly what De Gaulle forbids France to become: a country where ardent antiquarians go on holidays.

It is commonly suggested in the United States that De Gaulle's vision proceeds from the late nineteenth-century world of manners and politics (he has also been accused of resembling Louis XIV and Bonaparte). Yet our truer image of France is that of a nation standing at the crossroads of technological modernity, and it is precisely in the more forward-looking parts of France that De Gaulle has won his greatest electoral successes. If certain aspects of modern life are distasteful to the General's aesthetics —one cannot picture him in the world of the *quick lunch* and the *supermarché*—he has made himself a forceful director of all modernizations that increase French power. "France has married her time," he declared, with evident satisfaction, on July 12, 1961.[14] His close attention to economic policy and careful choice of advice in this sphere has confounded those who said he knew little and cared less about such things. A recent writer speculates that one of the main lessons De Gaulle drew from the fragility of the Fourth Republic was the curse of trying to conduct policy from a position of economic weakness.[15]

Opportunity is the last ingredient which a statesman can apply to the raw matter of history. In striving to increase French power, De Gaulle has been a practicing empiricist, for he has less binding ideological commitments to any one view of the future of the globe than have the Americans, the guardians of the international system. Years before World War II De Gaulle criticized French military staff work for its dogmatism.[16] His diplomatic moves today show that he places goals at the far end and simple events at the near, and then devises middle-range policies to take advantage of simple events in pursuit of long-range goals. His public utterances clearly elucidate his political ideas, but like Bismarck's, they are not always believed.

It has been fashionable, especially since the French recognition of Peking, to compare De Gaulle's conduct of diplomacy to the

[14]For a penetrating analysis of France's difficult marriage to her time, see Stanley Hoffmann, Charles Kindleberger, *et al., In Search of France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

[15]Paul-Marie de la Gorce, *De Gaulle entre deux mondes* (Paris: Fayard, 1964), p. 746.

[16]In *The Edge of the Sword* (*Le fil de l'épée*), (translated by Gerald Hopkins; New York: 1960), pp. 98-101.

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concept of *raison d'état,* first methodically employed by Cardinal Richelieu in the seventeenth century. Richelieu was the first national statesman to succeed in refining diplomacy to a conscious practice of state advantage beyond the accustomed restraints of religious and historical precedent. Completed by Mazarin, his work achieved, by means of a great religious war, the demise of the Catholic Spanish Hapsburgs as the predominant European power and the corresponding rise of the Catholic French Bourbons. He presided at the same time over the crushing of feudalism and the growth of centralized loyalty and armed strength. He practiced, in his way, a policy of "the world as it is."

The lines of psychological heredity that link De Gaulle to Richelieu are undoubted, but they are also the lines of a secular French diplomacy which calls for a skilled operator. France's considerable resources and geographic position in Europe, combined with her intermittent capacity for mastering internal factionalism, are the supports for such a diplomacy. If Richelieu was not a forerunner of Woodrow Wilson, neither was he a disciple of Machiavelli, as his political testament shows us. Nor was his "nationalism" that of the nineteenth century, and in that sense it may be compared with De Gaulle's. However, the latter has a theory of the reconciliation of nations beyond the time-bound clash of their social doctrine, a theory which was unavailable to the servant of the Bourbon dynasty.

In any analysis of the world, we must refer ourselves to history, which provides direction, empirical content, and sometimes inertia; and theory, which speaks of number, balance and abstract harmony. The science is never exact. In any calculation, it is perilous to neglect one element in favor of the other. Theory cannot make history, and history alone cannot show us the way to the best theory. Today, the United States has gone far along the path of arguing that theory has overleaped history in teaching the outlines and balances of a stable world. By the same token, the French have returned to the notion—so constant to one of their intellectual traditions, so alien to another—that history is the world's best guide. Those who rely upon history can find many guidelines from the past for current policy; when a chosen policy reaches a dead end, the lessons of history teach that many other alternatives and opportunities are available to the statesman. Theory, it seems, by contrast, must either fully achieve its goals —the "Atlantic Community," permanent *détente,* the evolution of an international order—or must fail.

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A secondary power feeds and grows on a spate of relative successes against its peers or superiors. The great power can derive confidence only from the maintenance or improvement of positions vis-à-vis its established great-power rivals. Such, in essence, is the source of our discord with Gaullist France.

IV

Today, in international affairs, France can no longer be dismissed as "the sick man of Western Europe." The currency is solid and relatively stable. The balance of payments is satisfactory. Annual growth has been until 1964 above 4 per cent. Political quietude, with the consent of the electorate, has been achieved, even if future prospects are not thoroughly sanguine. The Algerian problem has been solved. Military revolt has been quelled. Decolonization has been sped to a conclusion. The Common Market experiment, despite crises, is proceeding by tight-fisted compromise. A Franco-German treaty has been signed. Nuclear potential has expanded dramatically--and if the *force de frappe* is unworkable, as many believe, other nations have treated it with a concern that suggests respect. French influence in other parts of the world has grown in the measure that the hegemony of the great powers has been resented: the reporter Jean Daniel, for example, reported the rise of a "mythe de Gaulle" in Latin America, a legend which has not suffered from the General's recent state visit to many of these countries.[17]

French "history," it would seem, is succeeding, at least for the present. In Europe, attempts to isolate De Gaulle's policy via the Nassau agreements and the projected multilateral force have about them the air of a wager, which is less than reassuring for the American long-range vision of Europe. De Gaulle's ideal is a *France in Europe,* calmly but purposefully directing its *mission continentale.* The irony of this presumption is that the "Europe des patries" may very well be accomplished, not in De Gaulle's lifetime—the General personally being a subject of great controversy—but after his departure. The perpetuation and internationalization of "Gaullism" in continental Europe is no less a possibility than the fulfillment of the American dream of trans-Atlantic community. For it has as an additional advantage its strong appeal to the nations of a somewhat liberalized Eastern Europe.

[17] "Le mythe gaulliste dans le 'tiers monde'," *Le Monde,* February 5, 1964.

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One of De Gaulle's most recent diplomatic moves was the recognition of Communist China. The geometry of the situation has been most intriguing, even if the consequences are in doubt. France, with conspicuously less power than the United States (one-seventh of the U.S. GNP, for example), chose an opportune moment to inject herself prominently again into the affairs of an area halfway around the globe. Parodying the Soviet-American *détente,* France has employed her diplomacy in Asia to redress her European frustrations and to secure for herself a more significant role in world politics than she has had for twenty-five years. Cardinal Richelieu would heartily approve of this.

It is well to point out that General de Gaulle depends on a government by consent, even if the opposition is divided and bewildered. His recognition of Peking has deepened the confusion in the ranks of the domestic Left, where a major effort is underway to gain communist electoral support for the presidential candidacy of the moderate Socialist Gaston Defferre.[18] De Gaulle has not eased the task of those who seek to dethrone him from the Elysée before he, or a like-minded successor, can complete his historical tasks—in particular, to revise by the end of the 1960's the present concept of NATO relationships and strategy.

It would be rash to portray the French *démarche* in China as earth-shaking. A considerable residue of bipolar magnetism still holds the secondary actors and will restrict their activities for years to come. But the world is changing. If immediate global problems seem discouraging to U.S. policymakers, there are even deeper long-range implications that challenge our vision of the international system. We must begin to ask ourselves the following questions: Is the world pattern breaking up, and, if so, at what rate and in what manner? What will be the logical form of NATO in 1969? Will our current bipolar models—for negotiation, for stability, for arms control—continue to have relevancy?

[18]The troubles of the French Communist Party are pitiable. Challenged by a small but vociferous and well-financed "Chinese" left-wing, the party leadership is trying to negotiate a program of joint action with the Socialists, who, on their part, are trying to give as little as possible for the assurance of communist votes in the forthcoming direct-suffrage presidential election. On October 21, 1963, the Chinese newspaper *People's Daily* raked the PCF fore and aft: "For a long time the leaders of the PCF have abandoned all struggle against American imperialism, leaving to people like De Gaulle the banner of the French national struggle against the United States." Following the lead of the USSR, the West European communist parties have all endorsed De Gaulle's recognition of Peking, but the discomfort in the PCF at having been "outflanked on the Left" is acute. The creation of a Franco-Chinese Friendship Society, with numerous sponsors of the noncommunist Left, has not aided the party's equanimity.

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Can we still point hopefully toward that distant Utopia which regards communism as the last enemy, the last barrier standing before the threshold of world order? Will we have to begin again, piecing together the fragments of an unabashedly plural international system?

France is not entirely responsible for this developing pluralism, but these are the questions which the French performance should be forcing us to consider. De Gaulle is a mortal, but the theory of history from which he views the world should be respected as a theory of world politics as well.

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PRINCIPLES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY*

by Slavko N. Bjelajac

UNDER the pretense of "peaceful coexistence," Soviet as well as Chinese leaders have mounted a flanking threat to Western security through the exploitation of unrest and instability in the underdeveloped regions of the globe. Frustrated by and large in Europe after 1948, the Soviets, especially since the death of Stalin, have increasingly turned their attention to this "third world." Offering the new countries trade and aid and friendly relations with one hand, Chairman Khrushchev used the other to assist "national liberation movements" whenever the international climate and local conditions were favorable. When Khrushchev announced in his now famous January 6, 1961 address that national liberation wars were not only "justified" but "inevitable," he served notice on the West that this form of "competition" under the aegis of "peaceful coexistence" would become perhaps the major weapon in the communist arsenal.

Khrushchev's notion of peaceful coexistence was elucidated in his speech of May 23, 1963 at the Moscow meeting dedicated to Soviet-Cuban friendship: "We Marxist-Leninists make no secret of our attempt to draw all people in the world to the side of Socialism. In this we see our most important mission in the world arena. Our party has always held the view that peaceful coexistence creates favorable conditions for promoting the class struggle in capitalist countries, for furthering the national liberation movements." Khrushchev asserted that it is under conditions of peaceful coexistence that the world-wide "liberation" movements gained their momentum, for example, the Cuban revolution. Khrushchev's strategy[1] is as dangerous to the West as the support being given by the Chinese communists to North Vietnam's war against South Vietnam.

Insurgency as a Communist Weapon

The communists' success with insurgency is due to many reasons, but in particular to their ability to exploit the human

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion or policy of the Department of the Army or of any department or agency of the U.S. government.

[1]Despite Khrushchev's sudden fall from power in mid-October, his statements and policies remain the best guide to current and future Soviet policy.

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factor. They have perfected techniques for the selection and training of revolutionary cadres—leaders, propagandists, infiltrators, agitators, and organizers of guerrillas and of undergrounds —and for the organization, indoctrination and subversion of the masses. They establish highly disciplined cells to influence or control important groups in a society, and organize parallel hierarchies from the cell of a local committee to the central committee of the party. These become the party's invisible machine by which control is established over peasant and youth movements, sport and cultural associations, labor unions and other organizations.

The primary danger from this form of unorthodox warfare lies in the fact that it is nearly impossible to detect and measure (e.g., psychological, underground and subversive operations) and that it is difficult to counter (e.g., guerrilla, terrorist and sabotage operations). In the initial phase of an insurgency, psychological and subversive operations, which aim at establishing an invisible revolutionary structure, are the communists' most dangerous and effective weapons. Since their military strength is limited at this time, the insurgents' major effort is directed toward winning the active support of the indigenous population. All operations are designed to produce a desired psychological effect; in the event that an act of force becomes necessary, it is accomplished in such a manner as to minimize adverse psychological fall-out. The major objective is to capture the wavering masses ideologically, so that bases for subsequent guerrilla operations can be firmly established throughout the country. Communist activities in pre-insurgency and insurgency situations enjoy the advantage of being able to use a wide range of unconventional techniques—from lies and deceit to sabotage and terror—to achieve their goals. Thus the nature of the conflict favors the enemy.

What is happening today in South Vietnam is not new from the standpoint of communist revolutionary doctrine. The writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao are clear and explicit. Vo Nguyen Giap, one of their ablest disciples and now commander of the North Vietnamese military forces, is as straightforward about his military tactics in his book, *People's War—People's Army*, as Adolf Hitler was in discussing his plans for the conquest of Europe in *Mein Kampf*. But very few people read these books and even fewer try to probe the enemy's intentions. Giap drew up a blueprint for the attack on South Vietnam, and Che Guevara adapted it to the

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Latin American situation; neither added a single new principle or technique to long-standing communist doctrine.[2]

In short, Western policymakers would not have been surprised by communist guerrilla warfare had they studied communist books and pamphlets written during the last fifty years. The peoples and leaders of underdeveloped nations can be trained and prepared to cope with communist insurgency. If they are not, the communists will continue to gain future victories because of Free World mistakes and failure to heed the communists' own warnings. In discussing the problem of counterinsurgency, it is instructive to identify the major mistakes so that they may not be repeatedly committed.

Observations on the Mistakes of Counterinsurgents

The counterinsurgents' task, involving a mix of psychological, political, ideological, socio-economic and military operations, is extremely complicated. In addition, while government leaders grapple with these problems, they are exposed to a variety of domestic pressures such as those from social, student and religious groups. Whenever setbacks are sustained, it is the government leaders who are held responsible. Laboring under severe handicaps, they are prone frequently to arrive at decisions on emotional rather than rational bases, thus increasing the probability that mistakes will be made. Governments also commit mistakes because of faulty intelligence on revolutionary conditions and the targets and unconventional tactics of the revolutionary leadership; because they do not realize the gravity of the situation; or because they adhere too strictly to military tactics or socio-economic programs inapplicable to counterinsurgency conditions.

These kinds of mistakes have contributed in the past to the success of insurgent forces. For example, the French concluded that the initial rebel activity in Algeria was the work of a handful of ambitious terrorists unsupported by public opinion or a genuine desire of Algerians for independence. Failure to appreciate at an early date that this was not merely a rebellion but a full-fledged revolution turned out to be a cardinal error. Later the French branded the Algerian movement as communist-inspired, thus revealing an ignorance of the revolutionaries and their nationalist political goals and antagonizing the majority of Algerian people.

[2]Tito and his communist partisans in Yugoslavia used the same revolutionary doctrine, strategy and tactics now being applied in Vietnam.

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The French military initially believed that they could quell this revolutionary movement by the use of conventional weapons and forces. When the lack of a sound military doctrine resulted in heavy losses, French officers and soldiers became disillusioned with their military strategy and tactics. In addition, necessary political measures were unwisely delayed: the French made a costly error of timing when they undertook a drastic reorganization of the Algerian administrative structure in the face of rebel attacks. As a result, the insurgency, prolonged for years, divided the French military into two camps, cost France thousands of lives and billions of francs, and secured victory for the revolutionaries.

In Malaya, during the early stages of insurgency, the authorities failed to keep in close touch with local communities and to protect the people against communist propaganda and terrorism. Slowness in adjusting the governmental machinery to deal with the insurgency; inadequate psychological operations, civic action programs and security measures; and the dual military and civilian control of the army when it worked in support of civil authorities also proved to be costly mistakes.

In almost all cases of insurgency, the defenders have made the serious error of confusing the real reasons for the rebellion with the "favorable factors" which revolutionaries inevitably exploit (e.g., need for socio-economic reforms, governmental ineptitude). Ignorance of the real reasons inevitably creates confusion about how to deal with the insurgency. While political, economic or social grievances (in Marxist terms, "internal contradictions") may help to foster and prolong a revolt, their elimination is seldom, if ever, the major aim of the revolutionary leaders. In many cases governments have enacted reforms only to have them rejected by the rebels, for their acceptance would eliminate the "favorable factors" upon which the rebels have based their appeals for insurrection.

In South Vietnam, for example, the resettlement of the Montagnards into "strategic hamlets" is violently opposed by the Viet Cong, for this would remove a "favorable factor." Similarly, improvements made by the governments of the Philippines and Malaya were opposed by the communist rebels. In Algeria, limited political reforms instituted by the French were dismissed by the Front of National Liberation (FLN) as meaningless; large-scale economic and social reforms were publicly ridiculed as an admission of French weakness. In the Philippines, the governmental

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reforms instituted by President Magsaysay after 1952 won back the uncommitted populace but did not cause the revolutionary leadership to give up the struggle. The lesson which should have been learned is that the thirst for power by revolutionary leaders cannot be quenched by public welfare programs. And it is even less likely that a genuine struggle for national independence can be diverted by a colonial power's civic action program.

Governments frequently fail to detect and evaluate a revolutionary movement before the outbreak of hostilities; once fighting has begun, they tend to underestimate the potential strength of underground movements and their hold on the masses. In Morocco in 1953, the French underestimated the popularity of Sultan Mohammed V. In Algeria, they were convinced that they had crippled the budding revolutionary movement in 1950-53 by arresting several known nationalists — they miscalculated the strength of the Algerian underground networks and attached little importance to the outbreak in 1954.

Another common error is to presume that the leaders of the revolution can be found only among the guerrilla forces; that if the top guerrilla commanders and leaders are killed or captured an insurgent movement will collapse. Generally the opposite is true, for in most revolutionary movements the undergrounds and other supporters of the cause are directed by the nonmilitary elements of the revolutionary hierarchy. The leadership and its main directorates are usually located in the large cities and capital of a country. Hidden there at a safe distance, they provide political and military direction for the whole movement.

When a government fails to understand the nature of a revolution, it may place too much reliance on its administrative, police and military apparatus and on its superiority in matériel, while underestimating the strength of the revolutionaries. Because of its overconfidence, it may realize too late that artillery and planes, which are of crucial importance in conventional wars, are seldom advantageously employed in counterguerrilla operations. Elaborate maps showing the disposition of guerrilla forces reveal to governments nothing of the revolutionaries' minds or of their popularity among the masses. Bombs may kill guerrillas but they cannot exterminate the undergrounds or change people's minds.

Failure to understand the several phases of a revolutionary movement usually results in poor planning. Plans must be laid for coordinated action on all levels—political, economic, social and psychological—in order to eliminate conditions favorable to revo-

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lutionary activities, particularly in the preparatory or pre-insurgency phase of underground operations. These plans must achieve the highest possible level of coordination among operations such as local intelligence activities, police and security services, support of local administration and control of population and civic actions. There can be only one "commander-in-chief" at the head of a wholly unified counterinsurgency command structure. Whether a civilian or a military officer, he must have complete authority over the affected provinces or, if necessary, over the entire country. This principle of "across-the-board control" should apply equally to his subordinate commanders at their province, district and village levels.

The country's existing territorial administrative structure should be fully utilized and strengthened. Major reorganization in the face of insurgent attack tends to produce confusion; in fact, one of the immediate objectives of insurgents is precisely to disrupt the continuity of the nation's political and administrative processes. The drastic reforms undertaken by the French in Algeria only reinforced the rebels' claim that the former system was wrong and that they were strong enough to disrupt that system. Thus, maintenance of existing administrative, judicial, economic and political institutions is a basic principle; they should be modified only under the most extreme circumstances. In some cases—for example, where there is a lack of capable and honest civilian officials—it may be necessary to integrate a country's civil administration into its military structure. This is a delicate operation but its accomplishment ensures that trained military, paramilitary and police forces as well as civil support organizations are available and that their efforts are coordinated.

The functions of government and the lives of almost every citizen tend to be disrupted more during a revolutionary war than during a conventional war. Yet, while under assault, all sectors of the government administration and of society (labor, religious groups, students, civil servants) must, insofar as possible, continue to perform their functions normally and without interruption. The failure of any sector aids the rebel cause; the failure of several sectors would result in disaster. This, in turn, points up the importance of continuing authority vested in strong leadership—a fact repeatedly demonstrated in Malaya, Algeria and Vietnam. In counterinsurgency, military strategy and tactics cannot be dissociated from political and social measures, for the enemy seeks to impair not only the military potential of a government but also its

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administrative machinery, political support and moral sanction.[3]

It is another grave error not to appreciate that ideologies—the food of the soul—may often be more important to the masses than the economic development programs of their government or of a colonial power.[4] The Soviets believe that any man, given appropriate ideological indoctrination, can be re-educated to assimilate communist ideology, and that "the most essential thing is to raise the standard of scientific ideological work, turning it into a really powerful, constantly operative factor in communist construction."[5] They preach that "The ideological front is one of the most important in the struggle for the victory of Communism. If every Communist is ideologically well armed and skillfully conducts the attack against everything that hampers the forward movement of Soviet society, our affairs will proceed even more successfully."[6]

Is it bread or ideology that often motivates a soldier to fight better on the communist side? Overemphasis on economic progress and social reform to remove those socio-economic conditions on which communist insurgency feeds may be not only naïve but dangerous. Failure to recognize the true causes of discontent and the fact that these causes can change in the course of a rebellion may prevent the government from taking proper remedial action in time and may result in a misdirected counter-insurgency effort. The causes of initial discontent may have been of an economic nature, but communist propaganda and indoctrination may turn this into discontent of an ideological nature.

Once a revolt has broken out, the government should not assume that the sole or even primary aim of the rebels is to engage the government's troops in battle. On the contrary, the major goal of the rebels is to win the ideological war and thus "capture" the civilian population.[7] The chief task for the government is to maintain the loyalty of the population, to seek the

[3]See J. Hogard, "This War of Our Time," *Defense Nationale,* August-September 1958.

[4]This is not to deny the importance of socio-economic reforms; defending governments must carry out these reforms wherever conditions permit.

[5]L. F. Ilyichev, *Kommunist,* No. 16, 1962.

[6]*Partiinayazbizn,* No. 14, 1963.

[7]The defending government in most cases will be confronted by a well-organized rebel propaganda machine, established before the outbreak of open hostilities, whose purpose is to win supporters and sympathy throughout the world. This was done by the Algerian revolutionary nationalists and the Cuban communists. Castro, for example, was praised as a national hero and a liberal reformer by many in the United States despite strong indications before he came to power that he was a well-trained Marxist.

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participation of the people in various government-sponsored programs. Under no circumstances is it wise to permit the people to become mere observers—a disinterested third party—whose sole concern is to be protected by the government.

How a Revolutionary Structure is Organized

It is often believed that the answer to the insurgency problem lies solely in military tactics and strategy. This belief stems from an erroneous assumption that guerrillas are the backbone of the revolutionary structure and that, if they are destroyed, the whole movement will collapse. In reality, the structure of a revolutionary movement permits the various parts of its operational mechanism to function independently as well as in close coordination.

The structure of a revolutionary movement can be compared to a pyramidal iceberg, the bulk of which lies submerged with only its peak visible. Guerrillas play this small "visible" role in revolutionary warfare. Because of their relatively overt operations, organized guerrilla forces are thought to be the principal revolutionary element and receive credit for any impressive successes. The invisible part of the movement is rarely considered in proper perspective, in part because the effects of underground actions are not felt immediately. In building a revolutionary structure, insurgent leaders give principal attention to the development of an underground civilian support organization—a task done by specially trained personnel. The infiltrators organize the indigenous underground which in turn supports the guerrillas. An underground organization does not strike openly and achieves few visible successes. Yet undergrounds are the more dangerous enemy. One cannot easily detect their actions among the population nor identify their principal leaders. They work among the citizens in villages and towns, within the military, police and administrative apparatus of government, among labor groups and students. The underground is incomparably more elusive than the guerrillas.

A revolutionary movement is usually built upon the dissatisfaction of the population. Gradually, this discontent is converted into agitation, subversive action, sabotage and terror. The movement reaches the stage of guerrilla activity only when the revolutionary leadership decides that the structure is strong enough to support its own army. (For development of a revolutionary structure, see Figure 1.) The leadership may, for propaganda and

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FIGURE 1

BUILDING OF A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT


LARGE SCALE GUERRILLA ACTIONS
MINOR GUERRILLA ACTIONS
INCREASED POLITICAL VIOLENCE, TERROR, SABOTAGE
INTENSE SAPPING OF MORALE OF GOVERNMENT, ADMINISTRATION, POLICE AND MILITARY
INCREASED UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES TO DEMONSTRATE STRENGTH OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION
SABOTAGE AND TERROR TO DEMONSTRATE WEAKNESS OF GOVERNMENT
OVERT AND COVERT PRESSURES AGAINST GOVERNMENT, STRIKES, RIOTS AND DISORDERS
INTENSIFICATION OF PROPAGANDA, INCREASE OF DISAFFECTION, PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION OF MASSES FOR REVOLT
EXPANSION OF FRONT ORGANIZATIONS AMONG MASSES
ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS AND LIBERATION MOVEMENT; APPEAL TO FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES
SPREADING SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS INTO ALL SECTORS OF LIFE OF A COUNTRY
PENETRATION INTO LABOR UNIONS, STUDENT AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTO ALL PARTS OF SOCIETY
RECRUITMENT OF FELLOW TRAVELERS AND OTHERS; INDOCTRINATION AND USE OF THESE FOR PARTY'S PURPOSES
INFILTRATION BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS, AGENTS AND AGITATORS, AND FOREIGN PROPAGANDA MATERIAL, MONEY, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
INCREASED AGITATION, UNREST, DISAFFECTION, INFILTRATION OF ADMINISTRATION, POLICE, MILITARY AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, SLOWDOWNS AND STRIKES
AGITATION; FORMING FAVORABLE PUBLIC OPINION (ADVOCATING NATIONAL CAUSE), CREATION OF DISTRUST OF ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS
CREATION OF ATMOSPHERE OF WIDER DISCONTENT THROUGH PROPAGANDA, LIES, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT; DISCREDITING GOVERNMENT, POLICE AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES
DISSATISFACTION WITH POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND/OR OTHER CONDITIONS; NATIONAL ASPIRATION (INDEPENDENCE) OR DESIRE FOR IDEOLOGICAL AND OTHER CHANGES
ABOVE GROUND
UNDERGROUND
ABOVE GROUND
UNDERGROUND
PREPARATION OF REVOLUTIONARY CADRES AND OF MASSES FOR REVOLUTION
PREPARATION OF PARALLEL HIERARCHIES FOR TAKING OVER GOVERNMENT POSITIONS

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psychological purposes, place the guerrillas in the hills and swamps well before the revolutionary structure is fully developed. In the preparation of a revolutionary machine, special attention must be paid through all phases of the revolution to the organization of the cadre, parallel hierarchies and the masses. At the same time, the revolutionary leadership seeks to expand and strengthen activity in each "building block" (see Figure 1), from simple dissatisfaction to the establishment of national front organizations and the promotion of mass violence.

The building of a revolutionary movement by infiltration from another country works in reverse to the above pattern. The communists have applied this approach in South Vietnam. Their tactics call for infiltration by small Viet Cong units into South Vietnamese territory and the creation of an insurgent base with the help of indigenous discontents and rebels. After a base is created and consolidated, it becomes capable of receiving additional infiltrators and assigning tasks to them. The process continues until this base becomes large enough to support a guerrilla organization and to send cadres out to set up additional small bases which in turn gradually grow and become useful for infiltration purposes.

Whether the revolutionary movement is initiated by infiltrators or by local insurgents, the support of the indigenous local leadership and population is needed to guarantee its success. In the early stages of the war in South Vietnam, the government attributed overriding importance to the infiltrators from the North without realizing the extent to which discontent among the South Vietnamese people contributed to the grave situation. This miscalculation led to mistakes in the selection of weapons and tactics, and left the basic sources of dissatisfaction open to further aggravation. The local revolutionary leadership was free to organize new bases throughout the country and to expand those already in existence without interference. In this way they created the widespread revolutionary base which today seriously endangers the security of South Vietnam.

Governments which fail to recognize the significance of the invisible part of the revolutionary structure and the role of the masses will be unsuccessful regardless of how much effort they may put into military operations against the guerrillas. Final success is unlikely to be achieved even if military operations are combined with civic action programs, for these two operations alone cannot successfully destroy the enemy's revolutionary

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structure and its roots. The whole structure, including its ideology, leadership, underground and military arm, must be attacked simultaneously. The defending government must carry out a counterinsurgency program of informational, political, re-educational and psychological operations. In counterinsurgency, the psychological weapon is of supreme importance: to win the "hearts and minds of the people" is to win the battle. Such operations should comprise not only anti-insurgency propaganda but also military and nonmilitary actions planned chiefly for psychological effect. They should be directed at the whole nation, guerrilla and government forces, urban and rural dwellers, military and civilian, in order to protect the population from the enemy's propaganda and woo the renegades.

If the government's psychological warfare produces dissension within the invisible revolutionary structure, the guerrillas in the mountains, swamps and jungles will represent a minor problem. Lacking underground support, their bands will wither and be easily destroyed unless there is substantial reinforcement of infiltrators from outside. The importance of defeating the guerrillas in battle is, of course, not to be underestimated in the campaign against the underground. The effort directed against insurgents must be commensurate with their aggressiveness and, what is even more important, with the possible damage—including the psychological effect—which may result from their actions.

On the Application of Force Against Guerrilla Troops

Guerrilla bands, the visible part of a revolutionary structure, are small, fluid, mobile. Confronted with powerful military forces, they flee, refusing to fight except under chosen conditions. Their best allies are darkness and inclement weather, woods, swamps, hills, houses and, above all, people. Their undertakings are tailored for the psychological effect they have on the population. Numerical strength is of little importance to guerrillas because they use unconventional tactics. Their losses are replenished by drawing from the underground and other civilian support organizations. Under these conditions, if appropriate counter tactics are not used, they can operate and survive indefinitely.

Destruction of enemy guerrilla forces is the purpose of every counterguerrilla operation, but this does not mean that they have to be killed. Surrender of the enemy is more desirable, for it can be better utilized for psychological purposes. Because the use of crude force, no matter how discriminately employed,

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entails a degree of cruelty, counterinsurgents should not resort to force for achievement of goals which can be attained through other means. Killing of civilians, destruction of property, sufferings and deprivations are damaging to the government's effort, creating distrust, fear and disaffection. Killing creates martyrs, reverence of whom inflames the people against the government.

Priority must be given to nonmilitary means for the achievement of pacification goals. Crude force, to be utilized only as a secondary—and emergency—instrument, must be employed according to the results desired and the specific situation, always keeping in mind its possible adverse psychological effects. This principle is crucial: the enemy often can gain support because the government's indiscriminate use of terror renders communist terror a lesser evil in the eyes of the people. Indeed, the term "force" has a special meaning and value in counterinsurgency. Because of the unorthodox character of the conflict, a successful psychological operation may produce more moving power—more force—than any strictly military action or weapon.

The Three Essential Ingredients: Intelligence, Mobility and the People

An effective organization for the collection and prompt exploitation of intelligence is one of the first requirements in counterinsurgency. An accurate evaluation of the strength of guerrilla forces and the underground is a prerequisite to the development of sound counterinsurgency doctrines, tactics and techniques, and the selection of correct weapons for the job. Deficiencies in intelligence regarding the enemy have been among the principal reasons for the lack of success in many postwar insurgencies.

What is known about the enemy is almost always incomplete, incorrect or outdated. The collection of information is a complex process; since the front is everywhere, information is everywhere. It may be gathered in unlikely spots, far from the target of an unexpected guerrilla attack or the site of terrorist activities. Yet, indigenous governments have for the most part directed their intelligence efforts against guerrilla forces. Intelligence operations should not be limited to a need for military information as on a conventional battlefield. They must keep under surveillance all the elements of the struggle, especially the invisible parts of the revolutionary structure.

Intelligence operations should be coordinated under a single

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military-civil agency which includes all echelons of command. Dissemination of intelligence must be instantaneous, both laterally and at the same time vertically, for in counterinsurgency the one who is on the scene and closest to events should have command. Officers at every echelon must be free—indeed, duty-bound—to act swiftly upon the receipt of intelligence. Coordination should be facilitated by collection and action centers established in operational sectors and subsectors, and at district levels in urban and rural areas.

A counterguerrilla force has a basic "unit of time" of one day in which to plan and carry out a tactical operation on a combat level. This time factor requires the commander to make a quick and difficult decision: whether to wait for verified information or to launch the tactical strike before the enemy disappears. The availability of accurate intelligence can permit quick action and ensure the success of the operation. The flow of reliable information must be maintained, for the nature of the conflict and the insurgents' mobility call for continual aggressiveness and flexibility on the part of government forces. The application of constant pressure on the enemy will prevent him from taking the offensive and will make it more difficult for him to recuperate from defeats.

When the guerrillas are spread over a large territory, counterguerrilla forces must possess tactical long-range mobility, i.e., a capability for dispersion followed by concentration for destruction. Dispersion is a means of controlling the populace and building a widespread feeling of security; in the latter case extensive use of paramilitary forces is effective. Concentration brings together as many troops as necessary, as rapidly as possible, for exploiting the receipt of information on enemy movements. The basic problem is to find and pin down the enemy; then he can be destroyed if counterinsurgent forces are mobile and superior in firepower. Government forces must also possess tactical short-range mobility, which makes it possible to respond to the enemy, adapt to a fluid situation, and capitalize on aggressiveness and initiative.

Flexibility in counterguerrilla operations permits a change of plans while an operation is in progress. At lower echelons, it means freedom to innovate—to undertake a new mission in the course of an operation. Rapidity is necessitated by the enemy's mobility and his capability for surprise attack, and also by the obligation to terminate an operation in a day's time. Flexibility

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and rapidity depend upon the proper conception and execution of combat plans, which in turn can be achieved only from unity of doctrine, organization and procedures in the training of officers and leaders.

The purpose of counterinsurgency forces cannot be to hold the ground or prevent the enemy from holding it—in neither case would a government possess forces large enough for that. Ground is not occupied; it is controlled. Fixed posts and fortifications are used only for the purpose of promoting reconnaissance and mobility, and for safeguarding important installations. In this kind of conflict, "gadgets" cannot successfully replace men and weaponry alone cannot win battles. The actions and efforts of the foot soldier are the essential factors. Regardless of its military equipment, no outpost or hamlet can be defended successfully at the line of bamboo and barbed wire fences unless the defenders patrol day and night, ambushing and routing the enemy from the surrounding area. Troops assigned for such defense must be constantly on the move within a five-to-ten-mile radius around the outpost or hamlet in order to discover the enemy's approach and check him before he is able to mount an attack. The enemy, moving on foot, cannot spring a "surprise attack" if the defense force is on guard, moving from one point to another within the defense perimeter.

The principles of mobility, flexibility and rapidity of execution are valid for all levels of counterguerrilla command. Because of the fleeting character of the enemy, the rapid change of situation and the dispersion of units, those in command of the immediate operation must be in a position to take the initiative, to move and act at the opportune time.

Above all, the government must not permit its population, the source of manpower and support for both itself and the rebels, to become disinterested observers. A program of intensive and uninterrupted activity among the people is of the utmost importance. This must be undertaken by private citizen groups as well as by the government because it is too complicated an operation for the latter to handle alone. The initiative for the organization of private groups, for encouraging them and for helping them materially will, of course, have to come from the government. This is particularly true of the less developed countries where private civic groups may not have the means or experience for such a program.

The control of the population in counterinsurgency is a subject

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frequently discussed but little understood. Basically, it is a task of political and ideological indoctrination. The masses must be informed of the nature and causes of the conflict and of the goals of their government; their confidence must be gained.

Isolation of the people for the purpose of control and protection, for example, in strategic hamlets, is a concept which is justified as a last resort: where the government is left without influence on the population; where terror may force large numbers of them to join the rebellion; and where forces of order are incapable of assuring a minimum of security for them. Although the hamlets seem to represent visible sectors of a front opposing rebels, they do not necessarily represent a solid front against them. The degree to which the strategic hamlets are a real front depends on the frame of mind and sentiment of the inhabitants: they must undergo indoctrination, re-education, moral rearmament and psychological preparation for active participation in a continued struggle against the enemy. The inhabitants of some hamlets in South Vietnam have supported the rebels and assisted them in destroying the defenses of their own hamlets. Many "defended villages" fall into communist hands because of indifference and a loss of morale. Very often these strategic hamlets have fostered an unwarranted feeling of security, encouraging the villagers to expect that somebody else is responsible for defending them.

No matter how one analyzes insurgency and its complicated problems, the inevitable conclusion is that the people are the principal factor. Counterinsurgency must be made a common cause of the populace and of the government; the people must come to look upon themselves as active participants. A nationwide campaign for "national salvation," in which every citizen takes part, is the most effective answer to insurgency.

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POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: THE THIRD DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

by Alexander T. Jordan

MILITARY power and diplomacy comprise the two conventional dimensions of strategy, and economic action is sometimes called the "third arm of statecraft."[1] By the third dimension in this article, however, we mean all efforts, not confined to dealings between governments, to influence foreign audiences—whether we call it propaganda, political communication or psychological warfare. While less easily defined than the other two, this third sphere of strategy is recognized by political scientists—though not always by politicians—as equal to them in importance.

American weakness in this third dimension is deplored by writers on the subject. "It is my personal belief that Russia is a good generation ahead of us in her understanding of propaganda and in her skill in using it," wrote George Gallup.[2] Murray Dyer has commented: "In Russian hands the psychological instrument has been used with consummate skill and no little success. It seems to be generally admitted that in our own hands both the skill and the success have been more limited."[3] Another writer noted: "The psychological warfare of the West is waged almost exclusively by America, or at least with American money; however, it is unsuccessful."[4] Arthur Krock, *New York Times* columnist, entitled one of his articles on this subject "Why We Are Losing the Psychological War."[5] Books such as *The Propaganda Gap, The Weapon on the Wall* and *The Idea Invaders* contain critiques of the U.S. psychological warfare effort by Americans dismayed to see their country second best in a field which they regard as vital.[6]

[1]Murray Dyer, "The Potentialities of American Psychological Statecraft," in *Propaganda and the Cold War*, a Princeton University Symposium edited by John Boardman Whitton (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963).

[2]*Ibid.*, "The Challenge of Ideological Warfare."

[3]Dyer, *op. cit.*

[4]Bela Szunyogh, *Psychological Warfare: An Introduction to Ideological Propaganda and the Techniques of Psychological Warfare* (New York: The William-Frederick Press, 1955).

[5]*New York Times Magazine*, December 8, 1957.

[6]Walter Joyce, *The Propaganda Gap* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); Murray Dyer, *Weapon on the Wall* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959); George N. Gordon, Irving Falk and William Hodapp, *The Idea Invaders* (New York: Communications Arts Books, Hastings House, 1963).

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The purpose of this article is not to criticize the current U.S. program in psychological warfare, although some references will be made to its shortcomings. Rather, we will examine at some length one major aspect of the psychological arm of strategy, namely, long-range ideological conversion, and recommend introducing into the overall U.S. effort an "organic system of political communication" which places more emphasis on the role of private, i.e., nongovernmental, institutions.

The Need to Focus Attention on Techniques

In the many studies devoted to the subject of psychological warfare, major attention has generally been focused on broad lines of policy and on the status of pertinent government agencies. Little attention has been given to the actual operating procedures and techniques. "The history of this instrument, roughly for the past 25 years, shows very clearly that a great deal of effort has been expended on who should control it, i.e., Department of Defense or State. By comparison relatively little effort has been spent on what the instrument ought to be doing and what its main job was."[7] In other words, there has been much concern with what should be said and who is to be in charge of saying it, but little thought as to the technique of conveying the message to its target.

This omission would seem to imply that the critics consider the current techniques satisfactory. If that were indeed the case, victory in the battle for the minds of men could be achieved by finding the right message and then leaving its transmission to an agency with an adequate budget and a proper status within the structure of government.[8] This is, of course, a dangerous oversimplification. For while it is obvious that the scale of operations of the third arm of strategy must be substantially increased before a proper balance among the three instruments can be attained, there is an even greater need for a major revision of thinking on the subject.

Nothing less than a systemic revolution in the field of Western

[7]Dyer, "The Potentialities of American Psychological Statecraft," *op. cit.*

[8]The idea that world opinion can be won over merely by spending more money and appointing a new Cabinet officer is similar to the suggestion that the problem of cancer could be solved in a few years by a crash program with a multibillion dollar budget. Scientists point out, however, that the solution to the cancer problem is a matter of brains rather than funds, that all the qualified researchers are already at work, and that their number could not be rapidly increased at any cost. In both these suggestions we are faced with a mechanistic outlook, inclined to substitute money for creative insights.

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political communication can turn the tide of battle in the war for the minds of men. The assertion that the outcome of that war, rather than the outcome of one fought with nuclear weapons, will determine the fate of the United States and of Western civilization is almost a cliché of political writing and speech-making. Yet little is done to forge new weapons and develop new techniques which will give us a chance to win the psychological war.

Even some of the most vehement advocates of a "psychological offensive" seem to think that the only weaknesses of present U.S.I.A. (United States Information Agency) activities lie in their limited scope and insufficient coordination with the other branches of government. Hence they conclude that an increased budget and a direct line to the White House would solve the problem. Such an oversimplified view suggests a failure to differentiate properly between various types of political communication. Military power—the first instrument of strategy—includes air, naval and land forces, which are not identical either in their character, deployment or operations. The various classifications of political communication differ among themselves at least as much as the Strategic Air Command differs from the Coast Guard. Each requires a different approach, different techniques and different organizational structures. There is a tendency to overlook this fact and to demand simply more propaganda, without specifying the type required.

The customary subdivision of political communication into strategic and tactical categories is not an adequate guide for fashioning instruments of psychological warfare. There is also an important dividing line between ideological conversion and all activity—both strategic and tactical—aimed at securing "relevant political action." The two fields inevitably overlap, but U.S. shortcomings lie particularly in the area of long-range ideological change. While less immediate in its effects, ideological conversion provides the indispensable infrastructure for strategic and tactical action toward specific objectives. The strength of Soviet political communication is precisely in this sphere, while in the medium-range and tactical fields the disparity between East and West is not as striking.

In advocating an enlarged U.S. effort, most writers fail to distinguish between these different types of endeavor and simply recommend increasing the budget of the U.S.I.A. and enlisting

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advertising talents in the campaign of "selling America to the world." This might be a valid approach in dealing with political communication at the level of "relevant political action," but it falls far short of what is needed to bolster U.S. efforts at long-range strategic conversion. Much more basic changes are necessary in methods of action, organizational structure and operating procedures if we are to reverse the trend and strengthen the third instrument of foreign policy.

An Organic System of Communication

Nature of an Organic System. What is needed is an organic system of political communication serving as a means of long-range conversion and cooperating with existing strategic and tactical psychological operations. *By organic, as opposed to inert, we mean a system in which the operating methods and even the organizational structure are determined by the ideas to be propagated.*

Organic communication systems are as old as the great religious faiths which, in their earlier stages at least, were seldom propagated by inert, bureaucratic methods. The innovation suggested here consists in consciously promoting the organic features of a communication system at the expense of the inert ones. That has certainly not been done by any Western government.[9]

An organic communication system would differ basically from a conventional one in the sequence of its operations. The conventional approach starts with the appointment of an administrative staff, which then hires professional communicators and seeks ideas to propagate. The organic approach would begin with the selection of ideas. The next step would be to find people who believe these ideas firmly enough to impart their conviction to others. Some may be trained communicators and others not, but it is easier to impart communications skills than intensity of belief—especially since professional communicators, by the nature of their calling, often tend to develop an attitude of doubt or even cynicism. Once assembled, a team of dedicated persons

[9]The possibility of creating an organic system of communication has been glimpsed, but sufficient attention has never been given to it. Senator Karl E. Mundt, in a briefing paper presented to the White House in 1962, noted that: "The private sector must know how it can participate in the global struggle in a sustained and systematic manner. There exists in the private sector a huge reservoir of talent, ingenuity and strength which can be developed and brought to bear in helping solve our Cold War problems." *Propaganda and the Cold War, op. cit.*, p. 75.

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should be given a fairly free hand in propagating its idea, and should be given such technical assistance as it may require. Far more mental energy would be released by such a method than could ever be delivered by a conventional organization working for the same objectives.

The Importance of Conviction. The model for successful political communication is to be found not in the dull bulletins of governments, nor in the flamboyant prose of copywriters, but in the patient labors and intense convictions of missionaries of religious and political faiths—from Saint Paul to Lenin. An organization dedicated to spreading its ideas among others should start with a group of passionate believers.[10] There are thousands of people in the United States who believe fervently in ideas which, if adopted in other countries, could serve the long-range interests of national policy. These individuals would not make good diplomats or information officers, but they could make excellent propagandists. The most urgent need of the third arm of strategy is to utilize the spiritual energy of such people, while guiding and assisting them in accordance with national policy. No attempt should be made, however, to try to make their activity merely a carbon copy of current tactical and medium-range policies.

The importance of what might be called the "conviction coefficient" has been demonstrated by many propaganda campaigns of the past. In the period between the two world wars several Central European nations engaged in strenuous political communication efforts, directed largely against one another. Although their objectives are now irrelevant, these efforts merit our attention because of their success in proportion to the means used. The budgets and the numbers of personnel employed were but a minute fraction of those now at the disposal of the U.S.I.A.; yet the world-wide effectiveness of their persuasive efforts was impressive. This is attributable not to the Central Europeans' superior knowledge of communication techniques, but rather to their firm conviction of the righteousness of their respective causes. Armed with such conviction, a single agent working from his apartment in a foreign city may sometimes achieve a greater impact on the public opinion of the country than can a large government information office. Even tiny

[10]This is one of the reasons why civil servants are generally inappropriate for this purpose: they may be passionate believers, but their first allegiance is to official policies; they are not free to act in accordance with the intensity of their convictions.

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Lithuania managed to make the West aware of her claims to Vilno, while the Ukrainians—though without a state of their own—conducted active propaganda campaigns in Western Europe and in the United States. The results of these endeavors, while perhaps not significant in terms of "relevant political action," were quite impressive in relation to the puny resources committed.

These cases illustrate one of the basic principles of an organic communication system: *the communicator's intensity of conviction is the critical factor in his effectiveness* (persuasiveness). The objective value of the propositions advocated is comparatively irrelevant, particularly as it is not susceptible to any scientific measurement.

Government Agencies and the Organic System. There is another important reason for recommending an organic communication system—not as a substitute for the existing one, but as a co-equal auxiliary. If political communication activities are to be expanded in volume—as they must be if we are to achieve substantial results—that expansion should not simply take the form of a bigger and better government agency. A huge ministry of propaganda would be both inadequate and undesirable. Such a centralized agency might be a suitable instrument for spreading a dogmatic and codified doctrine. In this sense Dr. Goebbels' *Propagandaministerium* was an organic body, since its structure and discipline reflected the character of the Nazi movement. But when the subject of communication is to be a vast body of thought which might be described, for want of a better term, as "the philosophy of Western civilization," the use of a huge centralized bureaucracy for its propagation would constitute a basic contradiction. Any attempt to spread an essentially pluralistic culture though a single agency of one government would be a denial of the very philosophy we are advocating, as well as a psychological blunder. It would be a violation of the principles of organic communication.

Vast expansion of the U.S.I.A. to handle these new activities would place an undesirable official stamp on them. Moreover, political action in the field requires personal initiative and a readiness for risk-taking which are not characteristics commonly associated with bureaucracies. That is why increasing the budget of the U.S.I.A. many times over and giving its director equal status with the Secretary of State would not solve the real problem of bringing the third arm of strategy up to full strength.

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Effective political action, especially in the long-range strategic sphere, must take the form of advocacy. Mere distribution of information, even selected and slanted, is not enough. "From this view of the nature of foreign policy, and of the psychological instrument of statecraft," one commentator has noted, "it follows that the 'information' approach to psychological operations is woefully insufficient."[11] The tactical and medium-range activities of the U.S.I.A. should be continued and even expanded, but they can never substitute for true political action of a more basic nature. In any case, no government agency can openly engage in political action abroad; international law is explicit in prohibiting such activity by governments.[12]

The Inappropriateness of Advertising Techniques. The other standard suggestion for strengthening U.S. psychological operations, that we use advertising techniques in selling our political philosophy to other nations, is potentially even more harmful and reflects a profound misunderstanding of the whole issue. Because commercial advertising bears some superficial resemblance to political communication, its practitioners conclude that the two are interchangeable. The differences between them, however, are more significant than their similarities. Furthermore, the cost of using advertising techniques on a world scale would be prohibitive, and high-pressure campaigns might well evoke adverse reactions. This approach would be the least organic of all. "Advertising men have their function—on the American scene and inside the American economy. But the world situation calls for a totally different type of professionals. Political propaganda, a task of extraordinary complexity, requires intellectuals, scholars, specialists and—in the final analysis—political philosophers."[13]

Some Advantages of the Organic System

In summing up the shortcomings of the U.S. effort in the field of political communication, John B. Whitton points to: (1) the lack of clear objectives; (2) the lack of confidence in our efforts; and (3) the purely defensive character of our efforts.[14] Although Whitton was referring to the entire communication effort, his

[11]Robert T. Holt, "A New Approach to Political Communication," in *Propaganda and the Cold War, op. cit.*

[12]L. John Martin, *International Propaganda, Its Legal and Diplomatic Control* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), pp. 62-108.

[13]Saul K. Padover in the *American Scholar,* April 1951.

[14]John B. Whitton, "The American Effort Challenged," in *Propaganda and the Cold War, op. cit.*

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observations are particularly applicable to long-range ideological conversion. All three areas of weakness could be bolstered by a program of organic communication, based on the better utilization of existing intellectual and spiritual resources.

The causes for these major areas of weakness are not difficult to find. The first is related to the commonly heard argument that we have no single great idea to sell, hence our efforts tend to be reactive and defensive. "Our policy has been too negative, its programs and slogans almost always a mere response, or reaction, to the more imaginative initiatives of the Soviets. Hence, it is claimed, we have been unable to provide for the West the inspiration and leadership the situation demands and our great strength warrants."[15] Furthermore, in a democracy, a governmental propaganda strategy is unlikely to have clear objectives for these might offend certain sections of domestic political opinion. Official objectives must be phrased in a manner acceptable to all domestic political factions, and as a result they often become so watered down that they lose their attraction for the peoples of other cultures.

These are all very real obstacles. While one may argue that "freedom" and "democracy" are ideas or ideologies that can be articulated and "packaged" for distribution abroad, these concepts often appear vague and irrelevant to the target audience. One solution is to give these ideas more concrete form through person-to-person contact: this becomes the task of the private political communicator. While he must serve the interests of national policy formulated by the President, the political communicator must also have the freedom to interpret broad national policies and goals, and to go far beyond official statements in explaining the "American way of life." Private organizations devoted to political communication can set themselves clear objectives and, unhampered by official connection with the government, they can afford to be more candid in pursuing these objectives than can our public servants.

The lack of confidence in our efforts, which Whitton lists as the second failing, is due largely to the absence of clear objectives and the limited achievements to date of the American propaganda effort. If a private political communication organization were permitted to establish its own objectives, select its own method of operation and subdivide the overall task into a number of separate

[15]Whitton, *op. cit.*

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endeavors, this obstacle might not seem so formidable. A private association, selecting a limited number of targets in a specific territory, would be more likely to give its members a tangible sense of accomplishment than a government agency which endeavors to do everything everywhere and thereby dilutes its efforts to the point where they become largely ineffective. Unlike civil servants inhibited by their official responsibility, private communicators would not confine themselves to purely defensive tactics. The morale of troops in the field is always at its highest in offensive action, at its lowest in holding operations. The private organization would be composed of individuals selected to propagate abroad a coherent set of ideas which they hold very strongly. Some object that "convinced political communicators" will be hard to find; if that is true, then it would seem that American ideas are hardly worth propagating abroad and we face eventual defeat on the ideological level. But the assumption here is that many Americans do feel strongly enough about their political heritage to serve as propagandists.

The defensive character of the American communication effort —the third weakness—is largely due to the restraints of governmental action. A separation between long-range ideological conversion and current U.S. foreign policy would remove this handicap. The ban on political initiative, implicit in diplomacy, tends to discourage some of our ablest civil servants and contributes to the second failing—lack of confidence in our effort. The situation bears an analogy to the loss of morale in the U.S. Air Force resulting from the ban on crossing the Yalu River during the Korean War. The government is, of course, justified in forbidding its civil servants to adopt an offensive political posture. Since they are representatives of the U.S. government, their statements are subject to close scrutiny abroad and serious complications could follow any indiscretion. The problem, then, is not one of changing the operating rules of the existing agency, but of transferring those aspects of political communication in which it cannot engage to an instrument capable of doing so.

The organizational form for such a political communication instrument should be kept as flexible as possible. Various groups may be formed for the purpose of spreading particular aspects of American political thought or culture, or for working in specific countries and among different types of persons. As purely private organizations, without official status, they would be able to inte-

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grate closely with local communities. They should not isolate themselves in the international compounds of capital cities. They would have to be accepted by the local populace or quit. Their members might not necessarily be American citizens, and they would not have to be screened as closely as government employees. This would involve no risk, since the security problems that exist in tactical and medium-range strategic psychological operations are not present in long-range ideological communication. Communicators need not have access to any classified information, nor would they require any knowledge of overall plans. Their activity would be wholly overt and involve no secrecy. There should be no connection between persuaders and intelligence collectors, for their tasks are clearly incompatible. It is always possible that in some countries propagandists may be suspected of espionage. To avoid such charges, they should be kept completely clear of any compromising contacts.

Under such a loosely organized system some errors might occur occasionally, through incompetence or excess of zeal. However, their importance should not be overrated in weighing the immense advantages of an organic communication system. Since the members of private organizations working in the field would have no official status, any *faux pas* they might commit would be no more compromising than those of an ordinary tourist. Civil servants, including the personnel of information services, may be guilty of few flagrant faults, but their official capacity permits of even fewer conspicuous achievements. The Soviet government dissociates itself from communist propaganda activities abroad very simply, by subordinating the Agitprop to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, rather than to the government of the USSR.[16] The distinction appears purely academic, but in practice it provides an effective shield.

An organic system of communication would also avoid the tendency of all bureaucracies to spend as much time and energy in reporting to headquarters as in performing their primary functions. In a flexible organization, run on the lines of a fraternal association rather than on those of a government bureau, there would be little need for voluminous reports and ratings, and persons evaluating the performance of others will have worked

[16]See Evron M. Kirkpatrick, editor, *Target: The World* (New York: Macmillan, 1956).

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in the field themselves. This is an important point, for in the sphere of communication few objective yardsticks of achievement are available.

Why an Organic System Would Be More Effective

The operation of an organic communication system with specific missions allocated to separate groups might be compared to illuminating a distant target with beams of coherent light emitted by a laser. Each laser beam uses a single wave-length and a single color, permitting far greater concentration of energy and more accurate aiming of the beam than is possible with a beam of ordinary diffused light, comprised of all colors mixed together. Thus a program devoted to a single set of ideas will more readily find its target than an ideologically amorphous campaign aimed at everyone and hitting nobody. When a target is struck simultaneously by many single-color beams of coherent light, the illumination will be better than if it had been lighted from a single source of diffused, so-called white light. Moreover, it will be possible to avoid the transmission losses of diffused light which did not hit the target at all. The overall efficiency between the energy input and the amount of light received at the target will be many times greater when laser beams are used. The same is true in the propagation of thought: the penetration force of well-defined "coherent" concepts is greater than that of nebulous and diffused ones, and the sum of these concepts will convey greater meaning than generalized ideas can. The difference, as in optics, is in employing a method of transmission which avoids excessive losses.

The importance of using a specific approach, clearly defined both as to content and target area, is particularly great when the amount of energy available for input and the choice of objectives are limited. One of the major shortcomings of advertising techniques when applied to political persuasion is the relatively indiscriminate character of their appeal. The number of potential purchasers of soap or cigarettes may almost coincide with the total population, but the number of persons wielding political influence does not. That is why the use of mass appeal in foreign action is doubly misdirected: it seldom affects the majority and is likely to miss the vital minority.

A specialized organization with clearly defined and limited objectives is better equipped to reach its particular target—those

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persons who are likely to be receptive to the ideas which it propagates. Such an approach may result ultimately in the establishment of close links between groups of people in different countries. Societies for international friendship in general founder in a flood of pious declarations and clichés. Associations for friendship between two nations sometimes do better, though they also tend to specialize in platitudes and lofty speechmaking. But associations devoted to promoting cooperation and friendly relations between two nations in a specific field of thought or action are more likely to achieve tangible results. If they exist in sufficient numbers, such operational and binational organizations can accomplish, cumulatively, far more than world-wide associations dedicated to furthering the brotherhood of man. If a small proportion of the economic aid now given to foreign governments were channeled through such bodies, the political effectiveness of U.S. aid programs would be vastly increased.

An organic communication system would foster the establishment of a greater number of such specific links between well-defined groups in different countries. As in an atomic pile where no chain reaction occurs until the number of neutrons emitted reaches a critical level, so in a target area undergoing psychological penetration the reaction will not become self-sustaining until the paths of the diverse and apparently random messages begin to intersect each other in sufficient numbers. In the absence of mathematical formulae dealing with the prerequisites for a psychopolitical chain reaction, we have to rely on empirical observation and a study of recorded cases. It is clear, however, that by whatever method we might measure it, the political radiation we are now emitting is far from the level necessary for starting a chain reaction.

Use of Existing Organizations and Publications

Organizations carrying out programs compatible with an organic communication system already exist, but the scale of their activities is too limited for an accurate evaluation of results. Furthermore, they now operate on a random, *ad hoc* basis; within the framework of an organic system they would be given specific missions.

A typical example of such an organization is the Center for Christian Democratic Action in New York, which endeavors to promote Christian Democracy in Latin America. It is a private

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body, staffed by Americans, Europeans and Latin Americans, and enjoying some support from American foundations. Christian Democracy has the advantage of being a genuine ideology with a positive content, rather than merely a reaction against communism. It did not originate in the United States, and is therefore free from association with "Yanqui imperialism," but it has behind it the authority of strong parties in Western Europe. It also has the support of important sections of public opinion in Latin America. Support given to Christian Democracy in Latin America may provide a better antidote to communism than some openly pro-American activities. This does not mean, however, that other deserving movements should not also be encouraged. If only one party were supported, it would soon be labeled the "pro-American party," with all the adverse consequences of such a designation. One of the weaknesses of a government agency is that its rigid policy lines and its official character may make it difficult to back simultaneously several movements competitive with each other. Yet such apparent inconsistency might be the wisest course in some situations.

American labor organizations have already entered the international field, endeavoring to promote their ideology. One could imagine the National Association of Manufacturers doing the same for the philosophy of free enterprise, the American Bar Association for the rule of law, the American Legion for cooperation with veterans, and so on. The fact that the activities of these private bodies might be overlapping and even to some extent contradictory would not detract from their effectiveness. On the contrary, the variety of viewpoints would reflect the pluralistic nature of a free society, while the consensus of all on basic issues would illustrate the possibility of combining free expression with national solidarity. Such an approach, diametrically opposed to the monolithic communist method, would convey the American message not only through its actual content, but also through the manner of its communication.

The director of an organic communication system would use specific ideological programs, selected for their force of penetration as well as their content, to create a mental picture even as an artist uses pigments to create a painting. Inevitably, such a picture would become meaningful only in the overall perspective. Its pattern would then emerge from the apparently jumbled juxtaposition of colors. Conventional communication, on the other

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hand, paints a single-color image in which the overall pattern is constantly repeated in miniature.

The presence in a foreign country of a number of American-inspired communication organizations, each handling a separate aspect of political, social, cultural or technical activity, and each pursuing its own aims yet remaining in basic harmony with the others, would be a most convincing scale-model demonstration of the practical working of a free society. This accomplishment could never be duplicated by the communists, and that would be its most valuable feature.

We would commit a major error if we tried to use communist methods in reverse, merely substituting white for black and vice versa. The use of entirely original methods, reflecting the character and way of life of the United States, would place the communists on the defensive.

In military strategy there is often the temptation to build a replica of the type of force with which we are threatened, instead of concentrating on a type of force which the enemy could not easily duplicate or defend against. So in psychological warfare the subconscious desire to match the opposition exactly in methods and tactics is always present. The greatest strength of the United States in opposition to communism lies not—as is sometimes assumed—in its superior material resources, but rather in the ability of its people to work together in harmony in the midst of many differences. A visible demonstration of that capacity for cooperation and for releasing individual energies within a diversified, flexible communication system, working through a variety of channels for a broad common purpose, would be more impressive to foreign observers than mere declarations of principle.

An example of the efficiency of the organic method of communication is provided by the international editions of *Reader's Digest,* which supply an estimated thirty million readers with material likely to strengthen their loyalty to the West and open their eyes to the deceptions of communism. It is possible that the international editions of the *Reader's Digest,* which cost the taxpayers nothing, contribute as much to the understanding of the American idea abroad as all the publications of the U.S. government specifically designed for foreign readers. Precisely because it is not primarily a propaganda medium, the *Reader's Digest* carries conviction and secures paying readers.

Many other American periodicals could be adapted for foreign

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readers merely by eliminating subjects of purely domestic interest. They could provide a communication medium far superior to the pamphlets specially produced for that purpose. A system of subsidies permitting leading magazines to put out foreign editions would be less costly than trying to produce special publications. The identity of a well-established American periodical gives it an authority which a propaganda pamphlet does not possess. The Spanish editions of some American magazines prove the feasibility of such operations. One can only wonder why this has not already been done on an adequate scale.

While it would be undesirable to try to imitate communist methods, any communication effort counteracting the communist offensive would have to match it in sheer volume of operations.[17] International communist front groups claim a membership running into hundreds of millions; international broadcasting originating in communist countries totals 1,672 hours weekly; 29,736,000 copies of books in Free World languages were published in the USSR in 1954; and communist parties in Western Europe alone claim a membership of over three million.[18]

Conclusions

The vast scale and diverse nature of the operations required rules out the single government agency approach. Experience has demonstrated that government bureaus become unmanageable beyond a certain size and that further increases in personnel fail to produce a corresponding increase in useful output. If, as has been suggested, the single information agency were to become an appendage of the State Department, confusion would be further compounded.

The government agency responsible for directing the overall strategy of political communication should be a supervisory, not an operating, body. Its function would be to set targets and offer some degree of guidance, without attempting to perform the actual task in the field. Such an agency, whatever its status within the structure of government, should have a small staff of senior experts, but no operating branches. It would differ entirely in

[17]One expert, George Gallup, had this to say about the cost of an American psychological warfare program: "Some years ago I had suggested to a Senatorial committee that five billion dollars spent on today's tanks, guns and battleships will make far less difference in achieving ultimate victory over communism than five billion dollars appropriated for ideological warfare." "The Challenge of Ideological Warfare," in *Propaganda and the Cold War, op. cit.*

[18]Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*

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purpose and character from the U.S.I.A. as it exists today and it should not be associated with it, either in personnel or in operational patterns.

Recognition of the inherent inability of any governmental body to undertake certain types of political action and transfer of this work to organizations capable of doing so would represent a real turning point in our political communications procedure. The point of contact between such organizations and the government would be narrow, but vital. There is ample precedent for private bodies receiving government grants for the performance of specific duties, such as research or education. Once it is recognized that international communication at the long-range ideological level should not be a function only of the federal government, suitable ways and means of supporting it will evolve, and the government will still have a large measure of control over the recipients of such support.

An organic communication system such as the one roughly sketched here is, by its very nature, incompatible with crash programs. It has to be built up gradually, starting in the case of each project with an idea or a definite objective, not with a ready-made organization. Since the individual projects, by reason of their specialized nature, cannot be very large, the overall effect can only be attained by multiplying their number.

The effectiveness of such an approach will not become evident until the sum of all the individual endeavors reaches proportions comparable to those of official operations in the same sphere. Although no accurate measurements are possible in this field, it is clear that an organic system would give a higher return on the investment of human and material resources than an inert one. Furthermore, the results of its operation are more permanent and can become self-sustaining. Any communication effort without a built-in capacity for self-propagation is futile. In this respect, the organic system might be compared to cloud seeding operations which use a few pounds of silver iodide to release thousands of tons of rain, while the conventional method resembles a project which sends up aircraft with tanks full of water to sprinkle the countryside with imitation showers.

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Reviews

On Waging Counterinsurgency Warfare*

by Bryce F. Denno

Thermonuclear war, in which the populations of combatant nations would be liabilities since they could not contribute to the military effort yet must be protected, is at one fairly well-defined end of an ever-widening spectrum of warfare. At the other end is an ill-defined area which includes counterinsurgency warfare, characterized by its reliance on the population of the nation in which the war is fought. For this population is not only the target of the insurgent and the counterinsurgent but the primary instrument by which the war is waged. Support by the population is much more than an asset; it is the *sine qua non* of victory.

This is a basic theme advanced by David Galula in his *Counterinsurgency Warfare,* a recent addition to the burgeoning literature on insurgency which the conflict in Vietnam has helped to inspire. In this book, Galula attempts to bring the nature of counterinsurgency or revolutionary warfare into clearer focus and to develop principles and strategy to guide a regime in suppressing an insurgency. In so doing, he draws not only on his own experience, but on that of the French Army which has, unquestionably, seen more extensive and varied service in counterinsurgency warfare than any other army in the West. A 1940 graduate of St. Cyr, Galula fought in Europe during World War II. Subsequent service included a tour in China from 1945 to 1948 (during which he was a prisoner of the Chinese communists for a brief period), an eighteen-month stint as a United Nations military observer in Greece during 1949-1950, and duty in Algeria from 1956-1958. *Counterinsurgency Warfare* was prepared under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

Familiar with the many recent books which have examined the causes and nature of insurgency in detail, Galula devotes little time to this subject. Rather, he analyzes the striking asymmetry between the contestants in a war of counterinsurgency—an asymmetry which gives this type of war its specialized and distinctive character. At the outset of a revolutionary war, the counterinsurgent has an overwhelming superiority in tangible resources. He has an established government; control of the administration and police; financial, industrial and agricultural resources at home or readily accessible abroad. The nation's transportation and communication facilities are at his disposal. He has armed forces and the ability to increase their size.

The insurgent has none or few of these assets. However, he does

**Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.* By David Galula. New York: Praeger, 1964. 160 pp. $4.50.

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possess two formidable advantages, both intangible. Unlike the counterinsurgent, he is not required to expend energy and means in maintaining order throughout the country. Further, he has a cause.

While attaching high importance to a cause with popular and lasting appeal, Galula contends that it does not have to be genuine. An efficient propaganda machine, he maintains, can turn an artificial problem into a real one. Although some psychological warfare experts would challenge this contention, the effectiveness of an artificial cause espoused by the insurgent Viet Cong in the Republic of Vietnam today lends credence to Galula's view. This "cause" is embodied in a ten-point program issued by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Viet Cong) in late 1960. In eight of the ten points, Americans or the U.S. government are mentioned specifically in developing the basic theme that the Republic of Vietnam is a creature of U.S. imperialists who are exploiting both the Republic and its people. This crude adaptation of the anti-colonial propaganda so effective in the war against the French is patently artificial. But it continues to help inspire thousands of Viet Cong insurgents to undergo the hardships and dangers of extended guerrilla warfare.

To develop his analysis of the asymmetry between insurgent and counterinsurgent, Galula compares revolutionary warfare to past wars. In most of these, opposing armies were armed and organized in somewhat comparable fashion. The laws and principles affecting combat between them, arrived at through centuries of practice and study, held true for both sides. The principles were, of course, applied differently according to the situation, circumstances and the abilities of leaders involved.

This is not the case in revolutionary warfare, where most of the principles applicable to one side do not apply to the other. The counterinsurgent has larger, better equipped and better armed military forces which usually have been designed to fight a conventional war. The insurgent's forces are inferior numerically, lightly and usually poorly armed. Clearly, the insurgent must avoid a direct encounter with his superior enemy who could easily vanquish him. The resultant contest is similar, says Galula, to that between a fly and a lion in which "the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow and the lion cannot fly. It is the same war for both camps in terms of space and time, yet there are two distinct warfares—the revolutionary's and, shall we say, the counterrevolutionary's."

This bizarre, disjointed war, fought a good deal of the time at arm's length, devolves inevitably into a protracted contest of attrition. (Galula points out that, to date, there has never been a short revolutionary war.) It continues until the counterinsurgent has eliminated the insurgent or until the insurgent has gained sufficient strength and resources to build conventional military forces com-

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parable to those possessed by the counterinsurgent. In that event, the fly becomes a lion with the knockout punch necessary to end the war. The development of Viet Minh conventional forces which overwhelmed the French at Dien Bien Phu illustrates this point.

How can the counterinsurgent capitalize best on his peculiar advantages and assets? In answering this question, Galula makes his main contribution, and an important one, to the evolving doctrine of counterinsurgency. He emphasizes that the beginning point for the counterinsurgent effort is not the insurgent but the people. If the insurgent must have popular support to survive, so must the counterinsurgent. How does the counterinsurgent go about gaining this support?

Here Galula's straightforward analysis, applied to a complex political problem, produces what strikes this reviewer as an oversimplified, if not misleading, solution. In any country, says Galula, whatever the insurgent's cause, there will be an active minority supporting the cause, a neutral majority and an active minority against the cause. Hence the task for the counterinsurgent is to identify the anti-insurgent minority and organize it in order to mobilize the population against the insurgent minority. This may or may not work depending, among other things, on the composition of the anti-insurgent minority. It is probable that, in a nation suffering from insurgency, the minority opposing the insurgency will include most of those whose abuses, mistakes or exercise of unearned privilege created the environment leading to the insurgency in the first place. As Galula himself points out, the counterinsurgent must attempt, where he can, to change conditions which permit the insurgency to thrive. It is not likely that he can do this effectively by enlisting those who undoubtedly retain a vested interest in a popularly discredited *status quo ante bellum.*

As a practical matter, the counterinsurgent, lacking other support, may have to utilize at least temporarily, these "counterrevolutionary" members of the pro-government minority. In fact, this group may even control the counterinsurgent effort, especially at the outset. In the long run, however, success in counterinsurgency is likely to depend, not on the identification and organization of an existing favorable minority, but on the development of a new minority, a new elite, supporting a countercause which can compete effectively with the insurgent for the loyalty and support of the people. This has been the essence of the problem in Vietnam and may well be the essence of the problem in future revolutionary wars.

Examination of the asymmetry between the counterinsurgent's military forces and those of the insurgent suggests the most effective ways for the counterinsurgent to employ his forces. Small commando-type operations against insurgent military units and bases have a distinct and important place

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in counterinsurgency operations, says Galula. He adds, however, that they "cannot represent the main form of the counterinsurgent's warfare." Rather, the major military effort must be centered on the primary target—the population.

Specifically Galula recommends that the main thrust of the military effort take the form of what is known, in Vietnam, as the "clear and hold operation." In such an operation, military forces enter into a selected area in almost saturation strength. They kill, capture or expel the identifiable enemy. Then, under the military protective umbrella, the real work of counterinsurgency — slow, tedious and laborious — begins.

Essentially this effort consists of the destruction of the enemy's political machinery and the erection, in its place, of comparable machinery by the counterinsurgent. Tasks involved are military, political, economic and psychological. Military units patrol the area, especially at night, and set ambushes for insurgents still inside the area or those attempting to return. Police and military intelligence operators detect and arrest members of the enemy's "shadow government," his intelligence informers and his sympathizers. Soldiers advise and assist the local populace in the building of defenses for hamlets and the recruiting and training of local self-defense forces. Government civic action teams, following on the heels of the military forces, enter the villages to assist in improving the local economy and the health and education of the people. Roads, wells and bridges are built or rebuilt. At the appropriate time, local elections are held for village and hamlet officials.

Throughout these activities, government propagandists assure the people that their government has arrived to stay, that the hated enemy has been driven off, and that a new life of security and prosperity awaits them. When an area is deemed "pacified," i.e., cleared of communist insurgents, the bulk of the military forces and the government civic action teams moves to another area to repeat the process.

The problem of determining laws or principles for counterinsurgency warfare is complicated, Galula maintains, by a paucity of experience in wars of this type. According to the author, there have been no more than a score of counterinsurgency wars, most of which have occurred since 1945. In so postulating, Galula agrees with many students of insurgency who feel that the counterinsurgency war, especially as it has developed (and will continue to develop) from communist-inspired "national wars of liberation," is essentially a new form of war. Its uniqueness has been obscured by association with many other forms of similar violence—guerrilla warfare, revolution or civil war—long familiar to mankind.

Guerrilla warfare, especially, resembles counterinsurgency warfare in its emphasis on hide-and-seek tactics by guerrillas seeking to avoid direct engagement with

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an enemy. Guerrilla forces, to exist, must have the support of the people among whom they fight. Guerrilla warfare is clearly an aspect of counterinsurgency warfare. But guerrilla warfare, as known in the pre-World War II period, focused primarily on the military contest between the guerrilla and the anti-guerrilla. The population provided a backdrop for this contest—not the goal. The people assisted the guerrilla or his opponent but did not become so involved *en masse* in the war that distinction between combatant and noncombatant became hopelessly blurred. By contrast, as Galula points out, in a nation afflicted with modern revolutionary war, "every citizen, whatever his wish, is or will be directly involved in it by the insurgent who needs him and cannot afford to let him remain neutral."

Identification of any problem must precede its solution. In *Counterinsurgency Warfare,* Galula has not only examined the complex problem of insurgency but has made a well-reasoned contribution to the development of a strategy and tactics which should assist the counterinsurgent in solving it.

Leadership and Ideology in the Sino-Soviet Rift*

by John J. Tierney

In intra-alliance diplomacy the elements of control and leadership are crucial. History teaches that alliances usually have had a single leader, the most powerful nation, in whose hands the diplomatic and military initiative rests. In the bipolar world of the first postwar decade, the overriding importance of nuclear weapons and technological supremacy—which only the superpowers could afford—reinforced this condition. However, in the second postwar decade the bipolar world has begun to come apart and the two major alliance systems are now rent with dissension. Each of the superpowers has been challenged within its respective bloc by a major ally, with the result that the formerly unquestioned leadership of Moscow and Washington—indeed, the future of the two alliances—is now very much in question.

The internal problems of these two alliance systems are already the subject of literally scores of books. Two of those treating the sources of conflict between Moscow and Peking are considered here. Although the authors deal with the same subject, they differ in their approach. David Floyd, the London *Daily Telegraph's* specialist on communist affairs, has written, in his *Mao Against Khrushchev,* a basic history of the relations between the Chinese and Soviet communists from 1949 to the July 1963 Moscow Conference. Edward Kardelj, whose book *Socialism and War* was recently translated from the Serbo-Croatian by Alex Brown, is Tito's second in command and the senior Vice President of the

**Mao Against Khrushchev.* By David Floyd. New York: Praeger, 1963. 444 pp. $7.95.

Socialism and War: A Survey of the Chinese Criticism of the Policy of Coexistence. By Edward Kardelj. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963. 238 pp. $4.50.

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Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia. It is no surprise that he addresses himself exclusively to the ideological aspects of the intrabloc struggle.

A student of communism for more than twenty years, Floyd provides an objective review and analysis of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Kardelj, on the other hand, is not an impartial observer. He argues against the Chinese position and presents his critique in the same ideological jargon found in the writings of all communists. Although the ideological factor cannot be ignored, the serious student of communist affairs must delve much deeper to unearth the real causes of the dispute.

Floyd immediately establishes the theme of his book by noting that historical and nationalistic differences are the fundamental causes of the present Sino-Soviet rift. After briefly tracing the contrasts in their historical development, he makes the point that "there was little in the later relations between the Russian and Chinese Communist Parties to suggest that ideology or a common faith in the teachings of Marx was stronger than the deep national and historical factors." (p. 9.)

The author takes up the familiar point that the Chinese communist victory of 1949 may not have been entirely welcomed by Stalin. Although it opened up tremendous prospects for the world-wide communist movement, it must also have posed serious problems for the Kremlin leader. That these problems materialized in the post-Stalin period would seem to confirm his alleged misgivings. The benefits to be derived from Mao's seizure of the Chinese mainland depended on Stalin's ability to retain leadership of the entire bloc. His failure in 1948 to keep Yugoslavia inside the fold was fresh in Stalin's memory when China a year later entered the communist camp—and the Soviet dictator was determined not to make the same mistake again. On the basis of a careful examination of Chinese - Soviet treaties and documents, Floyd concludes that the relations between Mao Tse-tung and Stalin were cordial and unselfish only on the surface. The Kremlin sought to induce Mao to accept Soviet authority by granting him certain political concessions such as recognition of the "special" Chinese status in the bloc and acquiescence in full Chinese internal autonomy.

Upon the death of the Soviet dictator, Floyd continues, the era of "relaxed tensions" as a tactic of Soviet foreign policy was applied not only to the capitalist camp but to intrabloc diplomacy as well. Unsure of their status as rulers at home and cautious in their approach to foreign problems, the new men in the Kremlin were above all anxious to improve relations with their Chinese ally. Aid to China was increased and China's prestige within the camp was enhanced. But the post-Stalin rapport was merely a honeymoon and, like most marriages between incompatible partners, could not withstand the test of time. The dormant political question of intrabloc au-

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thority eventually emerged as the dominant issue facing Mao and Khrushchev. By 1956 Chinese policies, as Floyd puts it, "can be seen to have owed as much, if not more, to Chinese nationalist ambitions as they did to Marxism, and there was certainly no indication that they were intending to become obedient members of a Communist camp run by the Russians." (p. 31.)

By 1958 Khrushchev realized that his efforts to retain unquestioned authority in the bloc had failed. The Chinese by that time had begun to build their communes, through which they expected "to achieve communism" in the space of a few years. In Floyd's view, this represented a serious challenge to Soviet primacy. After less than ten years of "building socialism," Peking claimed to be within sight of communism, while the Soviets, after forty years of industrial development, were still far from their goal. If the Chinese could "achieve communism," they would no longer have to recognize the USSR as the dominant partner and would be entitled to an equal voice in communist councils. Khrushchev, furious at this display of Chinese effrontery, declared in a 1959 speech that those who advocated communes "had a poor idea of what Communism is and how it is to be built."

The deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations soon became evident to all within the camp and to those in the West able to interpret the "battle of the quotations" issued in Moscow and Peking. The main ideological dispute centered on the role of violence in the transformation of capitalist countries into "socialist states." Kardelj's treatment of this problem is primarily a refutation of the Chinese viewpoint that war is inevitable and at the same time essential to the victory of the socialist nations over the capitalist bloc. By quoting extensively from the Marxist-Leninist classics, he argues convincingly for the renunciation of war as a "socialist" policy and for the pursuit of peaceful competition as the most effective means of doing the enemy in. War, he warns, will bring devastation to the socialist camp, hamper the spread of revolution, and abolish all communist successes recorded so far. The central theme of his argument is that the forces of socialism have achieved such dramatic success over the past twenty years that they can now exert sufficient influence over the internal economic and political development of the capitalist states as to ensure the latter's eventual decay and capitulation.

But this dispute between Yugoslav (and Soviet) and Chinese theoreticians on war is only one aspect of the Sino-Soviet conflict. As Floyd points out, the writings of Marx and Lenin are so elaborate and contradictory that they supply sufficient ammunition for both sides in the ideological battle; various of their statements can be construed as supporting coexistence, others as demanding war and revolution. The ideological dispute can be rendered meaningful only if seen in its true light: as a con-

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venient mask to hide the real causes of the split, namely, conflicting national interests and the struggle for leadership within the communist bloc. Opinions vary, of course, as to the central cause of the split. Some maintain that divergent national interests and separate views on bloc strategy toward the noncommunist world are the *causes* and the leadership struggle is the *effect*. But Floyd argues persuasively that the question of bloc leadership is the primary cause.

The debate over who is more "peaceful" and who is more "warlike" in the communist bloc is sometimes confusing. When the Soviets placed missiles on Cuba, the Chinese denounced this warlike act as "adventurism." Mao has spoken often of having respect for the enemy in "tactical" terms and thus of the need to avoid battle with the superior enemy; on more than one occasion the Chinese have subscribed formally to the Khrushchev view that war can be prevented.

Moscow, on the other hand, contributes to the confusion by proclaiming its readiness to deliver a "crushing blow" to any aggressor and to lend every kind of support to "wars of national liberation." Indeed, from an examination of Chinese and Soviet policies in the post-Stalin period, the conclusion could be drawn that the Chinese have as much respect for U.S. nuclear power as do the Soviets—if not more. After all, Mao Tse-tung is the author of the protracted conflict thesis, whose main principle is that the final blow should not be delivered until the superior enemy is rendered inferior to the revolutionary forces.

In his concluding chapter, entitled "Two Romes?," Floyd analyzes the wide disparities between the Chinese and Soviet societies as they both enter the mid-1960's. In three areas the Chinese are markedly inferior: Diplomatically they are isolated, while the Soviets are almost universally respected and are permanent members of the UN Security Council. Economically China is still a "have-not" nation while the USSR is an industrial giant. Militarily the Soviet Union is the second most powerful nation while China remains years away from building a significant nuclear arsenal and delivery system. These disparities might discourage a normal nation from aspiring to replace the powerful Soviet Union as the leader of the communist bloc — but not China. They have simply forced the Chinese leaders to turn to ideological and personal attacks against the Kremlin's leaders in order to substantiate their claim to bloc leadership.

The Floyd book is to be recommended on three counts. First, the concise and flowing historical review provides a proper setting for an understanding of the present conflict. Second, the interpretation of the fundamental causes of the conflict is logical and convincing—although this does not assure its acceptance everywhere. Third, the book includes the text of the most important treaties and documents

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in Soviet-Chinese relations since 1917, with emphasis on the post-Stalin period.

Kardelj's Titoist defense of peaceful coexistence, in which he actually sides with Moscow against Peking, is of less significance to an understanding of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Nevertheless, it gives the reader an insight into the communist mind and its ability to adapt Marxist-Leninist classics to current political-military problems. While reading Kardelj one should keep in mind Floyd's conclusion: "the threat to Russian leadership . . . is at the center of the Sino-Soviet dispute." (p. 203.)

The Mexican Renaissance*

by Frank Munk

The European and Japanese miracles of postwar recovery and renaissance may in the not-too-distant future be approximated, and perhaps surpassed, by the performance of our neighbor to the south. Mexico can no longer be regarded as an underdeveloped country. Even a casual visitor cannot fail to be impressed by the efficient and steady Mexican government, a dynamic and growing economy with a stable currency and fairly stable prices, and the general competence of the élite which runs the country.

Serious writers on Latin American affairs are now recording this encouraging story of progress in Mexico. Of the five books reviewed here, only one is devoted to "the making of modern Mexico" and that one is written by a *Yanqui;* the other authors are all Mexicans, ranging across the political spectrum from left to right. Yet they all have something in common: they are constructive, generally optimistic and favorable toward the present Mexican regime.

Brandenburg's book is one of the most penetrating and comprehensive accounts of the history and current developments and trends in Mexico. It is carefully documented, written in a manner to satisfy both layman and scholar, and abounds in interesting sidelights and anecdotes. The author points out that revolution, Mexican style, may be the only alternative in Latin America to communist-style revolutions, and warns that "we must present acceptable alternatives to Marxism-Leninism—and, by itself, the example of the United States has proven inapplicable."

Mexico is ruled by an élite which Brandenburg calls "The Family." He provides a detailed analysis of the Family, its inner council, the approximately 200 spokesmen who constitute the second layer of power, and the Partido Revolu-

**The Making of Modern Mexico.* By Frank R. Brandenburg. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 379 pp. $8.95.

Viabilidad Económica de América Latina. By Victor L. Urquidi. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1963. 203 pp. n.p. Also, in English, *The Challenge of Economic Development in Latin America.* New York: Praeger, 1964. 223 pp. $6.00.

Free Trade and Economic Integration in Latin America. By Victor L. Urquidi. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964. 190 pp. $3.75.

Los Subamericanos. By Victor Alba. Mexico: Costa-Amic, 1964. 342 pp. n.p.

Entrevistas y Pláticas. By Ramón Beteta. Mexico: Renovación, 1961. 449 pp. n.p.

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cionario Institucional (PRI), the official party, which he considers as the third level. He describes the eleven men who have risen to the leadership of the Revolutionary Family, beginning with Madero in 1910 and ending with López Mateos (who has been replaced by Díaz Ordaz), as well as the changing policies and personnel of each administration. Convinced that traditional democratic institutions are unlikely to be introduced in Mexico, the author concludes that the present leadership plans to retain in the presidential office a tolerant, powerful chief executive, a "liberal Machiavellian."

Although Brandenburg defines the system as liberal authoritarianism, he is quick to defend the governmental structure of Mexico as a powerful factor in its economic progress and political order, a model for other Ibero-American countries. Professor Frank Tannenbaum, who wrote the introduction, is considerably less in awe of the omnipotent presidency: "The candidate for the succession, *El Tapado,* remains covered until he is revealed by the magic touch of the president." It is his feeling that "Dr. Brandenburg is kinder to the political machinery than he need be."

Victor Urquidi, one of Mexico's most prominent economists, has written a valuable book on economic development and its problems. Optimistic about the prospects for economic growth in Latin America, he points to the progress already made in spite of unfavorable export conditions and lack of progress toward commodity price stabilization and supply-demand adjustment, and concludes that the economy of Latin America is quite viable, if proper policies are adopted. Not everyone will agree with his position condoning, if not approving, inflation as preferable to price stability with stagnation, but all will profit by his balanced examination of the pros and cons of foreign investment, the role of state action and private enterprise, and the cost of social reform (which he regards as indispensable). He advocates the integration of the Latin American economies, speaks favorably of the Latin American Free Trade Association, and believes the Alliance for Progress has a good chance of succeeding, if we have enough patience.

Urquidi's other book, *Free Trade and Economic Integration in Latin America,* focuses on the trend in Latin America toward common markets. Two such attempts are now under way, one (the Latin American Free Trade Association, LAFTA) comprising the more developed Latin American countries, the other composed of four countries in Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras). Unlike the latter plan, LAFTA seems to be a going concern: it has secured a reduction of tariffs by as much as 40 per cent, although these cuts apply to specific items unlike the across-the-board cuts of the European Economic Community. It is noteworthy that Mexico has been one of the chief sponsors of LAFTA and is work-

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ing hard to promote further liberalization of trade.

Victor Alba, author of *Los Subamericanos* and editor of the excellent Mexican review *Panoramas*, was born in Barcelona and remains an active participant in the affairs of the Spanish socialists. Drawing upon a collection of articles and essays written during the last twenty years, he offers a different interpretation of Latin American trends. Like Urquidi, Alba favors greater unity among Ibero-Americans, but he asserts that vertical integration is even more urgent than horizontal integration. He defines two classes in Latin America: the "Latin-Americans" and the "unthinkables," the submerged masses, frequently Indian, a kind of sub-proletariat which does not really belong to modern society. He finds the new urban middle class bent on industrialization, nationalistic (in particular, protectionist and "anti-norteamericanismo"), supporters of statism rather than private enterprise, and frequently receptive to communist propaganda. He regards the Alliance for Progress as a sincere attempt by the United States to substitute bourgeois revolutions for Marxist revolutions. Although he recognizes the obstacles in the way of balanced economic development, he is generally optimistic about its prospects and convinced that democratic institutions and methods will do the job better in the long run. His voice is particularly valuable because it comes from the left.

The last book reviewed here comes from the other side of the Revolutionary Family. Its author, Ramón Beteta, is a member of the inner circle of former President Miguel Alemán (1946-52), whom many regarded as a "rightist." A former Minister of Finance in Alemán's administration, Beteta now directs some of the country's most important newspapers. His book, a collection of television lectures and interviews, provides many absorbing glimpses behind the official façade of the regime and insights into the thinking of responsible Mexicans. On the subject of the Mexican attitude toward communism, Beteta proudly states that Mexicans are not afraid of communism because the Mexican revolution antedates the Soviet revolution and is now a going concern, and because Mexicans will not tolerate any kind of foreign intervention, whether Soviet or American.

The central issue in all these books is the Mexican Revolution—a mature revolution by all accounts, behaving sometimes as no revolution at all, cooperating when necessary or expedient with foreign capitalists, tolerant though critical of Castro, guarantor of political stability and agent of dynamic industrialization. The Mexican Revolution is truly a unique phenomenon in the Americas and worthy of comparison to the postwar renaissance of Western Europe and Japan.

The Uncertain Finances of the United Nations*

by Franz B. Gross

For many years scholars have felt the need for an adequate study

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of the financial procedures and problems of international organizations. A new study, *Financing the United Nations System,* written by Professor John J. Stoessinger and his associates under the sponsorship of The Brookings Institution, succeeds in filling this gap. The authors review the methods and difficulties of financing the League of Nations and administrative units such as the Postal Union, but devote the major part of the book to a broad survey of UN financial problems up to the end of 1963.

Professor Inis L. Claude, who drafted the first chapter, introduces the key issue: the priority of political interests over financial considerations. He suggests that "Members of the United Nations are not really divisible into those that oppose and those that favor an executive role for international agencies. Those that might be listed in the former group oppose United Nations operations *unless* control arrangements acceptable to themselves are made; those that might be listed in the latter group favor United Nations operations *only* if control arrangements acceptable to themselves are made." On this desire for control over UN operations the theory of a "financial veto" is based. This, in short, is the capability of major states, if outvoted in the Security Council or General Assembly, to obstruct the activities of the UN by refusing to pay their contributions.

Although most states do not command sufficient resources to influence UN decisions by their threat of financial dissent, the authors state that the Soviet Union "has indicated clearly that it values the power of financial deprivation as a partial compensation for the weakness of its formal voting capacity in the General Assembly." The United States, on the other hand, is more concerned about the UN's excessive financial dependence on U.S. contributions and its effect on the organization.

The present deadlock over finances, then, is a political rather than a financial problem. Stoessinger asserts that "indeed, the political aspects of United Nations financing are so all pervasive that there is really no such thing as an exclusive fiscal question." The refusal of the major powers to support peace-keeping operations which they believe are contrary to their own national interests is the major obstacle to financial solvency.

Stoessinger, with the assistance of Professors Norman J. Padelford of M.I.T. and Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard, traces the history of the financing of international bodies up to 1945. He describes the different methods by which international organs have raised funds—from voluntary contributions of the host states, to unit systems (requiring contributions from states according to one of seven classes to which they were assigned), and after 1945 to a cost system based on the per capita GNP of member-states. Stoessinger examines such special arrangements as the "minimum contributions"

**Financing the United Nations System.* By John J. Stoessinger and Associates. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964. 348 pp. $6.75.

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from states whose GNP's are so small that they are assessed an amount equal to only 0.04 per cent of the regular budget, and the "maximum contribution" (usually just over 30 per cent of various UN programs) paid by the United States, and finds them on the whole satisfactory.

Stoessinger, however, is critical of many proposals for meeting those expenses of the organization which go beyond the regular administrative budget, i.e., those expenses needed for peace-keeping operations. These expenses could become substantial burdens for smaller states: since the percentage of their contribution remains the same, an increase in the overall assessments would bite more deeply into their limited national resources. Some suggestions have been made therefore to establish something resembling a progressive income-tax for peace-keeping operations, increasing the share of the developed states by a large amount and that of smaller states only slightly. It has also been suggested that smaller states should receive rebates made up by the voluntary contributions of larger states. Stoessinger finds most of these suggestions unrealistic and warns that any attempt to introduce an immediate far-reaching change, deviating from the principle of GNP, is unlikely to win sufficient support.

The principal author then turns his search for sources of revenue to the private sector and income-producing activities of the UN. He points out that the tremendous amount of private support given to the UN since its founding is rarely appreciated. The very establishment of the UN in New York depended upon a gift from the Rockefellers, and social and economic projects such as UNICEF receive substantial income from private sources. However, all private contributions together represent only a small percentage of the regular assessment paid by member-states.

Stoessinger searches everywhere for income-producing activities for the UN. He examines present income sources, such as guided tours and UN stamps, to determine which UN services could be expanded into major sources of income. Then he takes up various proposals, such as a surcharge on mail and taxes on canals and air and sea traffic, but these are dismissed on grounds that they would surely provoke widespread popular resentment. The authors even search for revenue sources in the exploration of Antarctica and outer space and the exploitation of ocean resources, and admit that only the latter suggestion may have some potential.

It is regrettable that the authors did not devote more effort to the attempt to find an acceptable principle or procedure which would guarantee the United Nations a regular income while providing flexibility for emergency needs in the areas of peace-keeping and security. Their most valuable proposal in this regard is the creation of an emergency fund into which some six million dollars would be placed annually for the use of the

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General Assembly. A search for relatively small sources of revenue to provide for this fund would have been a useful addition to this study. The accumulation of, say, ten million dollars a year for five years would have given the UN sufficient funds to carry out a one-year peace-keeping operation in Cyprus, Yemen or Indonesia without risking any "financial veto." The big problem, which remains unsolved, is where can the UN obtain the funds for this emergency budget?

A guaranteed source of income for minor peace-keeping tasks is necessary to prevent the breakdown of the UN system. The UN's financial crisis has placed the world body at the crossroads: it can become a group of debating diplomats or a financially solvent organization prepared to intervene to preserve peace and security. Stoessinger believes that the UN is moving "in the direction of the dynamic evolutionary conception of international organization." However, a pessimist would be justified in warning that there is no substitute for the prompt payment of assessments; delinquency by some states for whatever reasons will lead to widespread delinquency, and in the end a few countries, in particular the United States, will be left to foot the major share of the expenses.

The need for an effective world organization can hardly be denied, and member-states, acting in their own interests, would be well-advised to preserve the United Nations as an effective instrument for peace and a safety-valve in case of conflict. Professor Stoessinger is correct when he says that "realism and idealism are needed in equal measure if the financial crisis is to be surmounted and if the United Nations is to move towards a better world of international order."

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Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Atlantic Crisis: American Diplomacy Confronts a Resurgent Europe. By Robert Kleiman. New York: Norton, 1964. 158 pp. $2.95.

Mr. Kleiman, a member of the Editorial Board of the *New York Times,* thoughtfully reviews trans-Atlantic diplomacy from 1960 to January 1964. He considers the reasons for De Gaulle's veto of the British application for membership in the EEC; discusses the bilateral relationships of the three leading Atlantic powers, Britain-France, France-U.S. and U.S.-Britain; examines the Nassau agreement and British policy "errors"; and recommends new approaches for a closer and more enduring Atlantic Partnership.

Barren Victories: Versailles to Suez. The Failure of the Western Alliance, 1918-1956. By Basil Collier. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1964. 302 pp. $4.95.

An outspoken critique of the divergent and short-sighted foreign policies of the United States and Great Britain from the end of World War I to the Suez disaster of 1956. Military historian and biographer, Mr. Collier touches on such events as Locarno, Japanese aggression in the Far East, Munich, wartime military decisions and diplomacy, and the Iranian, Berlin and Suez crises in the postwar period.

Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. By Ernest B. Haas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. 595 pp. $11.50.

Professor Haas develops propositions about the relationship between integration, systems theory, and functional analysis in an effort to present a theory of international organization. As a case study for the application of hypotheses set forth in this volume, the author examines in detail the operation of the International Labor Organization. Included are chapters which assess the utility of functionalism in the process of integration at the international level, as well as a statement of problems for further study in the quest for theory in international relations.

Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West. Edited by Arnold Wolfers. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 242 pp. $6.00 ($2.45 paper).

In this collection of nine papers presented to the European-American Colloquium at the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research in May 1964, the

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authors seek to determine the nature of the so-called Soviet-American *détente*, the reasons behind recent changes in Soviet policies, and the impact which a *détente* might have upon Central Europe and upon future Soviet and Western behavior.

The Dimensions of Diplomacy. Edited by E. A. J. Johnson. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 135 pp. $3.95.

Each of the six essays in this short volume is addressed to a different aspect of modern diplomacy in an attempt to ascertain whether the quality of diplomacy in the 1960's is adequate for its tasks and whether the forms of diplomacy are properly structured. Contributors are McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, W. W. Rostow, James R. Killian, Jr., Adolph A. Berle and Livingston Merchant.

Diplomacy. (Third edition.) By Harold Nicholson. New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Book, 1964. 151 pp. $1.50 (paper).

This brief text on the conduct of diplomacy, first published in 1939, was updated in 1949 to take account of new practices and reforms growing out of the wartime period. The present edition takes note of the emergence of an Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations and its impact on international diplomacy.

International Relations. By Joseph Frankel. New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Book, 1964. 227 pp. $1.50 (paper).

A brief introduction to the field of international relations by a Professor of Politics at the University of Southampton, England. Professor Frankel examines such subjects as states as units of international society, the making of foreign policy, the foreign policies of major powers, the elements of national power, instruments and techniques of state interaction, some major current international problems, and international organization.

Labor and Management in Industrial Society. By Clark Kerr. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1964. 372 pp. $1.45 (paper).

A collection of thirteen essays, originally published between 1953 and 1961, by the President of the University of California. The focus is on four problems: individual freedom in industry, industrial peace, progress in a highly-institutionalized society, and industrialism in the world of the future.

The Meaning of the Twentieth Century: The Great Transition. By Kenneth Boulding. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 199 pp. $4.50.

The author assesses the impact of science, technology and ideology upon modern civilization, and proposes a strategy for adapting existing forms of political organization to the perceived needs of tomorrow's world.

Natural Resources and International Development. Edited by Marion Clawson. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 462 pp. $7.50.

A collection of ten essays presented at the 1963 Forum of Resources for the Future, Inc. Such topics as resource and commodity problems in different areas of the world, and the potentialities and hazards of foreign investment for resource development are discussed.

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Neutralism and Disengagement. Edited by Paul F. Power. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1964. 169 pp. n.p. (paper).

This anthology on neutralism and disengagement presents the views of past and present statesmen such as V. K. Krishna Menon, Josip Tito, Nikita Khrushchev, Chou En-lai, John Foster Dulles and John F. Kennedy, and those of scholars such as Robert Scalapino, Norman D. Palmer and H. Stuart Hughes.

Politics and Power: A Text in International Law. By Urban G. Whitaker, Jr. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 646 pp. $8.95.

Designed as an undergraduate text in international law, this volume attempts to relate international law and international politics: "to demonstrate that international law performs a vital political function, and that international politics serves as a cradle for the growth of the law rather than as a place of confinement for it." Cases and documents have been integrated with the author's commentary.

II. United States

The Critical Decade: An Economic Policy for America and the Free World. By Henry S. Reuss. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 227 pp. $5.50.

Congressman Reuss (D., Wisc.) questions the economic and political philosophies which have influenced U.S. foreign policy since World War II, and contends that domestic and foreign policies and programs are too often planned and executed in isolation from each other. He argues that there will be no improvement in this respect until Congress is reformed so that it can solve problems rather than postpone them.

A History of Presidential Elections. By Eugene H. Roseboom. New York: Macmillan, 1964. 600 pp. $10.00.

A popular history of the major issues and personalities of the quadrennial American presidential elections, first published in 1957 and updated by this edition to cover the 1960 elections.

Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration. By Adrienne Koch. New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Book, 1964. 294 pp. $1.85 (paper).

A systematic exploration of the political theory jointly professed by Jefferson and Madison. The author, Professor of History and Chairman of American Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, examines their characteristic differences as well as their basic agreement about political values and concludes that "the political philosophy known simply as 'Jeffersonian' is actually an amalgam of ideas, which owes very much to James Madison."

A Nation of Immigrants. By John F. Kennedy. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 111 pp. $.95 (paper).

In a study published posthumously, President Kennedy traces the history of immigration from pre-revolutionary times to the influx of refugees into the United States after World War II. The study contains an assessment of the immigrant contribution to American life as well as President Kennedy's evaluation of United States immigration policy.

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The President as World Leader. By Sidney Warren. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1964. 480 pp. $6.95.

The author analyzes the policies, the achievements and failures of American presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to John F. Kennedy. The twentieth century brought new powers to the American chief executive as an international leader; as the chief foreign policy maker his qualities and resources play a significant role in determining whether or not national objectives will be achieved. Mr. Warren has examined such topics as the social backgrounds of the presidents, their personalities, training, constitutional views of the office, relations with Congress, ability to influence public opinion and political skill. The final section sets forth those qualities the author feels most necessary for an American president today.

The Revolution in American Foreign Policy: Its Global Range. By William G. Carleton. New York: Random House, 1963. 530 pp. $6.95.

A survey of the global crisis since 1945 and the ways in which U.S. statesmen have sought to deal with it. Combining narrative with interpretation and analysis, Professor Carleton examines the "revolution" in U.S. foreign policy since 1945; the various revolutionary developments of the postwar world; the question as to whether America was prepared for world leadership; the period of attempted cooperation with the Soviet Union, 1945-47; the policy of containment; the post-Stalin thaw; the world of the neutrals; the developing rifts within the two power blocs; and the functions and evolution of the United Nations.

III. Western Europe

The Americanization of Europe. By Edward A. McCreary. New York: Doubleday, 1964. 295 pp. $5.50.

The author, a member of the editorial staff of *Business Week,* presents a journalistic account of the successes and failures of Americans and American business firms in the Common Market countries.

Britain in the Sixties: The Other England. By Geoffrey Moorhouse. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 190 pp. $1.25.

Basing his conclusions upon extensive travel and interviews, the author examines the life, countryside, and unique characteristics of such regions in Great Britain as the West Country, the West Midlands, the East Country, Lancashire, Yorkshire and the North of England. The study draws comparisons and presents contrasts between the rapidly expanding region around London and the less dynamic areas to the North and West.

The Burden of Guilt: A Short History of Germany 1914-1945. By Hannah Vogt; translated by Herbert Strauss. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 318 pp. $6.00.

Originally published in Germany for the enlightenment of the postwar generation, this study assesses the nature of German responsibility for the two world wars and traces the rise of Nazism. The volume, a German critique of the Nazi era, contains chapters which evaluate the causes for the failure of the Weimar Republic, describe the fate of Jews in the Third Reich, and condemn Hitler's political and military leadership.

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Churchill and Ireland. By Mary C. Bromage. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964. 222 pp. $5.00.

The author traces the evolution of Sir Winston Churchill's attitudes toward Ireland from his childhood to his later political career. By examining Churchill's views toward such questions as Home Rule, Dominion status, and Irish neutrality during World War II, Professor Bromage attempts to show how he reached critical decisions as Prime Minister.

Communism and the French Intellectuals, 1914-1960. By David Caute. New York: Macmillan, 1964. 413 pp. $10.00.

In an examination of the impact of communism upon the French Left, the author traces the evolution of Communist Party policies and attitudes toward intellectuals and describes the behavioral patterns of French intellectuals who have committed themselves to communist ideology. The study assesses the implications for the French communist or pro-communist intellectual of improving economic and social conditions in France and the vacillating policies of the Soviet Union. Included are case histories of Andre Gide, Andre Malraux and Jean-Paul Sartre.

Interest Groups in Italian Politics. By Joseph La Palombara. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 452 pp. $8.95.

This is an examination of the structures and functions of such Italian political interest groups as the General Confederation of Italian Industry, Italian Catholic Action, the Christian Democrats, the Italian Liberal Party, the Italian Republican Party and the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement.

The Mask of Merlin: A Critical Biography of David Lloyd George. By Donald McCormick. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. 343 pp. $6.00.

In a reappraisal of the career of Britain's last Liberal prime minister, the author examines the childhood of Lloyd George in Wales, as well as his activities as a Welsh nationalist Member of Parliament and, later, as Chancellor of the Exchequer and wartime leader. The study, drawing upon new documentary sources and scores of interviews, yields new insights into Lloyd George's public and private life, his attitudes toward the allies and the Bolshevik Revolution, his intrigues with industrialists and party leaders in Britain, and his views regarding the coming of World War II.

Nazi Propaganda. By Z. A. B. Zeman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 226 pp. $7.00.

The author examines Nazi propaganda during the 1920's as well as during the years of Hitler's dictatorship. Included are chapters on the use of propaganda in indoctrinating the German masses and influencing foreign audiences, and its role in such Nazi gambits as the annexation of Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Professor Zeman has drawn upon such sources as National Socialist publications, autobiographies, diaries, newspapers and periodicals in the Wiener Library collection of materials on the Nazi era.

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Purpose in Politics: Britain's Role in the Post-Colonial World. By Harold Wilson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964. 270 pp. $4.95.

Britain's new prime minister sets forth his views over the past seven years on key problems confronting the Labour Party and the British electorate. Included are chapters which present Wilson's thoughts on economic policy, monetary questions and taxation, the Common Market, foreign relations, defense and the future of British socialism.

The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria. By Peter G. J. Pulzer. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964. 364 pp. $5.95 ($2.65 paper).

The author traces the development of anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria from the middle of the nineteenth century to the end of World War I. The study includes chapters which examine liberalism and conservatism in modern German thought as well as the status of Jews in the political and economic structure of the countries under consideration. In an epilogue Dr. Pulzer assesses the nature of anti-Semitism in the Third Reich on the eve of the Second World War.

Why Liberal? By Harry Cowie. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 155 pp. $.65.

A member of the research department of Britain's Liberal Party examines the principles of his party as well as its policies for modernizing government, achieving economic growth, reshaping transport, building new homes, and broadening educational opportunities. The study contains chapters which set forth the Liberal Party's conception of Britain's role in East-West relations and in the less developed areas.

IV. Communist Bloc

Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1948. By Paul E. Zinner. New York: Praeger, 1963. 264 pp. $6.50.

In this case study of the seizure of power by minority communist parties, Professor Zinner discusses the political, military and socio-economic setting in postwar Czechoslovakia; the policy and leadership of the Communist Party; the subversion and conquest of political institutions; the communist use of trade unions, economic levers and propaganda; and the immediate events leading to the seizure of power in February 1948. In the opening chapters, the author briefly reviews the history of the Czech Communist Party and developments in Czechoslovakia during World War II.

Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence. Edited by Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 467 pp. $10.00.

This important volume considers how the communists have utilized revolutionary movements in the past, what they have learned from their experience, and how they view the prospects for future revolutions in the underdeveloped world. Subjects treated include revolution, modernization and communism; the foundations of communist revolutionary doctrine; communist revolutionary movements in Eastern Europe, Finland, Southeast Asia and Korea; and evolving communist strategies in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

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Contemporary Communism: Theory and Practice. Edited by Howard R. Swearer and Richard P. Longaker. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1963. 405 pp. n.p. (paper).

A compilation of readings selected from communist documents and statements and analytical essays by Western sovietologists. Subjects covered include Marxist-Leninist theory; the appeal of communist ideology; the political, economic and social structure of the USSR; Soviet foreign policy; communism in China; and the relation between communism and nationalism throughout the world.

Leadership in Communist China. By John Wilson Lewis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963. 305 pp. $5.00.

A study of leadership doctrines and techniques by which the Communist Party rules China. The author examines many formal organizations which are used to guide the populace into "proper" actions and thoughts; the party member and cadre training program; the principal concepts of the "mass line" and democratic centralism; the structure of the Party; and the lessons gained from the commune experiment of 1958-1962.

Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary. By Stefan T. Possony. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964. 418 pp. $7.95.

A comprehensive study of Lenin as a thinker who combined Marx with the Russian revolutionary tradition and with Machiavelli and Clausewitz; as a political boss who invented new political techniques and organizations and set in motion a world-wide totalitarian movement; and as a strategist who introduced novel combinations of violent and non-violent combat and conceived the multi-dimensional warfare of the modern age. Dr. Possony concludes that Lenin's life was dedicated "to practicing the maxims of expediency." Destruction was his outstanding achievement; his constructive efforts were failures. "His failure proved the incompatibility of immoral methods with 'noble' results. Lenin's heirs were faithful to the means, lost sight of original purposes, and ended by worshipping dictatorship for its own sake. . . . It is a pity that Lenin never studied the dialectics of ethics and political morality. If he had done so, this born leader might have prodded mankind forward on the road to progress."

The Life of Lenin. By Louis Fischer. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 703 pp. $10.00.

An impressive biography of Lenin and description of the events leading to and following upon the Russian revolution of 1917. Mr. Fischer shows how Lenin's incredible strength of will, organizational skills and total devotion to the goal of revolution enabled him to surmount domestic dissension and disorder, war and foreign intervention, and to forge the instrument of revolution, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Mass Persuasion in Communist China. By Frederick T. C. Yu. New York: Praeger, 1964. 186 pp. $5.00.

An exploratory study, based almost entirely on Chinese communist publications, of the manner in which mass persuasion is conceived, developed and manipulated by the Peking regime. There are individual chapters on the role and nature of mass persuasion; theory, policy and organization; and the press, radio, posters, film, art and literature.

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The Realities of World Communism. Edited by William Petersen. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963. 222 pp. $2.25 (paper).

A survey of theory and practice and of continuity and change in world communism in the 1960's. Bertram D. Wolfe, William Petersen, Gregory Grossman and Paul E. Zinner write on the Soviet Union; Paul Kecskemeti on the East European satellites; Robert A. Scalapino on Communist China; John Hutchinson on communism and trade unions; and Robert Alexander on Latin America.

The Soviet Regime: Communism in Practice. (Fourth edition.) By W. W. Kulski. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963. 444 pp. $8.00 ($3.95 paper).

In this thoroughly revised edition of a text first published in 1954, the author offers a tentative appraisal of Soviet government and society ten years after Stalin. He devotes chapters to such topics as the Party and the West; Russian nationalism; the State and the Party; courts, civic duties, family and youth; workers' responsibilities; wages, salaries, bonuses and social stratification; trade unions and labor disputes; and collective farms and the state.

Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the Russian Revolution, 1900-1930. By Theodore H. Von Laue. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1964. 242 pp. $3.95 (paper).

The author endeavors to explain the emergence of Soviet communism "as an integral part of European and global history, treating it . . . as a problem of comparative studies, not as an isolated phenomenon to be explained largely from Russian conditions alone." Professor Von Laue considers the basic significance of the Russian revolution to be the struggle for political and economic modernization and the Soviet determination to replace the West as the model for the emerging nations.

With God in Russia. By Walter J. Ciszek, S.J. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 302 pp. $5.95.

The autobiography of a Jesuit priest who spent 23 years in prisons and labor camps in Siberia as a "Vatican spy."

V. Middle East and Africa

African Socialism. Edited by William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. 313 pp. $6.75.

Eleven essays by authorities on contemporary Africa who examine the general characteristics of African socialism and present case studies of the different national forms of socialism in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Senegal and Tanganyika. The appendix contains statements on socialism by leading African statesmen.

Eastern Arabian Frontiers. By J. B. Kelly. New York: Praeger, 1964. 319 pp. $8.50.

Dr. Kelly traces the history of the conflicts between Saudi Arabia, which seeks to dominate the Arabian peninsula, and the littoral states, striving to remain unabsorbed, from the 19th century to the present.

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Federalism and the New Nations of Africa. Edited by David P. Currie. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. 440 pp. $8.50.

Prepared for a symposium held at the University of Chicago Law School, these papers are concerned with the immense challenge of establishing sound government in the emerging nations of Africa. The contributors examine such topics as the historical background of these nations, the possible adaptation and development of federalism, and the relevance to new nations of the political and economic experience of older countries. Several papers discuss the impact of a division of authority between central and provincial governments upon economic advancement, the protection of human rights, and international legal relations. The commentary of other experts on these papers is also included.

The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development. By Richard D. Robinson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 367 pp. $5.95.

An interpretation and analysis of Turkish national development from the advent of the First Turkish Republic in 1923 to its demise in 1960 when the military assumed power. The author suggests "that the evolution of modern Turkey is an experimental pilot run of accelerated development under western-oriented leadership without recourse to the harsher methods of the totalitarian state." He feels that, from the liberal political point of view, the experiment has thus far not been a success. "If . . . the Turkish experiment in democracy and development fails, those committed to liberal political concepts are surely in trouble elsewhere."

A History of Africa South of the Sahara. By Donald L. Wiedner. New York: Random House, Vintage Book, 1964. 578 pp. $2.75 (paper).

Written for the layman, this history of sub-Saharan Africa traces the impact of external forces upon the cultures and peoples of the continent. Nearly three-fourths of the study is devoted to the developments of the last 100 years and the book contains 35 informative maps and an extensive bibliography.

The Geography of Modern Africa. By William A. Hance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. 653 pp. $12.00.

Professor Hance focuses upon two important aspects of the African economic scene: the present state of economic development and the potentialities for development in the years ahead. The physical, economic, democratic and political features of the continent are examined to determine their relationship to the development process. Also included are more than one hundred maps, and fifty tables and charts.

The New Liberia: A Historical and Political Survey. By Lawrence A. Marinelli. New York: Praeger, 1964. 244 pp. $5.95.

Mr. Marinelli presents an historical, economic and political survey of Liberia's growth under President Tubman. Of particular value are the appendices which include important documents on the history and development of Liberia—the Constitution of the Republic, the Labour Agreement of 1928, major addresses of President Tubman and correspondence concerning the Sanniquellie Conference.

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Sanctions Against South Africa. Edited by Ronald Segal. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 272 pp. $1.25.

A collection of papers presented at the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa, convened in London in April 1964 and sponsored by foes of the policy of apartheid from the United States and Britain as well as African states. The symposium contains studies on the legal, strategic, economic and political implications—for the West as well as Africa—of sanctions against the Verwoerd regime.

South Africa: Crisis for the West. By Colin and Margaret Legum. New York: Praeger, 1964. 332 pp. $6.95.

After examining the origins of the South African crisis and describing the country's power structure as well as the moods of its various racial and linguistic communities, the authors conclude that the nation's racial crisis cannot be resolved without international intervention—preferably through the United Nations. Should the United Nations fail to solve the problem, the likely result will be intervention by other states and a racial war in Africa.

VI. East Asia

Atlas of South-East Asia. Introduction by D. G. E. Hall. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964. 102 pp. $10.00.

This atlas is a necessary tool for any serious student of Southeast Asia. Its contents include a 25-page introduction (including many photographs) to the geography of the area; 60 pages of maps on the political divisions, topography, geology, rainfall, temperature, winds, vegetation, land use, ethnology, density of population, minerals, industries, and transportation of each nation; street maps of the major cities; eight historical maps; and a 10-page index.

Birds' Nests in Their Beards. By William Stevenson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964. 280 pp. $4.50.

Mr. Stevenson, a Canadian journalist and author of a book on Red China, *The Yellow Wind,* provides an interesting account of the political scene and foreign policies of Sukarno's Indonesian regime from 1955 to 1963. He covers such pivotal developments as the army colonels' revolts in 1956-57 (in which the U.S. government was allegedly involved), the successful diplomatic-military maneuverings against West Irian, the "confrontation" against Malaysia, and the gradual drift of Sukarno's Indonesia toward the communist bloc.

Ceylon. By S. Arasaratnam. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 182 pp. $4.95.

This volume in the Modern Nations in Historical Perspective series traces Ceylon's unique cultural heritage and identifies the legacies from three successive colonial powers—Portugal, the Netherlands and Britain. The author attempts to explain why nationalist feeling in Ceylon has been slow to develop in both the pre- and post-independence periods.

From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam. By Hoang Van Chi. New York: Praeger, 1964. 252 pp. $6.50.

A Vietnamese scholar, who was a nationalist in the 1930's, supported the Vietminh after 1945, and then, bitterly disillusioned, escaped from communist

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North Vietnam in 1955, has written a detailed inside story of the establishment of communism in the northern half of his country. The author traces the inter-war efforts of the Comintern to establish a communist party in Indochina and describes the manner in which the communists seized the initiative in the war against France after 1945. He shows how Ho Chi Minh and his associates paved the way for communist domination in the North, and examines at some length two aspects of communist control: thought reform and land reform.

A History of Southeast Asia. (Second edition.) By D. G. E. Hall. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964. 955 pp. $12.00.

Originally published in 1955, this history of Southeast Asia has been revised in the light of recent research, its scope has been expanded to include the history of the Philippines, and a final chapter has been added dealing with Southeast Asia in the 1950's. A companion *Atlas of South-East Asia,* with an introduction by Professor Hall, has been published simultaneously with this text.

Indonesia. Edited by Ruth T. McVey. New Haven: HRAF Press, 1963. 600 pp. $12.00.

The twelfth volume in the series, Survey of World Cultures, is a comprehensive survey of modern Indonesia, written by such leading scholars as Herbert Feith, Douglas S. Paauw, Karl J. Pelzer, G. William Skinner and Robert van Niel. There are chapters on physical and human resource patterns, Indonesian history, the nation's agricultural foundation, the transition from a colonial to a "guided" economy, the Chinese minority, the dynamics of "guided democracy," the enduring cultural tradition and modern literature.

Japan: Past and Present. (Third edition, revised.) By Edwin O. Reischauer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964. 323 pp. $3.45.

This widely acclaimed short history of Japan has again been revised and updated. Professor Reischauer, currently U.S. Ambassador to Japan, has revised his chapter on the U.S. occupation period and post-occupation Japan and has updated the chronological and bibliographical sections.

The Last Years of British India. By Michael Edwardes. Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1964. 248 pp. $5.95.

An objective account of the events preceding, during and following the independence and partition of the Indian subcontinent.

The Road to Pearl Harbor. By Herbert Feis. New York: Atheneum 1963. 356 pp. $1.65 (paper).

This is an unabridged paperback edition of a book which Professor Edwin O. Reischauer has predicted will "remain for some time the standard account of the diplomatic relations leading up to the war with Japan."

VII. Latin America

Colombia Today—And Tomorrow. By Pat M. Holt. New York: Praeger 1964. 209 pp. $5.50.

Mr. Holt, a staff member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

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briefly surveys Colombian history and describes the socio-economic setting before turning his attention to contemporary affairs. The national elections of 1962 and 1964, the important coffee export trade, and current projects aimed at social and economic development are discussed.

Continuity and Change in Latin America. Edited by John J. Johnson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. 282 pp. $6.75.

A collection of essays originally presented to a Conference on Continuity and Change in Latin America in January 1963 sponsored by the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies. The authors examine recent changes in the status and behavior of selected social groups including peasants, the military, labor, industrialists and intellectuals. Contributors include Richard Adams, Frank Bonilla, Lyle McAlister, Kalmen Silvert and Charles Wagley.

Economic Survey of Latin America, 1962. By the Department of Economic Affairs, Pan American Union, Organization of American States. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 444 pp. $8.50.

This annual survey contains data on the region's trade, balance of payments, production, and other sectors of the regional and national economies. The editors also analyze the data to measure each nation's progress toward achieving higher rates of growth in keeping with the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

Generals vs. Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America. By Edwin Lieuwen. New York: Praeger, 1964. 160 pp. $4.50.

An analysis and comparison of the military coups that have taken place in Latin America since 1962. The author examines the policies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations toward military coups, and seeks to show which new military governments are oriented toward or against social reform.

History of the Peoples of Trinidad and Tobago. By Eric Williams. New York: Praeger, 1964. 292 pp. $6.95.

Dr. Williams, the first prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, wrote this book to give his people an account of their history prior to independence in 1962. The economic, social and political problems of the new state are ascribed in large part to the evils of Spanish, French and British colonialism, and recent U.S. policy is also criticized. A bibliography of sources on the history of Trinidad and Tobago is included.

International Communism in Latin America: A History of the Movement, 1917-1963. By Rollie E. Poppino. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. 247 pp. $5.95.

This is the first volume in a series on Contemporary Latin America under the general editorship of John J. Johnson of Stanford University. The author analyzes the communist ideological appeal in Latin America, the activities of Latin American communist parties, the influence of the Soviet Union and the future of the communist movement in the area. The author, Professor of Latin American History at the University of California, Davis, was from 1954 to 1961 an Intelligence Research Specialist in the Office of Research and Analysis for the American Republics, Department of State.

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Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921. By Dana G. Munro. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 533 pp. $12.00.

A prominent U.S. scholar and former State Department official challenges the widely-held belief that selfish interests of American businesses dominated U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean during the first two decades of this century. He argues instead that the fundamental purpose of U.S. policy was to create political and economic stability in this area so that U.S. security would not be endangered.

Mexican Government in Transition. (Revised edition.) By Robert E. Scott. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, Illini Books, 1964. 345 pp. $5.75 ($2.25 paper).

An analysis of trends and changes in the Mexican government since the Revolution of 1910. An epilogue has been added to update the original 1959 edition.

Religion, Revolution, and Reform. New Forces for Change in Latin America. Edited by William V. D'Antonio and Frederick B. Pike. New York: Praeger, 1964. 276 pp. $5.95.

This is a collection of essays and discussion by Latin and North Americans, such as Eduardo Frei, President of Chile, Mark G. McGrath, C.S.C., Bishop of Panama, and scholars Robert J. Alexander and Arthur P. Whitaker. They range over a variety of topics related to social reform and the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America. A thoughtful essay by Emilio Willems on Protestantism in Latin America is included.

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